Making Enemies, Creating Conflict:

Pakistan's Crises of State and Society

Edited by:
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Publisher:
Mashal
RB-5, Second Floor,
Awami Complex,
Usman Block, New Garden Town,
Lahore-54600, Pakistan

Telephone & Fax: 042-5866859
E-mail: mashal@mashal.edunet.sdnpk.undp.org

Title design:
Hasan Rasheed

Printers:
Maktaba Jadeed Press,
Lahore, Pakistan.

Price: 200/-

For Feroz Ahmed

remembered for his intellect and courage

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Introduction

It is increasingly common to ask whether Pakistan shall survive its next fifty years. Of course it will, for the land and the people who live on it shall always remain. The real question is: will we survive with or without dignity? Looking back at the last 50 years, it has been the latter. Citizens have grown weary of political leaders who have been heavy on rhetoric while stashing their plunder overseas, of an army that consumes the bulk of the nation's resources while national security becomes ever weaker, of a bloated bureaucracy which administers less as it grows larger, and of shrill proclamations of religiosity while people of all religions are murdered. But growing weary does not mean that change is at hand.

It is not in our tradition to be bold. In a culture as insurrectionary as Pakistan's where governments come and go, this statement may seem to be false. To oppose an Ayub, Bhutto, or Zia may well have been the need of the moment. But it did not, by any means, go far enough. Time after time, expectations for a brighter future have come to nothing because it was merely the symptoms, not the causes which were being attacked. The truth is that we have not thought through ideas about real change, which requires boldness, much less experimented with them, which requires courage of conviction going well beyond boldness. If the future is not to be as bleak as the past or bleaker, then it is time the people of Pakistan summon their intellect and courage to speak, regardless of the consequences, of what must be done to save

this country.

What Pakistan lacks is not good people, but a vision and shared ethos that can bring together its diverse social classes, linguistic, regional, and religious groups. Instead, feudalism reigns, religious fanaticism is on the rise, ethnic movements have resorted to brutal savagery, the population doubles every 25 years, the environment has become polluted, education is in shambles, and the rule of law has largely broken down. Blind to all these issues, our school books and the national media continue to preach hatred and divisiveness instead of the virtues of peace and equality.

What we need is a vision of a civilised society. This is necessarily one that is pluralistic and democratic, where each individual is free to believe what he or she chooses and where all are equal before the law, irrespective of status or power. It is only in a free society that the creative potential of individuals can be of benefit to society, and only a free society can breed true loyalty to it. This is the vision which must be propagated if Pakistan is to survive with dignity.

Ultimately, in any society, it is the power of ideas that brings about real change. Every major movement in history bears witness to the fact that once an idea takes firm root in the minds of people, change inevitably ensues. Sadly, given the intellectual bankruptcy of our universities, and the virtual absence of free debate outside the narrow confines of a few English language newspapers and magazines, there is little discussion of substantive issues. This makes it imperative that every opportunity be sought for discussing the urgent problems of Pakistani society clearly and honestly.

It was precisely the search for such an opportunity that resulted in the book that the reader now holds in his or her hands. Mashal Books, a small publishing organisation dedicated to increasing social consciousness, has held a number of

discussions in Lahore and Islamabad on issues of peace and conflict in Pakistani society. This particular book is the outcome of a seminar to which thoughtful people of intellect and integrity were invited for a 10-hour-a-day discussion for two days in Islamabad. The book has both English and Urdu versions.

We are grateful to the editors, Iftikhar Ahmed and Zia Mian, for compiling and editing the presentations; to the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung for arrangements for the seminar and partial support for publication of this book; to Khadim Hussain for logistical support; and, most of all, to the speakers and participants who made this seminar worthwhile.

Pervez Hoodbhoy

Mashal

The Roots of Violence

Eqbal Ahmad

Proliferation of violence has become the most serious social problem in Pakistan today. Not a week, often not a day, goes by without some terrible act of violence shaking public confidence in the state's ability to protect citizens, and reminding us that a serious decline in civility has occurred in this country. Officials announce ever stronger measures as the cure while citizens wonder over the causes which underlie our descent into insensate savagery such as the recent massacre of mourners in a Lahore cemetery. This essay is but one man's perspectives on the roots of contemporary violence in Pakistan.

I should begin with five simple observations: One, apart from war and aggression as defined under international law, nine forms of violence may be identified as among the most commonly observed world wide. The degree of their incidence differs in place and time. They are: domestic, criminal, official, ethnic, chiliastic, political (protest oriented), religious-sectarian, terrorist, and revolutionary violence. Often these forms overlap. For example, official violence can be as terroristic in nature as revolutionary and criminal violence. Officially sponsored death squads and foreign covert operations are examples. Similarly sectarian violence frequently takes terrorist

forms as Pakistan has been witnessing with some frequency. And revolutionary violence nearly always involves a combination of protest, terrorism, and warfare.

Two, of these forms of violence only one, the revolutionary type is not currently in evidence in Pakistan. Typically, revolutionary violence differs from the other forms in that it seeks system change and tends to be practised in a sociologically and psychologically selective pattern. The other eight forms not only prevail in Pakistan today but have also been on the rise in the last two decades. However, one should note that conditions for revolutionary violence have been gathering in Pakistan since the start in 1980 of the internationally sponsored Jihad in Afghanistan.

There are indications that we might be at the threshold of the outbreak of organised violence aimed at system change. If it does occur, it is unlikely to be selective in the manner practised earlier by the secular revolutionary movements in China, Vietnam, Cuba, or the Algerian struggle for independence. This lack of selectivity shall be ascribable to the fact that the perpetrators of revolutionary violence in Pakistan are likely to be religious and right wing organisations which have not set theoretical or practical limits on their use of violence. In the countries where Islamists have so far engaged in violence with revolutionary objectives, i.e. with the objective of system change, they have tended to be quite indiscriminate in its use. Contemporary Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt and, increasingly, Pakistan are examples.

Three, the convergence and accentuation of multiple forms of violence, such as now exists in Pakistan, has historically signalled the decline of the state, its legitimacy, ideological mooring, and institutional will and capacity to govern. Violence practising groups emerge as the weakened state's competitors. As such, in countries where the phenomenon persists the state gradually loses the attributes of authority, and anarchy ensues with power passing to a myriad

of militias, warlords, and other more or less lawless and predatory groupings. On a safe-to-critical scale of 1-10, Pakistan falls, in my estimation, somewhere between six and seven among contemporary states. In other words, it is not quite there but is moving perilously toward a critical zone from where it will take the state and society generations to return to a semblance of normal existence. When the critical point of near collapse is reached, the viability of statehood depends more on external than internal factors. In recent years, this development occurred in Lebanon, Somalia, Rwanda, and Liberia.

Four, durable and efficient governing structures and mechanisms often develop when there is a timely and meaningful response to the challenges posed by the enfeeblement of state institutions, and the growth of an environment of generalised violence. A meaningful response is normally one that is based on precise understanding of the roots of the violence and character of its perpetrators. It also requires a certain taming of the repressive instincts that favour augmentation in the coercive capabilities of the state as the best way to deal with augmented terrorism and crime.

The South Asian subcontinent experienced this process in the last century of Mughal power and the early years of British state formation in India. The Mughal did not respond in a creative and contemporary fashion to the challenge, and failed. The British developed contemporary institutions and legislated with care and caution, thus laying the foundations of a state which endured for more than a century. .

These considerations suggest that what Pakistan needs is a two-pronged policy pursued simultaneously: a carefully planned and methodically executed program of reform aimed at removing the root causes of the proliferation of violence in society, and improvement in the investigative, preventive and prosecutorial capabilities of security and intelligence agencies, and the administration of justice. The enactment of harsh laws

such as the recently enacted anti-terrorism law, and tolerance of extra-judicial practices such as murder in custody rarely contribute to solving the problem. More frequently they blur the distinction between law and crime.

Five, throughout history violence has served as a principal weapon of domination, and final arbiter of disputes and discontents. While social attitudes toward and actual expressions of violence have not significantly changed in many societies, modern technology has vastly altered the traditional equation of means and ends in the uses of violence. Countries and cultures which fail to narrow the gap between their traditional instincts and modern reality court the risk of self-destruction. Afghanistan is a case in point.

Afghanistan's was a warrior culture in which the tribal balance of power, the individual's social mobility, power shifts, and even the political economy were defined by groups' and individuals' mastery of violence. The 'Saur revolution', the religious uprisings against it, and super power involvement in the Afghan conflict transformed Afghanistan's arms environment. The instincts and styles of a warrior culture remained and became linked to modern technology. The outcome is the literal destruction of a country which had survived many violent challenges including three colonial wars, and countless local conflicts. A similar process was at work in Lebanon, and later in Somalia and Rwanda.

Culture and Violence

There are links between culture and violence in our society. In particular, between feudal culture and violence. Barring a few Pirs, the feudal order is rarely based on ideology or ascription. Nor, unlike capitalism, does it derive its strengths from a process of constant growth in productivity. What defines the feudal order above all is its mastery of violence. Its members practice it constantly, occasionally with some regard for local customs, and always with scant respect

for the law. Any *Hari* knows, as the Hari Commission so accurately described some six decades ago, that violence defines the relationship between lords and peasants. Any experienced district officer will tell you that among the powerful lords of rural Sindh, Punjab, Sarhad, and Baluchistan it is the will and integrity of the government that makes the difference between law and lawlessness, civility and violence. The law abiding feudal is an oxymoron.

In economic terms, feudalism is now only one of many forces in our society, and certainly not the ascendant one. But, the culture it bred over the century remains. Culture almost always persists after the hegemon is weakened and gone. The tenacity with which the colonial culture has, after decolonisation, held out and tightened its grip on Pakistan and India is a case in point. The persistence of feudal and colonial cultures is defined by the failure of the post-colonial elite to spawn alternative values and styles as foundations of a new culture. This challenge, Pakistan's small and excessively consumption driven, therefore cautious and west-obsessed, intelligentsia has largely ignored. In fact, while feudalism serves as the whipping boy of Pakistan's intelligentsia, to my knowledge not one serious study exists on the nature and extent of feudal power in Pakistan, and none to my knowledge on the hegemony which feudal culture enjoys in this country. Hence, the two cultures, feudal and colonial, continue to enjoy absolute hegemony, that is to say, their norms of behaviour and values are largely those of society.

An extra-ordinary example of the persistence of feudal culture is that in the last decade of the twentieth century the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan has forced open private jails; entire families have been liberated from bondage -- tortured and chained, women used, children misused. And, a remarkable detail: these liberations have been affected not by the state but by a private organisation. It is failures of this magnitude on the part of the state, and the elite that controls

it, that help sustain feudal values in our society.

At the expense of stating the obvious, I should note that these values are the contemporary inheritance not only of a class but of society as a whole. Until such time as the state intervenes to enforce laws, and the intelligentsia actively promotes non-violent values, the culture of violence shall continue to prevail. Rather, as social change continues at a rapid pace, traditional systems of social control become progressively dysfunctional, and the state's administrative machinery continues to erode, violence shall increase in its varied forms.

Violence has traditionally occupied a central and elevated place in our cultures. There are numerous manifestations of it in our social life. I shall mention only three: (i) the value we put on revenge, (ii) the violence against women which persists and has possibly increased and, (iii) our abuse of children.

Revenge is viewed by perhaps an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis as a natural sentiment. It is not merely accepted as normal in many areas of our social, political, and family life; rather, it is linked to the identity and honour of the individual, family, *biraderi* and tribe. Friends and relatives express solidarity when a man takes revenge while his adversaries proceed, more often than not, to avenge the avenger. To my knowledge, no annual statistics are compiled of revenge killings in Pakistan. Were it available the figure would run into the thousands.

Pick a day, and you are likely to find a manifestation. Recently, newspapers have been carrying horrifying accounts of revenge driven tribal killings in Sindh between, among others, the Ujjan and Jatoi, Kalarie and Kalhora, Bhayo and Brohis, Magsi and Talpur. Typically, the feud between the Magsi and Talpur started 25 years ago when a woman of the Talpur clan was murdered. The latest flare-up has entailed gun battles between the two; at least one innocent girl died recently

in the cross fire. A similarly old feud between the Bhaiyo and Brohis has cost not less than fifty lives in the last three years. Another fifty persons perished in the dispute between Jatois and Mahars. So goes, week after week, one continuing exhibit on the culture of violence. The latest is the revenge the Nawab of Bugti has visited upon his adversary the Kalpars with, so it appears, the connivance of the state. It is equally certain that while the Kalpar chief wanders homeless with his clan, he dreams of wreaking vengeance upon the Bugtis.[1]

As for domestic violence, wife beating is viewed by a large section of rural society as though it were a droit de seigneur. It is common also among urban dwellers especially in working and lower middle class milieu, and is known to persist among educated upper class families. "Wife abuse is a fairly common phenomenon in Pakistan", says an extremely balanced and wise "Report of the Commission of Inquiry for Women" of August 1997, "[it] is also indulged in not only by the husband but also by other members of the husband's family. It can take the form of slapping, beating, torture, mutilation and murder." One may safely assume that for the most part these acts of violence are an expression not so much of hatred as of habit and attitude. People regard violence as a bonafide instrument of attaining social and personal objectives.

Rape, especially gang rape, is becoming endemic in this country. It is equally likely that we are taking more notice of it. In the first nine months of 1997 over 100 women were reported to have been raped in Lahore alone; of these, 28 were victims of gang rape. Typically, the police registered only 35 of the over 100 rape cases reported to it in Lahore, a phenomenon that adds to the victims' inhibition against reporting. Actual instances of rape are estimated by human rights groups as being two-&-a-half to three times higher than those reported in the

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1 See for example: *Dawn*, November 26, 1997; January 1, 1998; January 7, 1998

press. This may be a conservative estimate as girls normally do not report even to their parents the molestation which they suffer at the hands of relatives and servants at home.

With painstaking and risky effort, women's groups and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) have been documenting the crime against women. HRCP estimates that nation-wide a woman is raped in Pakistan every three hours, and "nearly as many minors become victims as adults" .In a majority of instances they also suffered violent assault either before or after the crime. Many commit suicide as a certain shame and opprobrium attaches to the victim of rape in our society.

The ultimate form of violence against women -- murder and mutilation -- is widely accepted as a mechanism for restoring honour, a practice institutionalised in customs like Karo Kari, in areas of Sindh, Baluchistan, NWFP, and southern Punjab. To these have been added now a new horror, stove burning, of which spot hospital checks indicate victims in the thousands. Notable, as they relate with my argument on feudal culture, are two facts: (i) 80% of the violent crimes against women are committed in rural areas, 20 % in the urban; and (ii) almost all victims of the reported cases of sexual assault were working class women.[1] Since from their infancy children witness violence as an integral part of adult behaviour, males and females alike grow to accept it as a normal, even preferred, mechanism for achieving one's objective or affecting behaviour change. There are scant laws to treat domestic violence as crime, and the police are known to routinely discourage registration of cases in domestic crimes.

Violent treatment of children is even more common than that of women. 'Spare the rod, spoil the child' remains a central tenet of our upbringing of children. It is extravagantly interpreted and excessively practised in schools no less than in

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1 Dawn, October 29, 1997

homes. To be sure, physical abuse of children is less prevalent today in educated upper and middle class families than a few decades ago. It remains, nevertheless, widespread in other strata of society. In the absence of available data it is impossible to identify its comparative prevalence along class or rural/urban lines. For a host of reasons, including studies on Latin American countries, I surmise that among the urban working class, lower middle class, and lumpen-proletariat child abuse is as widely and excessively practised as in rural areas. In the religious schools (*madaris*), which have proliferated exponentially in the last two decades, pupils are routinely administered harsh and inhuman physical punishment. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan has exposed instances even of children being kept in chains, for months even years at a time. There exists a considerable body of literature indicating that abused children often become abusive and violent adults.

If they are serious about eliminating the high rate of violence and crime in Pakistan, the least that our governments can do is to legislate against these practices, and vigorously enforce the laws. Laws, after all, are not merely links between crime and punishment. They also set the moral and behavioural standards for citizens of this and coming generations. Yet, the sensitivities of our ruling establishment are such that during nearly a decade of representative governments not one government has deemed it important to repeal a dictator's laws - the *hudood*, *qisas*, *diyat*, and blasphemy laws are prime examples, which devalue the humanity of women and minorities in our society, promote retrograde attitudes, and invite murder, mutilation and communal violence.

I have not spoken to one official, in this government or the last, who was willing to defend these laws and practices. To the contrary, all have found them, as any sensible and humane person would, repugnant and harmful to society. Yet, even this government, which commands a majority large enough to

repeal constitutional amendments, has failed so far to act on a single of the many sensible recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry for Women which was headed by an eminent jurist, Mr. Justice Aslam Zahid of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. This failure is of course another surrender of responsibility to opportunism, a phenomenon not uncommon in politics anywhere. So the responsibility falls ultimately upon us. The government's inaction underlines, among other factors, the absence of organised opinion strong enough to counter the loud pressures of right wing religious groups whose archaic and imagined perspectives on Islam, commonly described by contemporary scholars as Islamism - conform neither to the tenets of religion nor to the needs of society.

Faith and Violence

The violence of Islamism has emerged as a subject of anxious concern throughout the world, especially the Muslim world. Countries, such as Algeria and Egypt, are virtually in a state of civil war between Islamists of differing hues and secular, regrettably authoritarian, governments. Among these countries, Pakistan is distinguished in several ways:

1) It is the original staging ground of Jihad as an international movement.

2) Unlike Algeria and Egypt it has had a parliamentary system of government with four elections since 1988 in which the Islamic parties' share of the vote has been declining.

3) Unlike Algeria and Egypt where Sunni majorities predominate, Pakistan is a multidenominational country where the non-Sunni constitute an estimated quarter of the population. Furthermore, even the Sunni are divided by theological disputes, the one between the Barelvis and Deobandis is the primary example, which have tended to turn violent. Hence, there is a proliferation here of violence. So far we

have witnessed the mutual terror of Sunni and Shia, of Sunni groups against Christians and Ahmedis, and killings across the Barelvi-Deobandi divide.

4) Pakistan remains Islamism's 'front-line state', so to speak. The war in Afghanistan continues and, in multiple ways impacts on the internal developments in this country.

5) Pakistan's is an ideologically ambiguous polity; here, political paeans to Islam have served as the compensatory mechanism for the ruling elite's corruption, consumerism and kow-towing to the west. As a consequence, the ideologically fervent Islamist minority keeps an ideological grip on the morally insecure and ill-formed power elite. It is this phenomenon that explains the continued political clout of the extremist religious minority even as it has been all but repudiated by the electorate.

From the bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad to the recent massacre on Macleod Road, this country is strewn with innocent victims of Islamist extremism. Yet, these tragedies have barely caused any reflection in this country, and others whose policies sowed the seeds of the so-called 'Islamic terror'. The truth is that as a world-wide movement, Jihad International Inc., is a recent phenomenon, a modern, multi-national conglomerate whose founders include the governments of USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel. It was the American sponsored anti-communist crusade in Afghanistan that revitalised, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the notion of Jihad as the armed struggle of believers. Israel's invasions and occupation of Lebanon, the West Bank, Gaza, and Golan continue to invest it with moral meaning and give it added impetus.

In the United States, the Islamic resistance to Israel's occupation of Lebanon, the West Bank, Gaza, and Golan and

such incidents as the alleged plot to blow up the International Trade Centre in New York City, have aided the media and other propagandists' politically motivated campaign to demonise Muslims and Islam as a threat to western interests and civilisation itself. Their motivation is suspect as it condones Israel's U.S. aided violence on an enormously larger scale while condemning Arab resistance to it. It is suspect also because, as we shall presently discuss, the United States and Europe have played a historic part in spawning the violence of groups and individuals they now denounce, rather brazenly, as "Islamic fundamentalist". The U.S. and European countries largely withdrew from the enterprise after their interests had been served, while the native peoples among whom they promoted the violent ideological enterprise are continuing to pay the heavy price of it.

Never before in this century had Jihad as violence assumed so pronounced an 'Islamic' and international character. The twentieth was a century of secular Muslim struggles. The Ottomans fought their last wars in essentially temporal terms, in defence of a tottering empire and, at least in the Middle East, against predominantly Muslim foes. From the rise of Saad Zaghlul to the demise of Abdul Nasser, the Egyptian national movement remained secular and explicitly Arab and Egyptian. This was equally true of the Iraqi, Syrian, Palestinian, and Lebanese national struggles. The Turks attained their liberation under the banner of intemperate secularism. Iranian nationalists fought and forged a Belgium-like constitution at the start of this century. In India, Muslim nationalism, opposed by an overwhelming majority of Indian Ulema, defined the demand and achievement of Pakistan. All these movements had some resonance among other Muslim peoples who were similarly engaged in anticolonial struggles but none had an explicit pan-Islamic context.

Jihad, noun, to struggle, from the Arabic root verb J.D., to strive, was nevertheless a favoured word among Muslims in

their struggle of liberation from colonial rule. When my brother was expelled from school after raising the nationalist flag, he was welcomed in our village as a *mujahid*, one who struggles. In the Maghrib, Algerian nationalist cadres who engaged France in an armed struggle for seven gruelling years were called Mujahideen, and their news organ was named El - Moudjahid. This newspaper was edited for a time by Franz Fanon, a non-Muslim, and the struggle was led by a secular organisation, Front du Liberation National (FLN). In Tunisia, the national struggle was led by Habib Bourguiba, a die-hard and Cartesian secularist who enjoyed nevertheless the title of Mujahidul-Akbar. The word Jihad did occasionally appear as a mobilising slogan of the 1978 Iranian revolution but Enghelab, revolution, actually dominated as the symbol of the uprising against the Shah. After seizing power Iran's revolutionary government adopted Jihad-i-Sazindazi, jihad for reconstruction, as its mobilising symbol. Without a significant exception, Jihad was used during the twentieth century in a national, secular, and political context until, that is, the advent of the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan.

For the first time in this century the standard bearers of a Muslim peoples struggle for liberation were Islamic parties opposed to "godless communism", committed to its violent overthrow, and dedicated to the establishment of an "Islamic state" in Afghanistan. Theirs was a Jihad in the classical, strictly theological sense of the word. Ironically, they had the support of western powers as no liberation movement ever did. The United States and its allies supplied to the Mujahideen an estimated ten billion dollars worth of arms and aid.

They also invested in this Jihad the legitimacy of their enormous power, and the lustre of their media made glory. On one especially memorable occasion when Afghanistan's hard line Islamist visited the White House, President Ronald Reagan described them as the Muslim world's "moral equivalent of our founding fathers". Similarly, the American and European

media played up the war in Afghanistan as the greatest story of the eighties. Foreign correspondents combed the Hindu Kush for stories of 'Mooj' heroism. Competition for Jihad narrative was so great that in one instance a major network, CBS, paid handsomely to film a staged battle between Islam and Communism. As the western media carries great importance and authority in the third world, its Afghanistan war coverage made an enormous impact especially on Muslim youth.

Within a year of the Soviet intervention, Afghanistan's was on its way to becoming a pan-Islamic Jihad. Hundreds, eventually thousands, of young Muslims from places as far apart as Algeria and the Philippines, Sudan and Sinkiang travelled to Peshawar and Torkham, received training in the use of arms, and under the strict guidance of various Islamic parties became ideologically ripe and tasted more or less of the Jihad-in-the-path-of-God. The United States government and its vaunted intelligence agency.saw in this process a cold war opportunity to pit militant Islam against communism. Had the Soviet Union not collapsed unexpectedly, it is likely that the United States shall still be benefiting from this historic mobilisation of jihad.

We knew of the violent pan-Islamic character which the Afghan war was assuming with American sponsorship. But no country, not Algeria, not Egypt, protested the participation of their nationals in a distant war. Pakistan was hospitable to a fault while all watched casually, then looked the other way until, that is, the chickens of Afghan insurgency returned home to roost. I found in 1986, for example, that Egyptian intelligence had an effective presence in Peshawar and excellent information on the demography of Jihad. They were merely keeping a watchful eye. America, after all, was an ally and benefactor; they could not interfere with its agenda. The demands for extradition started to reach Pakistan from Algiers and Cairo only after the U.S. had cashed in its investments in Afghanistan, and the gates of hell had broken loose in Algeria

and Egypt. But whom can Pakistanis request to rid their country of the thousands of armed zealots their government has nurtured, and continues to nurture?

The Jihad's pan-Islamic dimension was a historically new phenomenon. Since the great crusades in the Middle Ages Jihad had not crossed cultural, ethnic, and territorial boundaries. Pan-Islamism did emerge briefly as a movement in the nineteenth century, its banner having been raised by such ideologues as Jamal al-Din Afghani and warriors such as Syed Ahmed Shaheed. At the climax of this pan-Islamic drive, India's Muslims launched into the Khilafat Movement to save the Ottoman Caliphate. Khilafat's leaders, the Ali brothers, did often describe their movement as a Jihad. But this was a non-violent agitation supported by such non-Muslim pacifists as M. K. Gandhi and frowned upon by Mohammed Ali Jinnah who later founded Pakistan. More to the point, it had negligible pan-Islamic resonance. Arabs, Iranians, and Turks alike viewed it as an eccentric, uniquely Indian phenomenon.

Pan-Islamism survived only as an abstract agenda of a microscopic minority of Muslim intellectuals. Its influence showed in the works of some modern writers and poets including Mohammed Iqbal. The generalised sentiment of Muslim affinity on which pan-Islamism relied was real nevertheless and from time to time manifested itself in people's expressions of solidarity with co-religionists in Palestine, Bosnia etc. Yet, the national struggles of Muslim peoples remained national, and pan-Islamism endured only as an inchoate sentiment of solidarity.

By contrast, with the Afghanistan war pan-Islamism grew on a significant scale as a financial, cultural, political and military phenomenon with a world wide network of exchange and collaboration. Myriads of institutions, madaris, Islamic universities, training camps and conference centres, came into being in Pakistan and other places. Sensing its enormous opportunity, traders in guns and drugs became linked to the

phenomenon creating an informal but extraordinary cartel of vested interests in gun, gold and god.

Transnational involvement in the Jihad not only reinforced links among Islamic groupings, it also militarised the conventional religious parties. Pakistan's Jamaat-i-Islami is an example. Until their involvement in Afghanistan it was a conventional party, cadre- based, intellectually oriented, and prone to debate and agitation rather than armed militancy. Today it commands, outside Pakistan's army and rangers, perhaps the largest number of battle hardened and armed veterans. In 1948-49, its chief ideologue, Maulana Abul Ala Maududi had rejected, on theological grounds, the notion of Jihad in Kashmir. Today, his party openly boasts of its militant involvement there. In effect, while the U.S. government and media blamed Iran as the source of organised Muslim rage, armed Islamic radicalism was actually nurtured in Ziaul Haq's Pakistan with American funding and the CIA's help.

In recent years, other conventional Islamic parties, the Jamiat-e-Ulama-i-Islam and Jamiat-e-Ulama-i-Pakistan. have also been militarising, thanks to their linkages with the Taliban, thanks also to their involvement in Kashmir. In addition, other armed sectarian groupings, the Sipah-e-Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Harakatul Ansar, Sipah-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Tayba, Anjuman-e-Sarfaroshan-e-Islam, have emerged to menace society no less than the state. They are all sectarian formations, apparently a far cry from Islamism as expounded by the older religious parties such as the Jamaat-i-Islami and JUI. Yet the fact remains that their antecedents lie with these parties, and they draw sustenance from the neighbouring wars which are cast in Islamic terms.

The Battle for the Muslim Soul

The birth of Jihad International coincided with another development which has had a particularly unwholesome effect on Pakistan. Following the prolonged hostage crisis during

which Iranian radicals held American diplomats captive in Teheran, a contest began between two versions of political Islam, one conservative and the other radical. One was sponsored by Saudi Arabia and, until 1988, Iraq; the other was supported by Iran.

While the United States was involved in this development its logic was essentially regional. Iran's revolutionary Islamists were quite uncompromising in opposing the U.S. as an imperial power, and in their rejection of monarchy as an un-Islamic form of government. As a pro-U.S. conservative kingdom, Saudi Arabia felt threatened by Iran. Riyadh was quick to counter Iran's proselytising zeal and was supported in this mission by such Gulf sheikhdoms as Kuwait. With the start of the Iraq-Iraq war in 1981, Saddam Hussein's secular government joined in the theocratically cast campaign against Iran. Islamic organisations all over the Muslim world became beholden to one or the other side of this divide.

In countries with mixed Sunni-Shia population such as Lebanon, Pakistan and Afghanistan, this development had the greatest impact as sectarian groups and individuals found new incentive to arouse old hatreds. Neither the Americans, nor Saudis and Iraqis may have intended to arouse anti-Shia feelings. They were merely interested in promoting their brand of conservative Islam to counter Iran's growing appeal. But in local terms anti-Iran was easily translated into anti-Shia.

The Sipah-e-Sahaba is one such product of this process in Pakistan. It was first funded by Saudis; later Iraq stepped in. The terror and counter-terror which followed have involved murders of Iranian diplomats and trainees, American technicians, and ordinary folks in mosques, imambarahs and, most recently a cemetery. Battles for soul often degenerate into a hankering after body counts.

Stranded Between Past and Future

Without doubt, the Islamist and sectarian formations owe

much of their contemporary elan, proliferation and armed militancy to the internationalised and "victorious" Jihad in Afghanistan, and to the covert warfare between Iran and its detractors. It should be noted, however, that these international factors would not have yielded such lush growth nationally had they not found fertile soil in Pakistan, Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Lebanon, or Palestine. As the case of Pakistan under Ziaul Haq and Algeria under the Junta suggests, the growth as well as limits of Islamism are defined by local factors. In Lebanon and Palestine, as in Afghanistan during the Soviet intervention, Jihad became identified with resistance to foreign occupation.

Jihad International Inc. and the contestation between Iran and its detractors developed at a time when the Pakistani environment was particularly hospitable to religious activism. General Mohammed Ziaul Haq had inaugurated the process of "islamisation" which had aroused anxieties among minorities including the Shia minority of Pakistan. One response from it was the formation of the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-e-Fiqah-e-Ja'fariyya (TNFJ) which demanded that Shia be subject to their own Fiqh, a comprehensible demand which nevertheless served to arouse the Sunni die-hard. The Sipah-e-Sahaba followed on the heels of TNFJ.

In Pakistan's multi-denominational environment the proposal to construct the state, its laws, and institutions according to religious injunction was necessarily viewed as a differentiating, discriminatory agenda. Zia's Islamisation, like Z.A. Bhutto's consignment of Ahmedis to minority status, served as a framework for dividing this country and pitting its diverse people against each other. This had to be so particularly in a Muslim society. For our history is seeped in centuries of theological, often violent disputes, a point that is lost even on the current crop of politicians who have been witnesses to the pointless killing and dying of the last decade and a half.

Religious sectarian was an inevitable outcome of "Islamisation". There is first of all the simple insight that appears to have escaped several generations of politicians and soldiers of Pakistan: When a state claims a theocratic mission, it is bound to provoke conflicts over whose model shall prevail. Secondly, when religion is pushed explicitly into politics it becomes a currency of power. Any one who can uses religion to garner support and undercut actual or potential rivals. To verify this, one may need count only the number of religion wielding newcomers in national and local politics since Zia's Islamisation began. The most virulent hate-mongers of today also belong to his era.

Once religion becomes a hard political currency it has to be deployed in the political arena by means fair and foul. Those aspirants in politics who lack other political capital, large land holdings, modern education, industry, family connection, are likely then to use religion the more, and most virulently. It is not surprising then that the Sipah-i-Sahaba and its off shoot Lashkar-e-Jhangvi were born in Jhang. There, Shia landowners have traditionally held power. Economic changes in the last four decades have, nevertheless, produced a new middle class which is compelled to compete with the traditional power holders. The SS's new middle class leaders were keen to dislodge the old. The ideological environment of 1980s compelled them to deploy anti-Shia Islam in their battle. The logic of escalation is integral to ideology of hate; the results are before us.

There are other less obvious factors at work. The most important of these may be the highly skewed relationship that exist in contemporary Muslim societies between the past and the future. Throughout history, there has existed an ironic connection between them: Those who glorify the past and seek to recreate it almost invariably fail while those who view it comprehensively and critically are able to draw on the past in meaningful and lasting ways. People who have confidence in

their future approach the past with seriousness and critical reverence. They study it, try to comprehend the values, aesthetics, and styles which invested an earlier civilisation its greatness, or conversely, caused it to decline. They preserve its remains, enshrine relevant values, and draw enrichment from the images and events of the past both collectively and individually.

By contrast, peoples and governments with an uncertain sense of the future have distorted engagements with their past. They eschew lived history, shut out its lessons, shun critical inquiry into the past, neglect its remains but, at the same time, invent an imagined past, shining and glorious, upon which are super-imposed the prejudices and hatreds of our own time. The religious-political movements of South Asia and the Muslim world bear witness to this truth.

In this region, both Hindus and Muslims of right wing persuasion view history in ways that arouse sectarian hatred. Thus for decades many Muslims viewed the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb as symbolising the strengths and virtues of Muslim rule in India. On their part, Hindu nationalists presented the Maratha chief Sivaji as an embodiment of Hindu resistance to Muslim rule. In reality, both were tragic figures out of synch with their own history, signalling the decline of Indian statehood, and the rise of a European empire in India. In this instance, as most recently in the Babri mosque affair, history became a casualty of communal myth making.

In the summer of 1990, I visited Ayodhya and Mathura while researching the campaign which militant Hindu movements, BJP, VHP, RSS, and Bajrang Dal, had launched to demolish the Babri Mosque and build a temple on the site which they claimed was the real birth place of Lord Rama two thousand years ago. I was amazed at two features of this campaign. The Hindu revivalists had put out an enormous body of publications and 'educational material' on the alleged excesses of Muslim rule in India, and Hindu resistance to it.

Apart from books, colourful posters illustrated in graphic detail the presumed atrocities and heroism of the Hindu-Muslim encounter in India. Narratives in prose and songs were also available by the dozens on audio cassettes. I felt overwhelmed by the sheer volume of invented, poisonous, history. To their lasting credit, the most eminent among India's historians have consistently debunked the revivalists' version of history. When I mentioned this to him, M.R. Malkani, a BJP ideologue, was unsparing in his judgement of these historians: "*Inn historians kay liye Hindustan men koi asthan naheen hai.*"

The same attitude towards a critical history has been prevalent in Pakistan since the 1970s, when Pakistan Studies was introduced as a compulsory subject in schools and colleges. Through this, a distorted and sectarian version of history is fed to the overwhelming majority of children and youth who are not privileged to travel the O and A level road. During the decade of Mohammed Ziaul Haq's rule the trend toward sectarianising the educational system advanced to the point that Sunni and Shia were assigned separate Islamiyat syllabus, a practice which continues today. While they issue daily denunciations of sectarian politics, our government officials have retained the sectarian, hate-mongering syllabus in schools and colleges.

The differences between Pakistan and India are, nevertheless, worth noting. One is that during crucial periods of our history, governments have favoured sectarian elements, and actively discouraged historical research, instruction, and inquiry. The other significant difference is that because our institutions of higher learning sharply deteriorated and our insecure rulers, Mohammed Ziaul Haq occupies the highest place in this pantheon, needed the crutch of invented history, in Pakistan historians did not thrive. History and culture, including Islamic culture and history, ceased as a subject of serious study.

In fact, few subjects have suffered greater distortion in Pakistan than Islam and Muslim history. Here, Islam and its history have been invoked for more than four decades. Yet, throughout these years neither religion nor history have been accorded serious attention by the state or society. I know of not a single noteworthy work on these subjects to have been published in Pakistan. The curriculum of Islamiyat, a compulsory subject in our schools and colleges, is almost entirely devoid of a sense of piety (*taqwa*), spiritualism (*roohaniyat)*, or mysticism (*tassawuf*). At best it is cast in terms of ritualistic formalism. At worst, it reduces Islam to a penal code, and its history to a series of violent episodes.

The well springs of righteous ignorance have deepened in Pakistan as they did in Algeria where, following decolonisation in 1962, false attempts at "indigenisation" yielded parallel systems of education, one French and the other Arabic, one modern and the other traditional. It is largely the products of the two systems that have been at war since 1992. This war has by now cost some 70,000 lives and continues to inflict enormous suffering on Algeria and its people. In Pakistan, the last two have been decades of dramatic expansion of the *madaris* which continue to receive generous government subsidies and undetermined amounts of funding from abroad. According to the Ministry of Education, in 1995 there were 3706 such madaris in Pakistan with an enrolment of 540048. The figure of enrolment in the higher levels of study, 80051 male, 4738 female, is notable for its social and political implications. After 12-18 years of study, these young people are unprepared for any profession except to serve as imams in mosques or yearn for an Islamic state in which they shall presumably constitute the governing elite.

Commentators in the press often characterise these as 'medieval institutions' which is an outright insult to the medieval Muslim civilisation. Spot checks at several such institutions reveal that their curricula and instruction bear little

resemblance to such medieval centres of learning as al-Azhar in the 12th, Zaituna in the 13th, or the Qarawiyyin in the 14th centuries. None of the subjects that were part of the core program of studies in the Islamic centres of learning, e.g. mathematics, chemistry, botany, astronomy, and philosophy, are taught in the contemporary madrassah. They have not and are not likely to produce the al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Sheikh Saadi or Amir Khusro of the contemporary Muslim world. Their curriculum reduces Islam to a penal code, a ritual of ablutions and prayers, and a litany of sins crimes and their here and now punishments. Thousands of energetic and motivated youth who graduate from these institutions are men abandoned in the middle of the ford, cut off from their real past, totally unprepared to meet the challenges of the future, and fevered by the dreams of a religious polity.

They too can produce a history of sorts, of sectarian gangs setting out to purify the country, and create the Islamic order which they imagine they are equipped to run. The Taliban, graduates themselves of Pakistani madaris, have emerged as the role model of most students and alumni of our religious and secular schools and colleges. More ominously estimates of Pakistanis who have fought with the Taliban vary from 10,000 to 15,000.[1] Overall, the number of armed Islamist militants in Pakistan is estimated at 40,000-50,000, many of them veterans of wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

Many wanted Pakistani terrorists find sanctuary in Afghanistan, a fact that only occasionally becomes public. Qari Allah Wasaya who was believed to have led the jail break in Dera Ghazi Khan, is reported to have told police investigators that he had been summoned from a Harakat-ul-Ansar camp in Afghanistan to free his fellow terrorists. The massacre in the Mominpura cemetery on January 11, 1998 was an anniversary

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1 A. Rashid; Afghan Conflict Eroding Stability in Pakistan, *The Nation*, January 21, 1998

commemoration of the bomb blast which killed a founding father of the Sipah-e-Sahaba. It is understood also to be linked to Mr. Allah Wasaya's death in police custody. In turn, the protestors against the massacre attacked and burned the office of Lahore's deputy commissioner and the post master. This chain of events, like some others, symbolised the contradictory ways in which the state is implicated in the cycles of sectarian violence.

An Umbrella over South Asia's Savage Exchange

Pakistani and Indian officials routinely blame RAW and ISI respectively whenever a particularly heinous terrorist attack or atrocity occurs in either country. A decade ago these accusations did not fly with such frequency. That they do, reflects a certain reality which is that the pace of proxy warfare between India and Pakistan has increased. At various times, Pakistan has suspected India of aiding Afghan sabotage attacks of the 1980s, the ethnic strife in Karachi, and the religious sectarian violence across Pakistan. India has accused Pakistan of aiding Sikh militancy in the Punjab, Muslim militancy in Kashmir, and terrorist bombings in Bombay and Delhi. Independent observers believe that there is a significant measure of truth in these allegations.

The fact that both India and Pakistan have developed nuclear weapons capability may have much to do with their increased engagement in proxy warfare. We know this phenomenon from the cold war years. The United States and the Soviet Union used the condition of nuclear deterrence to wage wars of intervention and undermine each other by aiding and abetting dissidents, rebels, and revolutionaries in each other's spheres of power. In Iran, Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, and Middle East produced confrontations between the two giants; the threat of nuclear war defused them, confirming the premises of nuclear deterrence. India and Pakistan appear to have fallen for this logic of deterrence.

As countries in transition, subject to the instabilities and tensions of rapid social change, without the benefit of vast geographical separation, and lacking the elaborate system of command and control which was necessary to insure a relatively safe interplay of a mutual deterrence, they are dangerously exposed to miscalculation and misadventure. Yet, so far neither country's ruling élite seem to recognise the risks to which they are exposing themselves.

In conclusion, I should reiterate that violence in our society, as in most environments of accentuated violence, has multiple roots. These include (a) a culture of violence which persists while the traditional values and social processes which had limited its uses in an earlier time have been eroded by rapid and uneven social and economic changes; (b) injections of religion in politics and the theocratic promises which have had the effect of provoking sectarian divisions and demands; (c) U.S. sponsorship of an internationalised Jihad which provided the framework for proliferation of arms and sanctification of organised violence on religious grounds; (d) international and regional interests which have encouraged violent groupings to engage in proxy warfare; (e) an educational policy which breeds frustrated and ignorant armies of youth bred on literature of hate and violence; (f) a nuclear stalemate which has encouraged India and Pakistan to assume that they can support armed dissidents in each others country without incurring the risk of a wider war; (g) decline in the will and capacity of state institutions to investigate crime and enforce laws rationally and vigorously. The challenge, in other words, is too large and complex to be met by limited and half-hearted measures of crisis management

The Politics and Dynamics of Violent Sectarianism

Abbas Rashid

Understanding the rise of sectarianism in Pakistan must begin with the crisis of the liberal-democratic order that was envisioned for the country at the time of its creation. The political consensus underlying the establishment of this order broke down soon after the creation of Pakistan when East Pakistan was denied fair electoral representation. Instead of building a federal framework with a pluralist ethos that was implicit in its creation, Pakistan moved rapidly towards becoming a unitary, centralised state. The imposition of martial law in 1958 indicated the ruling elite was not willing to manage political and economic resources democratically. This resulted in the ethno-nationalist movement which led to the creation of Bangladesh and sub-nationalist movements in other parts of former West Pakistan.

A democratic order was eventually restored and so was a measure of political consensus, as illustrated by all the key political parties endorsing the 1973 Constitution. But, in practice, it turned out that there was little sharing of power by the executive, either with the other institutions of the state or

the leadership of the other provinces. There was a rise in the level of alienation in Baluchistan, NWFP and urban Sindh.

In 1977, an imperfect democracy was replaced by something worse: a military dictatorship that used religion to legitimise its rule. To some extent, the Zia regime's actions in this respect were a continuation of an elite tradition of manipulating religion for narrow political ends that dates back to the early years of Pakistan. Consider, for instance, Punjab Chief Minister Daultana's role in the 1953 Anti-Ahmadiya agitation, President Ayub's campaign against Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah in the 1962 elections using religion to question a woman's candidacy, or Bhutto's 'Islamic' concessions to save his government in the last days of his rule. But the Zia regime's contribution was qualitatively different from anything that preceded it. In seeking legitimation and a social base for his rule, General Zia's policies encouraged fundamentalism, strengthened its institutional base and provided a fertile base for sectarianism to grow and prosper.[1]

The less charitable would contend that this was always part of the plan of divide and rule by a junta that lacked a constituency. Creating this was a task that the Zia regime set about with great enthusiasm while it engineered a more divided polity. In Sindh, the MQM was supported if not created as the urban counterweight to the Pakistan Peoples Party, whose base was seen to lie in rural Sindh. Similarly, the deepening of sectarian divisions, a corollary of Zia's policy of using law and the state for privileging religion as understood by one sect, rendered it more difficult for a unified political opposition to emerge and civil society less likely to challenge the appropriation of the state by those who had no popular mandate to do so. It is no coincidence that the Tehreek-e-

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1 A. Rashid; Pakistan: The Politics of Fundamentalism, in *Internal Conflicts in South Asia*, eds., K. Rupesinghe and K. Mumtaz, Sage, 1996

Nifaz-Fiqh-Jafaria, the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and the MQM all emerged during General Zia's rule.

The sectarian and ethnic essentialism that came into its own in an organised, militant form in the Zia years now threatens the very fabric of society and poses an ever more serious challenge to the state. The dynamic of exclusion and minoritisation that had informed state policy, starting fairly early on with the Bengalis and moving to the Ahmadis in the 1970s, had moved under Zia from the periphery to centre-stage, as it were. The amended blasphemy law, the Hudood Ordinances, the public hangings and whippings created an ethos of brutality in which weaker sections of society became fair game by way of serving as instruments to establish the 'Islamic' credentials of the state as well as the 'privileged' claims of the more powerful mainstream sections of society. Religiosity rather than religion had been placed at a premium under Zia and had a significant bearing on the rise of a certain class to a point where it had access to the resources of the state and learnt to manipulate the levers of power.

Zia's rule fostered the growth of sectarianism in a number of ways. It created among the Shia community a perception that his government was moving rapidly towards the establishment of a Sunni Hannafi state in which the 'Islamisation' of laws was seen to reflect the 'Islam' of the dominant community. The 1980 'gherao' (siege) of the government Secretariat in Islamabad by tens of thousands of Shias protesting against the Zakat and Ushr ordinance was a clear indication of their apprehensions regarding Zia's 'Islamisation' project. The selective backing of the Afghan groups resisting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan again corresponded to a sectarian pattern of preferences that reinforced perceptions on both sides of the divide.

Under Zia, with the promulgation of the Zakat and Usher Ordinance of 1979, the religious establishment was considerable strengthened. On joining Zakat committees,

maulvis became responsible for distributing money to the poor. In rural areas, maulvis became Usher collectors and this changed their status considerably as it put them in touch with the district administration and local government. The government's decision to provide Zakat funds to madaris resulted in their mushroom growth. The induction of their graduates into government service created the prospect for upward social mobility rendering them a more attractive proposition. Meanwhile, they dove-tailed nicely into a system of recruitment and cadre-building on the part of politico-religious parties. Not least, Zia made it difficult for his divisive policies to be countered by systematically undermining institutions of state and society that had the potential to do so, such as political parties and the judiciary.

Organised Sectarianism and Sectarian Violence

By the end of Zia's rule the consequences of his policies were fairly obvious. Over the last decade there has been a major escalation in sectarian tension, the number of sectarian killings and armed sectarian groups. Among those that have gained particular prominence are the Sipah-i-Mohammad Pakistan (SMP), which is an off-shoot of the Tehrik-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria (TNFJ), the main politico-religious Shia party in Pakistan, later renamed the Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TFP); the Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba, later renamed the Sipah-e-Sahaba-Pakistan (SSP), an off-shoot of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), a leading politico-religious Sunni Deobandi party. A further off-shoot of the SSP is the even more militant Lashar-e-Jhangvi.

The present state of organised sectarian conflict can be traced to the murder of TNFJ leader Arif Hussain Al-Hussaini in 1988. Others date it to 1987, when Ahl-e-Hadith leaders, Allama Ehsan Elahi Zaheer and Maulana Habib ur Rehman Yazdani, were killed, along with six others, at a meeting near the Minar-e-Pakistan. Prior to this there were serious anti-Shia riots in Lahore in 1986. In any case, the spiral of violence

registered a sharp rise in February 1990 with the murder of Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, founder of the SSP. This was followed by violent clashes resulting in dozens of casualties and burning down of numerous houses and shops in Jhang. In December that year, Iran's Counsel General in Lahore, Sadeq Ganji, was killed and the phenomenon of sectarian violence in Pakistan began to receive international attention.

By 1992 it was clear that the SSP had access to sophisticated arms, had acquired the ability to use them and could do so even against the law enforcment agencies. In June of that year, a rocket launcher was used by its militants in an attack that killed five policemen. In terms of militancy and defiance of the state the SMP is not far behind. An attempt by police to storm the SMP Headquarters in Thokar Niaz Beg on the outskirts of Lahore resulted in the loss of about five police vehicles and a hasty withdrawal. SMP activists involved in serious crimes fled from police custody in Bahawalpur in May 1996. The fleeing persons fired rockets at the police chasing them.[1]

In Punjab, 1994 was one of the worst years in terms of sectarian violence when such incidents claimed 73 lives and more than 300 people were injured. Many of these killings were the result of indiscriminate firing on people saying their prayers. The chief minister at the time ordered a crackdown and more than 200 people were arrested. Many were later released at the intercession of the Milli Yakjeheti Council, created in March 1995. The level of violence also registered a decline that year, after the loss of 140 lives in February.[2]

In any case, the relief, of sorts, was to be short-lived. The latter half of 1996 saw bloody sectarian fighting in Para

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1 H. R. Shafi; Sectarianism, in *Crime Control: Role of Police and Socio-Political Forces*, NIPA, 1996

2 *State of Human Rights in 1995*, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 1996

Channar and parts of Kurram agency that left hundreds of people dead. The government machinery was found badly lacking yet again in its ability to deal with the issue. Two things were brought out most clearly as a result of these clashes. Firstly, the inability of the government machinery to anticipate trouble and identify and apprehend the key actors. Secondly, the administration in this case did not co-opt local elders and other influential people who might have helped diffuse the situation. The political agent for Kurram agency and the Assistant Political Agent for Upper Kurram were both non-Pakhtoons, and lack of communication between them and local peopel appeared to be a significant factor in their inability to move quickly enough to avert the clashes.

The resurgence of sectarian killings in the second half of 1996 indicated that senior government officials were also going to be targeted. Among those who were murdered were the Commissioner of Sargodha and the deputy commissioner of Khanewal. There were, in fact, fewer incidents but on average more people were killed per incident. Ten people were killed in indiscriminate firing at a mourning procession in Mailsi in Vehari district in July. The SSP was blamed for the incident. Twenty-two were shot dead in a Multan mosque during morning prayers in September. This time, the TJP was blamed.

Last year, 1997, saw no let up in the spate of sectarian killings. In January, a bomb blast at the Sessions Court left 30 people dead, including 22 policemen, a journalist and the SSP chief Zia-ur-Rehman Farooqi. In the same month, the Iranian Cultural Centre in Lahore was attacked and set on fire, while in Multan seven peopel were shot dead including the Iranian diplomat Muhammad Ali Rahimi. The death toll for 1977 had risen above 200 well before the end of the year.

The dead included senior government servants and foreign nationals. Among the government personnel killed was a secretary to the provincial government who was murdered near the civil secretariat in February, followed by the murder

of Guranwala's Senior Superintendent of Police, a brother-in-law of the interior minister. As for foreign nationals, apart from Mr. Rahimi, five personnel of the Iranian armed forces who were in Pakistan for training were murdered in September. These killings came at a time when the anti-terrorist legislation was being celebrated for its effectiveness by the Punjab administration

The attack on the Iranian Air Force officers was the second attack on Iranian officials in less than a year. It came at a time when relations between Pakistan and Iran were already at a low ebb due to conflicting interests in Afghanistan of the two countries. The Iranian foreign office claimed that the killings had occurred only because Pakistan's government had failed to punish the killers of the Iranian diplomat, Mohammed Ali Rahimi. Other foreign victims included four American executives murdered in November of that year. While this attack cannot be called a sectarian killing, it was part of the dynamic of violence that can be categorised as fundamentalist. It was certainly aggravated by the perceived high-handedness of the United States in particular, and the West in general, towards the Muslim world.

The pattern and scale of violence indicates some key features. The contending groups are well organised and well armed. Their ability to maintain their effectiveness and to elude the law enforcement agencies also has to do with an extensive support network that includes madaris, political parties, bases across the border, and financial support from foreign countries if not foreign governments. It is a fairly common belief in Pakistan now that something of a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia is going on in Pakistan, with different groups in Afghanistan weighing in as well.

The authority of the state has been challenged by the sectarian groups in various ways. Their hate literature and cassettes -- easily available across the country -- obviously violate the law of the land but seldom invite sanction. Offences

such as murder and destruction of property do get a state response but it lacks the will to take the difficult steps necessary to deal with the phenomenon. A narrow law and order approach, with a police force unequipped to deal with highly motivated, well trained and well organised militants, has obviously not had much of an impact, particularly when the latter have state of the art weapons. In any case, the organisations' decision to target state functionaries, and institutions such as the courts, is a clear indication that sectarianism is now no longer confined to a societal framework but informs state-society relations.

There is evidence of a considerable level of intimidation directed at state functionaries responsible for law and order. For instance, a Lahore Jail Superintendent, Syed Sibte Hassan Naqvi, was killed in September 1994 in what appeared to be retaliation for harsh treatment of prisoners of one sect. Similarly, judges of the lower judiciary, and even some of the Superior judiciary, are said to avoid hearing cases that involve sectarian violence and the more powerful sectarian groups. In November 1977, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Sajjad Ali Shah, was reported to have asked the registrar of the court to send him a list of all the judges who appeared to be avoiding such cases.

The increasing militarisation and brutalisation of the conflict has meant that there are virtually no sanctuaries left. Neither the home nor the mosque, nor the hospital. Not even the jail. And being innocent is not the issue. Just 'being' is enough -- being Shia or Sunni, Barelvi or Deobandi. And, of course, in the realm of secular divisiveness, being Sindhi or Mohajir or more often a Mohajir with one kind of political affiliation rather than the other. People have been killed while praying, while taking part in funeral processions and while sleeping in their homes.

One explanation for this is that in a situation where different sectarian groups are vying to prove themselves the

standard bearers of Islam one option is to stand out as being closer to 'true Islam' by displaying extreme hostility and intolerance to those designated as being un-islamic by virtue of belonging to religious minorities and minority sects.

The rise of militant sectarianism can also be viewed in terms of the quest on the part of a relatively deprived section of the population for a proximate identity, security in an environment in which the state cannot be relied upon, economic betterment, and a bid for political power. This is reflected in the profiles of sectarian activists put together by the police; they had little education, belonged to poor families, were young and mostly unemployed. A number of them had no religious education either and had never been to a madrassa.

Militant sectarianism may also be converging with militant ethnicity in certain ways. There is, for instance, some evidence to suggest that a level of interaction has come to exist between ethnic and sectarian organisations. According to a report published in an Urdu weekly, an armed group was arrested in Lahore in February 1996 and on 25 March the police brought three of them before the press. Fahim Bihari, Mohammad Asif and Asghar it turned out were members of the SSP as well as the MQM (Altaf). They had started off as members of the latter, but over time had been inducted by the SSP. They were provided with cassettes and inflammatory literature and offered a small amount of money, Rs. 2000-5000, for doing the group's bidding. They were to kill members of the rival sect. Allegedly, they started doing this in Karachi but then moved to Lahore, where they were eventually caught. The advantage to both sides of such an arrangement is obvious. The terrorists were able to evade the Sindh police by coming under the cover of a different organisation and operating in a different province. At the same time, the Punjab police was obviously going to find it difficult to track them down as they would be unknown in the province.

There may be deeper common aspects to the rise of ethnic

and sectarian militancy. Pakistan has by and large adhered to a doctrine of 'functional inequality' in terms of its approach to economic growth and development. This has created tensions among competing groups. This competition is further aggravated when these differences or divisions conform, or can be made to appear to conform, to distinct sectarian or ethnic identities. These identities may, in turn, be accentuated either as a matter of course or as the outcome of deliberate policies. For example, the ethnic conflict in Sindh serves to obscure class divisions between the respective communities, while in Jhang the sectarian conflict has superimposed an active sectarian identity on an existing divide between the landed elite and the middle and lower middle classes, including a strong presence of the bazaari element.

Sectarian and ethnic militancy may both be responses to the social pressures generated by a type of modernisation that results in alienation, marginalisation, and unemployment. The process disproportionately affects the young who are readily swayed by simplistic ideas and are quick to embrace a proximate identity in which they can feel more secure.

The case of Jhang, to which the present-day state of political violence and conflict can be traced in large measure, illustrates this phenomenon. Home base to the SSP, Jhang is located in a region that divides Central from Southern Punjab and still has a significantly high proportion of large land holdings, leaving feudalism relatively undisturbed. Most of the larger landlords belong to the Shia community and have dominated both society and politics. But, over the years Jhang has developed as an important *mandi* (market) town gradually increasing the power of traders, shopkeepers and transporters serving the rural areas. This class has been seeking a political voice and role and is now challenging the traditional feudal hold. The most potent political challenge, so far, has been articulated in the form of virulent sectarianism, with the formation in September 1985 of the ASS -- now SSP. This has

meant, however, that the contest for access to resources and status is not framed in terms of class divisions, or the imperatives of modernisation, but confrontationist sectarian identities.

This has created its own contradictions. In Jhang a sizable proportion of traders and shopkeepers have continued to fund the SSP. Though many no longer condone the violence associated with the party it is also now a matter of buying security. Nevertheless, there may have been some decline in their support for the SSP over recent years as a result of the economic consequences of sectarian strife.

Another feature shared by ethnic and sectarian groups is the way they project the local issue as part of a larger concern. The MQM, for instance, does not limit itself to the urban areas of Sindh and has switched from being the Mohajir Qaumi Movement to the Muttahida Qaumi Mahaz. Similarly, in the case of a sectarian group such as the SSP the local problem is consciously linked to the international arena of Shia-Sunni confrontation by reference to Iran and Saudi Arabia and the battle for the soul of the Muslim world.

Madaris

The institution of the madrassa needs to be considered in greater detail, given the impact it has had on the strength and salience of sectarian organisations and politico-religious parties in Pakistan. The role of the madaris is important in terms of providing the manpower to sustain the sectarian conflict and as an institution for reproducing the ideology in which such conflict has its moorings. Often these institutions themselves have a sectarian orientation which they impart to their students. Some of these institutions go further and impart military training.

Sometimes the state has been indifferent to this, and at other times consciously looked the other way, when it suited its purpose. The training of the Taliban in many of our

madaris is by now a well known fact. Whatever Inter-Services Intelligence and other concerned institutions of the state saw as the role of the Taliban in the context of the ongoing civil war in Afghanistan, it is not clear if they perceived with the same clarity the consequences of this policy within the country.

These madaris were supported by the JUI which is also linked to the SSP. At the same time the JUI is a mainstream political party with a relatively strong base in the provinces of Baluchistan and the Frontier. Its head, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, has been the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly under the Benazir government. It has now renounced the path of elections and seems to have joined the broader effort of politico-religious groups to attack democracy, which they can, unfortunately, argue has delivered very little to the common man. The case of the JUI provides a telling illustration of the links between madaris, mainstream politico-religious parties, sectarian organisations and representative institutions.

The rise in the number of madaris has been phenomenal. At the time of Partition, besides a few Shia madaris, there were 137 traditional Sunni madaris. By 1950, there were 210, and the number nearly doubled in a decade, reaching 401 in 1960. The number continued to rise, reaching 563 in 1971. Around this time the total number of big and small madaris was estimated to be at least 893 with more than 3000 teachers and more than 30,000 regular students.[1]

In 1979, a committee set up under the secretaryship of Mohammad Yusuf Goraya and commissioned by General Zia-ul-Haq estimated the number of madaris in Punjab as being

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1 N. Ahmad; Jaizah-yi-Madaris-i `Arabiyyah Islamiyyah Maghrabi Pakistan [A Survey of Arabic Madaris of West Pakistan] (Muslim Academy, 1972) pp.587 cited in Fazalur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition*, The University of Chicago Press, 1982, p. 42

over 1000.[1] Today, in Punjab alone, according to one estimate, the number of madaris exceeds 2,500. There are about as many spread throughout the rest of the country. The Barelvis have approximately 1200 institutions, the Deobandi about 1000. About 200 belong to the Ahl-e-Hadith. The Shias have about 100 institutions. Bahawalpur division has the highest number, about 900. D.G. Khan, Multan and Lahore divisions follow with nearly 400 for the former and over 300 for the latter two. Generally, Southern Punjab has the highest number of madaris. In all, these institutions are estimated to have about 200,000 students and their number is about evenly split between the Deobandi and Barelvi madaris with the former being in a slight lead.

Most of the students studying in these madaris are aged between five and eighteen. Most come from low income families in rural areas and semi-rural towns and cities. Among the prominent towns and cities in this regard are Kabirwala, Muzzaffargarh, Khanewal, Bhawalpur, Bhawalnagar, Leiah, Karor, Shuja Abad, and D.G. Khan.[2] According to a survey conducted by an agency of the Punjab Government, about 36% of the deeni madaris were getting financial aid from the government out of Zakat fund. The rest were being run by their organisations either using foreign funds directly provided to them by foreign countries/organisations or on the basis of regular subscriptions. Some of those getting funds from the government of Pakistan could also be getting funds from abroad.

Bahawalpur division provides an interesting insight into this dynamic. Here the government provides aid to less than a quarter of the madaris. It does not seem possible for them to generate much funding through local resources in this

1 Report Barai deeni madaris Pakistan' [Report with Respect to Religious Madaris Pakistan], Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan, 1979, p. 198

2 Agency Report, Government of Punjab, 1994, pp. 8-9

relatively economically depressed area. But it has a very large number of madaris. This suggests most sectarian madaris may no longer be in great need of government assistance. Former students and well off sympathisers settled abroad or in big cities seem to be providing funding.

The survey included an investigation into madaris involved in sectarian activity. In Sargodha, Faisalabad, and Rawalpindi, the percentage of such madaris is reported to be particularly high: 105 out of 149 in Sargodha, 87 out of 112 in Faisalabad and 90 out of 169 in Rawalpindi. In Bahawalpur, D.G. Khan and Multan it is closer to 25%, though it should be kept in mind that the absolute number of madaris here is higher. In Gujranwala and Lahore it is considerably lower, though the number of students is relatively high. Bahawalpur and Lahore in that order, account for almost 50% of the students of deeni madaris in Punjab, with approximately 64,000 and 42,000 students respectively.[1]

The madaris have also been consolidated as an institution in another manner. General Zia's government took a decision in 1984-85 to induct the graduates of deeni madaris into the education department as Arabic teachers in BPS-9, if they were in possession of a Wifaq-ul-Madaris degree. Every sect has its own Wifaq to which madaris belonging to its own school are affiliated. There is no official regulation or monitoring system for these Wifaq. The degrees are bestowed without any formal examination.

Besides the local students young people from about six Muslim countries were studying in these schools. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has gone on record as saying that some of these countries were funding terrorist organisations. He also said that there were demands of dispensing with government financial assistance to madaris, announced the closure of some

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1 Agency Report, Government of Punjab, 1994, p. 17 and Annexure

but then back-tracked. About 750 madaris were said to have a sectarian orientation. Around 100 madaris were imparting military training. Successive governments have talked of a 'foreign hand' fanning sectarian differences.[1]

Factionalism and sectarian militancy

Until the 1980s Pakistan had only three mainstream Sunni parties, the Jamaat-e-Islami, the Jamiat ul Ulema-i-Islam, and Jamaat-Ulema Pakistan. At this point a new set of militants entered the scene partly because of socio-economic conditions, partly through the factionalising of the existing politico-religious parties.

The JUP, a Barelvi politico-religious party split into five groups. The Sunni Tehreek in Karachi is the largest of these. It is headed by Maulana Saleem Qadri. Another big faction is the Dawat-e-Islami headed by Maulana Ilyas Qadri (former Punjab president of Anjuman Tulaba-e-Islam, the JUPs youth wing). Another smaller group is the Punjab Sunni Tehreek. In 1982, Maulana Ilyas Qadri declared himself Amir-e-Ahle-Sunnat and founded the organisation in Karachi. Until 1994 the Dawat held its annual congregation in that city but since then it has become more active in Punjab and the congregation is now held in Multan for the last three years. The DI puts its own strength of activists at over 100,000. The DI runs scores of madaris all over the country. It is planning to set up an Islamic university in Karachi. Another breakaway faction of the JUP is run by Allama Tahir-ul-Qadri. Apart from the Minhaj-ul-Quran which is a forum for teaching the Quran. the political wings of his establishment are Jamaat-e-Ahl-e-Sunnat and Tehreek-e-Tahaffuz-e-Namoos-e-Risalat.

According to the Barelvi ulema the Deobandi sect was a minority until 1970. Subsequently, Maulana Mufti Mahmood's government in NWFP patronised Deobandi mullahs and

1 M. Zaman, Blood, Sweat, and Tears; *Dawn Review*, September 11-17

appointed them to head official mosques which were looked after by the provincial Muslim Auqaf (Trust). This led to the growth of Deobandi madaris in NWFP (from where the Taliban derive their strength). General Zia also patronised Deobandis, and Saudi Arabia helps them financially. All this has led the Barelvis to come up with a response.

The JUI was split into the Sami, the Darkhwasti and the Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman groups. Later the SSP was founded. A number of other factions also emerged from the base of the JUI. Among them were the Tahaffaz-e-Khatm-e-Nabwwat under Maulana Khan Muhammad of Kundian Sharif and the Harkat-ul-Ansar under Maulana Saadat Ullah Khan. The latter's involvement in Kashmir and Afghanistan is well known. The relationship between the JUI and the other factions (as in similar cases of breakaway groups) is not necessarily one of sustained antagonism. This is illustrated by Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman's volunteering to negotiate with the Harkat when it was alleged that it was the organisation responsible for the kidnapping of the five foreigners in Kashmir. It may at times may be more of a division of labour arrangement wherein the primarily political is separated from the primarily militant so that each side can work effectively in its own sphere.

The SSP, of course, has emerged over the years as one of the key militant factions. It was established by Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, Maulana Zia-ur-Rehman Farooqi, Maulana Eesar-ul-Haq Qasmi and Maulana Azam Tariq in 1985. It now organised in virtually all 32 districts of Punjab. Its reported number of workers is over 100,000.

The Jamiat Ahle-Hadith split up as well. The Jamaat Ahle Hadith was founded by Maulana Habibur Remain Yazdani and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Ahle e Hadith by Maulana Abdul Qadeer Khamosh. Another significant faction is the Al-Dawah-wal-Irshad.

The Shia party, the TNFJ, also split into two groups. Now Tehreek-e-fiqh-e-Jaffaria is the main Shia politico-religious party led by Allama Sajid Naqvi. The move was not endorsed by Allama Hamid Ali Moosvi. Subsequently, the Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP), headquartered at Thokar Niaz Beg, was created out of the TJP probably by Maulana Mureed Abbas Yazdani in 1993 and adopted a more militant stance against the SSP than the TJP would allow.

The sects and sub-sects also seem to be trying harder to mobilise followers at a mass level. In 1997, within almost exactly a month there were three major gatherings of Sunni sub-sects in the Punjab. The Barelvi Dawat-e-Islami held a 4 day gathering in Multan starting 17 October. The Al-Dawah-wal-Irshad held its annual 3 day convention at Muridke in the first week of November, and the Tableeghi Jamaat held its annual moot in the second week of November. The attendance at each of these three gatherings ran into lakhs with young people, significantly, making up a sizeable number of the participants. The Shias have yet to hold this kind of a meeting but it is almost certain that they can mobilise large numbers not least by pointing to the harsh nature of the continuing sectarian conflict, the kind of large gatherings that the rival Sunni organisations are arranging and by emphasising the need for a minority to close ranks in such circumstances.

In such annual meetings organised by Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith groups most participants come from the urban lower-middle and middle classes. The DI's case is different. Most of its followers are from the working classes, rural areas and there is remarkable participation on the part of the young. These meetings, requiring arrangements for tents to house half a million people, a perfect loudspeaker system, etc. have demonstrated that the sectarian groups have a remarkable ability to organise.

The meetings, however, are sometimes occasions for violence. At the Dawat-i-Islami congregation six Deobandi

students who had come to attend, for whatever reason, were kidnapped and tortured, and four were killed. Two escaped and later on identified their assailants. The police has apprehended them and is keeping their inquiry secret.

The SSP and SMP have alleged that the state is involved in aggravating sectarian differences. This seems far fetched, but it is worth recalling that some years ago the local administration had encouraged the formation of the Barelvi Anjuman Sipah-e-Mustapha (ASM) as a counterweight to the SSP. Of course, it is fairly well known that in the case of the MQM a strategy of building up a rival faction was actively pursued by state agencies, as a way to cut the MQM down to size. Meanwhile, the SSP, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (a further militant off-shoot of the SSP) and the SMP remain the key actors in the ongoing sectarian conflict.

A key feature now of sectarian militancy is that it is not the province of a few extremists acting in isolation. Their support system extends well beyond their own organisation. The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, for instance, could look to the JUI or the Taliban in time of need. The SSP itself is considered a legitimate political party, participates in the elections and has been part of the governing coalition at the provincial level. The JUI, for its part maintains its linkages with the Taliban in Afghanistan and, it seems, to some degree with Harkat-ul-Ansar in Kashmir. This means, among other things, that the militants have sanctuaries just beyond Pakistan's borders and that makes it that much more difficult to counter them. The JUI wields considerable influence with the government at home and in some measure externally with countries such as Saudi Arabia. At another level it is linked with a mass base which is sustained and extended through forums such as the Tableeghi moot.

The JUI has now renounced the path of elections. Clearly, what the Taliban, albeit with more than a little help from Pakistan and the United States, have managed to do in

Afghanistan appears now to be a model that promises far richer dividends than continued struggle within a democratic framework. Other sectarian and sub-sectarian groups as well as politico-religious parties of different hue are taking an equally hard look at the experience of Afghanistan and Iran. For instance, the Jamaat-e-Islami has been linked to the Hizb-e-Islami led by Gulbaddin Hekmatyar in Afghanistan[1] (26) and in Kashmir to the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen which is said to be supported by the local Jamaat-i-Islami.[2] To the extent that the activities of these politico-religious parties across the border may coincide with the foreign policy objectives of the government, it becomes that much more difficult to restrain them on either side of the border.

A telling example of how borders have become porous in many ways for such organisations came in Karachi. When the principal of Jamia Islamia (Binori Town), Dr Habibullah Mukhtar was shot dead in Karachi in November 1977, the protest strike called by the Deobandi ulema led by the JUI's Maulana Fazlur Rehman was reportedly enforced by the Taliban. Whether the ISI or other policy-making sections of the establishment anticipated such a dynamic is not entirely clear.

It goes without saying that, so far, there has been no systematic administrative, political and economic effort to counter the menace of sectarianism or for that matter an intellectual one to counter the appeal of fundamentalism. Over time various law enforcing and intelligence agencies have made numerous recommendations to meet the challenge of sectarianism. These can be summarised as follows:

1. Review the law regarding registration of deeni

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1 O. Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, Cambridge, 1990, p. 134

2 R.G. Wirsing, *India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute*, Delhi, 1995, p. 133

madaris. There is already a committee at the district level for giving a no objection certificate. It should not make exceptions and violations should be strictly punished.

2. Credentials of the Mohtamim and the executive body of such madaris should be verified through intelligence agencies.

3. Sources of funding should also be ascertained before allowing registration

4. Zakat funding to existing madaris should be rationalised

5. Government should consider establishment of a regulatory body to supervise the functioning of all deeni madaris

6. Foreign involvement must be exposed and steps taken by the government to discourage these elements.

7. The policy of inducting holders of Wifaq-ul-Madaris into the education department must be reviewed.

8. Peace committees should be established down to the district level to maintain sectarian harmony.

9. A code of conduct should be negotiated which should be strictly enforced.

10. Effective legal action should be taken against those delivering objectionable speeches or publishing such literature.

11. An operation clean-up should be carried out to arrest Proclaimed offenders and criminals who operate under the cover of religion and on behalf of sectarian organisations.

The government response appears to have been piece-meal

and half hearted most of the times, and to have had no major impact so far, though there are more positive assessments of its efforts. According to one newspaper report, both SMP and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi had suffered major damage as a result of the government offensive against sectarian groups in the months preceding the incident.[1] Among the hit men arrested during the course of the operation was Malik Ishaque, the chief of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, believed to be responsible for masterminding many killings and responsible for the activities of the organisation in Faisalabad, Multan and Bahawalpur divisions and Bhakkar district. While in Lahore, Gujranwala, Rawalpindi and Sargodha divisions the command is held by the most wanted terrorist Riaz Basra. Incidentally, this suggests the government's failure in eradicating the organisation completely has to do with its multi-cellular structure -- it is divided into small groups which are not in touch with each other all the time.

Another reason underlying government failure to curb sectarians is that successive governments have sought the support of politico-religious parties and sectarian groups. The occasional crackdown and arrest of some of the militants in the absence of other measures is unlikely to have any significant impact. Then there are measures such as the Anti-Terrorist Act, under which special courts are supposed to hand down speedy justice and police powers are increased. But even given the narrow scope of this approach, so-called speedy justice cannot be a substitute for wide-ranging judicial, police and intelligence services reform needed to tackle the problem at this level. Efforts such as the formation of the Milli Yakjeheti Council have only provided temporary relief in the past. Now, the Punjab government has reportedly nominated 72 religious leaders as emissaries of peace and, under the auspices of Ittehad Bain-ul-Muslameen, they will seek to promote sectarian harmony in the province.

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1 *The Nation*, November 1997

Meanwhile the alternative, a liberal democratic model, has been thoroughly devalued in Pakistan by a grasping, incompetent and corrupt establishment and a ruling elite that has shown itself incapable of leadership and of recognising even its own enlightened self-interest. As population has grown and expectations have risen larger sections of the population are becoming marginalised. They have continued to vote but with less and less commitment to the political parties to which they belong. This seems particularly true for the two major parties.

The mainstream political parties themselves continue to pay lip service to Islam in a way that has little to do with its spirit or ideals with the result that the politico-religious parties gain more space to expound their own particular understanding and interpretation of Islam. The NWFP Assembly through unanimously adopted three identical resolutions asked the Federal government to enforce the Islamic system in the country without further delay:

> Since Pakistan came into being in the sacred name of Islam and the relevant provisions of the Islamic system are also incorporated in the Constitution, therefore, this house recommends to the federal government to make an early announcement about the enforcement of the Islamic system and carry out dispensation of justice in the courts according to it. Similarly, all civil and criminal laws be also made in accordance with the Islamic spirit of the Constitution and enforced in the country.[1]

At its best, the secular-democratic order in Pakistan has provided ample room for the most deplorable inequities between regions and classes. It has allowed for the worst kind of feudal excesses. The process of democracy has been repeatedly blocked by military intervention and its institutions

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1 *The Nation*, 7 November 1997

gravely undermined. The massive allocation of resources for our external defence has meant that we have been left vulnerable to internal conflicts. A process of globalisation externally and a policy of privatisation internally can only add fuel to the fire by marginalizing more and more people, reaffirming the growing belief that they are the victims of a deep-rooted conspiracy and have no option but to fight back as best as they can.

It is a miracle that the people of this country have continued to bear allegiance to a system of democracy. But we may now be at a turning point in this respect. The question is are there sections of civil society and the state with the will and the ability to change the substance of democracy in Pakistan? This would have to be the point of departure for a meaningful response to the issue of sectarian and ethnic extremism, and the rise of a fundamentalist creed which, even if it does not become dominant, has already begun to pose a very serious challenge to state and society in Pakistan. The short answer is that the ability may well be there but the will, so far, is clearly missing.

The Karachi Cauldron

Irfan Hussain

Within one lifetime, Karachi has expanded from a small, sleepy backwater to a cosmopolitan commercial and industrial centre, and finally turn into one gigantic, ugly no-go area. Today, virtually everyone in Karachi has been touched by violence in one form or another. Everybody has a horror story to tell. And ultimately, everybody in Karachi is a victim. Businessmen, journalists, students, workers and housewives all tell of friends and family members who have been killed or wounded in armed robberies, real or fake confrontations with security forces, targeted attacks, and random shooting. Police and Rangers will tell you about hundreds of their friends and colleagues, as well as family members, who have been killed and wounded over the last three or four years.

Despite the current uneasy calm on the political front in Karachi, scarcely a day goes by without press reports of a bullet-ridden corpse bearing marks of the most horrendous torture. These incidents are now so commonplace that they are reported in a paragraph or two in the inner pages of local dailies. Indeed, those who live in Karachi have all become so battle-hardened that they have lost the capacity to be shocked or saddened by random violence until it strikes at a loved one.

Despite these problems, however, Karachi is still full of

energy, and its people keep coming up with creative responses to the overwhelming difficulties it faces. People like Maulana Edhi and Akhtar Hameed Khan may be household names, but there are many unsung heroes in Karachi, and these people deserve to be honoured for making the city a little more human, a little more liveable.

The Roots of Conflict

It is important to understand that the roots of conflict are no different in Karachi than they are in London or Lagos. Hatred, deprivation, frustration and envy are some of the universal seeds of conflict and violence that lie dormant to varying degrees in all human beings everywhere and throughout history. No individual or city or nation can claim a monopoly on the dark side of the human soul. What does differ, however, is the self-control an individual has on his passions, and the degree of discipline attained by a society. Individual actions depend on upbringing and genetics; social interaction is dependent on the level of civilisation attained by a society. In primitive societies like Pakistan, practices like *karo-kari* and blood feuds go largely unpunished, but in more evolved ones, they are neither tolerated nor condoned. Thus, while the seeds and roots of conflict are the same everywhere, what differs is the soil and the climate that enable those seeds of hatred and envy to grow and flourish. In Karachi's case, hospitable factors have been provided by neglect, bad governance and prejudice, to name only three.

Turning to the current situation in Karachi, the city, which was once more or less in line with the rest of the country with respect to the level of violence, suddenly exploded in 1985, and has stayed on the boil these last dozen years. The reasons for this eruption and continuing tension and killing have been analysed and discussed endlessly in cabinet meetings, dinner parties, newspaper editorials and columns from Islamabad to Karachi until there is nothing new

left to say on the subject.

It is widely believed, specially outside Karachi, that the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) and its offshoot, the Haqiqi group, are largely responsible for the present state of affairs in the city.' Liberals generously concede that the government has committed a number of excesses in the name of law and order, but generally hold the view that if Altaf Hussain, Afaq Ahmad and their henchmen can be controlled, the situation will become 'normal'. They also recognise that the government should 'do something' to address Karachi's many civic, economic and political problems. People fortunate enough to live elsewhere are generally not clear exactly what they expect the government to do, but they are unanimous that it should do 'something'.

Even the MQM, at the very highest levels, may not be clear about what it wants. There is a general consensus within it, however, about the abolition of the quota system in Sindh for government jobs and college admissions, and the release of party workers from illegal incarceration. But if these and other demands were met tomorrow, would the MQM disband itself? In short, would the frustration and anger that gave birth to the MQM and triggered off a 12 year-long cycle of bloodshed suddenly abate? Sadly, probably not. Like it or not, the MQM has come to stay, as have all the other ethnic parties that mushroomed under General Zia. Basically, they came into being because minority groups felt marginalised in a despotic dispensation; unfortunately, despite the trappings of democracy, these groups still feel cut off from the mainstream, and hence perceive a need for the protection of militant political organisations.

However, the dimensions of the Karachi conflict go far beyond the MQM or any other political party. Ultimately, the struggle is over the division of the cake: who gets how much out of the nation's wealth. Virtually every minority in Pakistan feels that it has been done out of its proper share.

Irrespective of the statistics, this perception has gained so much currency over the years that it is taken for granted in all the minority provinces. In a sense, the mohajirs of urban Sindh have a sense of double deprivation: on the one hand they feel they have been marginalised at the national level; on the other they think they are getting a raw deal in Sindh in terms of government jobs and college admissions.

So, contrary to perceptions, Altaf Hussain still has so much support simply because he is seen to be the only one fighting for mohajir rights. He does not sweep the polls in every election in Karachi because of his charisma or because of mohajir short-sightedness, but because his supporters think he will improve their lives by forcing the Sindh and federal governments to make greater concessions in terms of jobs and college admissions. If people all over the country vote for their economic betterment, why should we think the mohajirs are any different?

A second element fuelling the mohajir sense of deprivation and frustration is of a cultural and psychological dimension. Today, the typical MQM activist is in his late teens or early twenties. Although he has no personal knowledge of life in his ancestral home in India, he has been fed on a steady diet of mythical images about how good things were in the old days. This is typical immigrant psychology, excepting that in most cases, second and third generations get absorbed in the new mainstream through employment, marriage and a wide array of contacts with the majority population. For the most part, such an interaction did not take place in Karachi. One reason was that the dominant section of the local population, the Sindhi Hindus, emigrated at the same time the Muslims arrived from India, leaving a vacuum that was filled by the new migrants. Then, to a very great extent, Karachi became a city for migrants from all over Pakistan as Punjabis, Pathans and Balochis flocked to the country's political, financial and industrial capital for opportunities. Even after Islamabad

became the nation's capital, Karachi continued to act as a magnet for millions of Pakistanis, and later, for Bengalis, Biharis, Sri Lankans and Afghans.

The result of this unceasing inflow was to transform Sindhis into a clear minority in Karachi, allowing the original mohajirs and their descendants to retain their separate identity, as well as a thinly disguised sense of cultural superiority. They believed that, having ruled much of India for eight centuries before the British arrived, North Indian Muslims held a manifest destiny to rule the new state of Pakistan. Indeed, the average MQM activist and supporter is convinced that Pakistan was created by the sacrifices made by his father's and grandfather's generation, and therefore that he had a right to demand and expect a special status.

Never mind that the reality was completely different. In the overwhelming number of cases, hard-core members of the MQM are descended from families who were just as badly off in India as their children are in Karachi. Indeed, in most cases, they are better off now than they were in India. And most Indian Muslims migrated to Pakistan because they had no choice: they feared for their lives and were forced to move. So it was not a case where most Muslims made a conscious sacrifice for a cause. While they may have supported the idea of Pakistan, it is unlikely that the same number of Muslims would have moved had the bloody Hindu-Muslim riots not broken out at the eve of Partition.

Nevertheless, perceptions more than reality shape the ideas and actions of the MQM. So this is the emotional baggage carried by most MQM supporters, and it is this unarticulated desire to not just get an equal deal, but a better deal, that is driving the MQM agenda. It has struck a deep chord in the mohajir psyche.

Nowhere is this sense of injustice greater than when it comes to jobs. The biggest single problem facing Pakistanis

today is unemployment, and this issue is magnified in Karachi with its huge pool of young men without jobs. In a country with one of the highest rates of illiteracy in the world, a university degree does generate a certain legitimate expectation of gainful employment. When a young graduate is rejected time and again in the job market, he becomes frustrated and angry. Bear in mind the fact that with our middle class ethos, a young man would rather get a poorly paid clerical job, preferably in a government department, than become, say, a foreman in a factory. Apart from job security, even the lowest official position is seen as having prestige and clout far beyond the salary it pays. This lemming-like rush for government positions has led to fierce competition for scarce jobs, and a corresponding resentment of the quota system.

Thirty years ago, Karachi had a quota of 2% for the Central Superior Services which translated into one seat for the Civil Service every three years. In the early Eighties, a further urban/rural provincial quota was fixed for Sindh in respect to jobs and college admissions. This may well have led to the support the MQM enjoys today. Opponents of this system point out that no other province has enforced any urban/rural quotas, and it has been imposed on Sindh to keep mohajirs from getting their rightful share of jobs and college places. This suggests that the mohajir -- non-mohajir conflict is over opportunities, not language or ethnicity.

There is a larger national context that helps keep the Karachi cauldron on the boil. It includes the whole wider sectarian conflict that has gripped the entire country; the progressive criminalization of politics; the easy availability of arms; the addiction to heroin that is now endemic, especially among the younger generation; the breakdown of law and order; the demoralisation and corruption in the police; and the increasing irrelevance of the state.

The national context becomes apparent when it comes to the issue of resource allocation. It is a fact that Karachi today is

home to millions from all over the country, as well as hundreds of thousands of Biharis and Afghans. These new citizens have placed enormous demands on the frail infrastructure as well as the job market. Clearly, the federal government has a responsibility to help the Karachi and Sindh administrations to bear some of this burden. But time and again, Islamabad has told the Sindh government to deal with the problem as best as it can. Not surprisingly, the provincial government has completely failed to cope.

With no positive intervention from Islamabad, violence and economic crisis feed off each other and will continue to do so. The violence in Karachi has scared away new investments, even while pushing existing industrial units and commercial offices to shift their operations to Punjab. This has led to further unemployment, and no doubt has increased the number of activists flocking to the MQM banner. Ultimately, the politics of violence is the politics of deprivation.

Some Steps Forward

Much as people living outside Karachi would like to, this problem cannot be wished away. The city plays too crucial a role to sweep its problems under the carpet forever. In purely financial terms, a total strike in Karachi, even for a day, has more ramifications for the whole country than a few random killings. So the current temporary lull in the tension does not mean that the problems have gone away. The merest spark sets off an explosion in Karachi.

By now, all that most mohajirs in Karachi want, whether they are in the MQM or not, is a period of stability and development. Nobody, excepting a small hard-core of militants, is interested in further violence or strikes. The government would do well to show some imagination and magnanimity, and take some unilateral steps.

For instance, this government has made a number of promises to the MQM regarding the scrutiny of cases against

the party leadership and rank and file who are currently behind bars. With respect to both groups, the government has been dragging its feet unnecessarily. Most MQM leaders currently have scores of cases registered against them. Altaf Hussain alone may have as many as 60 pending against him. Others have an equally ridiculous number of criminal charges against their names. However, now that the Muslim League is in alliance with the MQM in Sindh and at the Federal level, nobody bothers about the strange fact that a number of provincial and federal ministers have scores of criminal cases pending against them. Our mainstream politicians turn a blind eye towards these legalities. It seems logical to withdraw these trumped-up cases against the MQM leadership unilaterally as a first step.

Next, the entire quota system needs a thorough review. When it was first introduced in the early Fifties, it was aimed to balance the inequalities in the educational facilities in different parts of the country. The system has been in force this last half century, and with time, various vested interests have sprung to its defence whenever it was criticised. But the plain fact is that its original raison d'être has been overtaken by the progressive deterioration in our public educational system: now government schools and colleges are almost equally mediocre whether they are in Karachi, Hyderabad, Peshawar or Lahore. This being the reality, the quota system has outlived its usefulness and needs to be scrapped. In the context of Sindh, the discriminatory urban/rural quota can be easily dispensed with as it does not require any constitutional amendment. These two steps will go a long way in removing the sense of deprivation so widespread among the mohajirs. Unfortunately, the government has recently announced its intention to keep this illogical system intact for another 20 years.

While the gulf between mohajirs and the establishment may seem very wide, it is not yet unbridgeable. If this or any

previous government had the vision and the imagination, many of the political problems facing Karachi would have been resolved. Of course this does not mean that the city's many social and economic problems would be simultaneously sorted out, but at least a beginning would have been made.

Development and Conflict

Zia Mian and Iftikhar Ahmad

Everything in Pakistan carries the mark of more than fifty years of development and its failures. The problems that development was supposed to solve are still there. In fact, they now larger. There are now more poor people in Pakistan than the total population at the time of independence. The poor are not only more numerous, they are also poorer; the gap between rich and poor is larger now than it ever has been. Like poverty, illiteracy has grown. The number of people who cannot read or write is now three times Pakistan's total population at independence. At the same time, the limits on development imposed by nature are becoming increasingly evident.

This essay begins with how the idea of development emerged and took hold, despite the fact it was based on an acceptance of enormous social dislocation and misery, and ignorance of how societies work. It is these fatal flaws that are now being exposed. This essay then charts the history of development, its motivations, and some of its failures in Pakistan, from the time of the British Empire through independence to the present, and into the future. It argues that development has created conflict at all levels in Pakistani

society, and that the failure of development is now so complete that it has created a fundamental conflict between citizens and the state. In the absence of political intervention, this conflict is resolving itself by state and society abandoning each other.

The Idea of Development

Before looking at Pakistan's experience of development, it is important to clarify how the idea of development itself has developed.[1] Briefly, development started out as a biological concept, referring to the process by which animals and plants grew and changed to achieve their normal, adult form. This concept was only transferred to thinking about society in the late 18th century, as Western societies started to experience the massive social and economic changes associated with the industrial revolution. As these changes started to affect more and more people, and protests became widespread, the idea of development and social change became increasingly tied up with progress and the promise of a better future. By the late 19th Century, progress meant focussing on "the life of future generations who are to enjoy conditions of happiness denied to us, but which our labours and sufferings are to help bring about."[2]

The modern idea of development is built on this foundation. However, it took shape as one of a set of interlinked terms, the others being underdeveloped, developing, and developed, none of which were associated with the 19th Century idea of development. This new shape emerged first in the early 1940s as passing references to 'underdeveloped areas' in the international economics literature. It acquired real political force when it was used by US President Truman in his inaugural address in January 1949. He declared:

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1 G. Esteva; Development, in *The Development Dictionary*, ed. W. Sachs, Zed Books, 1992, p. 8

2 J. B. Bury; *The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into its Origin and Growth*, Dover, 1960, p. 346

> More than half of the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate, they are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap... For the first time in history humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people... Greater production is the key to prosperity.[1]

Unlike earlier European ideas about progress and development as something that happened as part of the inevitable course of history, and had to be endured if they could not be turned to one's benefit, this new concept was of development as a planned process of social change. This naturally implied that there was someone with a sense of what society should develop into, knew how to develop it, and had the means to do so. From Truman's speech it was clear that the US saw itself as fulfilling all these requirements.

The vision of development that was offered, and that many leaders of newly independent states shared, was of a society that was urban, industrial and based on mass consumption, in short, a replica of Western Europe and North America. It did not take long for thoughtful people to realise that this kind of development would inevitably be a traumatic and destructive process. More so even than the development of the already developed societies. History suggests that these states developed because of the unlimited supply of natural resources and markets that their conquests and empires gave them. This option was not open to the new developing states. A United Nations study in 1951 pointed out that:

> Rapid economic progress is impossible without painful adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be

1 A. Escobar; *Encountering Development - The Making and Unmaking of The Third World*, Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 3

> scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate, bonds of caste, creed and race have to burst; and large numbers of people who cannot keep up with progress have to have their expectations of a comfortable life frustrated. Very few communities are willing to pay the full price of economic progress.[1]

If 'very few communities' were 'willing' to pay the price then how was development to proceed? This has been the question at the heart of development. The answer has been, by and large, that communities who refuse to 'pay the full price of economic progress' willingly have had to pay it unwillingly. The elites that controlled the new states wanted the wealth that development generated. Development became too important to allow the poor, who were supposed to benefit, to get in the way.

Once development was accepted as a goal, and the desired end result was clear, someone needed to know how to do make it happen. Development planning was the attempt to meet this challenge. It was based, fundamentally, on the idea that entire societies could be completely and systematically reconstructed in a controlled way. This presupposed that someone could know exactly how everything in a society worked, how everything in it is connected together, and how to make things change in a planned way. This kind of knowledge is impossible. The kind of things that need to be known are, as was pointed out decades ago, "among the most inaccessible social relationships, still largely unknown even in western countries, where social research flourishes."[2] But, oblivious to their own ignorance, development planners went ahead and set about tearing apart one society after another.

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1 A. Escobar; *Encountering Development - The Making and Unmaking of The Third World*, Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 4

2 G. Myrdal; *Asian Drama - An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, Vol. III*, Pantheon, 1968, p. 1880

The unanticipated consequences that this has unleashed around the world offer a final insight into the failure of the grand design. For decades, development planners paid no attention to the fact that if they succeeded they would have destroyed the global environment. The consequences of the last 150 years of industrial development in the West are now increasingly making themselves felt as climate change brought on by the burning of fossil fuels threatens to transform the very basis of ecology in large areas of the world. If "more than half the people of the world" who were poor, hungry and sick, were to consume as extravagantly as Americans, the amount of water, forests, fossil fuels, chemicals, and so on they would consume would render the world unfit for anyone to live in. Development, rather than offering hope for a better future for the poor, now threatens their future.

Colonial Development

In the areas that now constitute Pakistan, a kind of development started under colonial rule. Over a period of fifty years the British built roads and railways across India on an epic scale. In 1858, there were only a few hundred miles of railway track in the whole of India. Within ten years the British built more than 5,000 miles of railway line, and by 1900 this had grown to 25,000 miles. By 1914, the total length of the Indian railways was 35,000 miles. There were two purposes for creating such a rail network. The first was that it helped create the basis for more effective empire, one able to extend its power across the country and ensure that popular revolt was put down effectively.[1] The second can be seen from the organisation of the railway lines. They were laid to connect the interior with the nearest principal ports, in effect opening all of India to British access, to take things out and bring things in. In other words, to bring India more fully into the economy of

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1 S. M. Naseem; *Underdevelopment, Poverty and Inequality in Pakistan*, Vanguard, 1981, p. 14

Britain as both a supplier of raw materials and a market.

The other great British development project was irrigation. The British constructed canals and barrages that brought 10 million acres of land into cultivation. This allowed an enormous increase in agricultural production, particularly the production of export crops such as wheat and cotton that require large amounts of water, and so generated wealth for the colonial state. There was no doubt about what the canals were for, even the Indian Irrigation Commission at the turn of the century described them as "more or less commercial undertakings."[1]

The British construction of railways, roads, and canals, would now all be classed as development infrastructure projects aimed at encouraging economic growth. The impact that they had on the lives of ordinary people offered an early test for this kind of development. Studies of India's economy suggest that the rate of growth of real national income per head was very small, and may even have been negative from 1900-1940.[2] In other words, after decades of an extraordinary development effort the people were as poor, and possibly poorer, than before. In 1939, the General Secretary of the Indian National Planning Committee, K.T. Shah, described the situation more directly:

> The mass of humanity in India habitually live below the level of subsistence. In regard to the amenities of life, their position is hardly superior to that of the wild beasts of the jungle.. an ill-fed, unclad, ignorant mass of humanity, scarcely above the level of brutes in living conditions.[3]

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1 S. M. Naseem; *Underdevelopment, Poverty and Inequality in Pakistan*, Vanguard, 1981, p. 17

2 B. L. C. Johnson, *Development in South Asia*, Penguin, 1983, p. 23

3 B. L. C. Johnson; *Development in South Asia*, Penguin, 1983, p.

It was at this time that the British transformed their Law of Development of the Colonies into the Law of Development and Welfare of the Colonies. This was done in order, it was said, to guarantee minimum levels of nutrition, health and education.[1] However, the new found concern by the British for the lives and the poverty of ordinary Indians was motivated by more than altruism. The amended law came at a time when World War II started. The new law may well have been an attempt to buy public support for Britain in the war and the need for such support had never been more desperate. The movement for independence had created severe problems for continued British rule in India. The leaders of the movement argued that India, rather than being developed by the British, was being kept in poverty, its people illiterate, so that Britain could become wealthy.[2] The promise of independence was that in the new nation these problems would be solved.

National Development

The first attempts by the new state of Pakistan to set its own priorities for development show how, like many other laws, policies, and institutions left over from colonialism, the practice of development continued largely unchanged. A British official, Archibald Rowlands, was asked to make recommendations on how to organise economic planning and development. Not surprisingly, his recommendations were to set up a duplicate of the imperial ideal, with the planning and financing of development to be controlled by the central government. His policy was summed as "if Pakistan is to be strong, it must be strong at the Centre."[3]

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1 G. Esteva; Development, in *The Development Dictionary*, ed. W. Sachs, Zed Books, 1992, p. 10

2 P. R. Brass; *The Politics of India Since Independence*, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 12

3 H. Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan*, Oxford University

The first step was obviously to create the strong centre. The measure of strength the newly independent state used was an imperial measure. In the first budget of Pakistan, the government announced that 65.2% of central government expenditures was to be for the military. The very first budget speech included the admission that the expenditure on defence was higher than would normally be justified for a young state like Pakistan, but claimed there was no choice. The demands of creating the state took precedence over the needs of the people.

The first year turned out not to be an exception. In the second year, the military's share was set as 71.3% of government spending. This increased again in the third year, with military spending reaching 73.1%. The military share of central government expenditures did not in fact fall below 50% until 1973. It is currently around 25% of central government expenditure. While this may seem to show great progress in reducing the burden of military spending, it needs to be remembered that this 25% share is in the presence of a massive foreign and domestic debt which was not there before. Since successive governments have chosen to put paying the debt above all other priorities, it is necessary to subtract debt servicing from government expenditures before assessing the impact of current levels of military spending. Doing this shows that, in 1995-1996, military expenditure was over 40% of what little was left after paying the debt. As debt payment increases, and military expenditure remains more or less fixed, it will take an ever larger share of what few resources are left.

The attempt to begin development, and the preference given to first creating a strong state came at a historic moment. As mentioned earlier, it was in 1949 that US President Truman launched the new Age of Development, calling for the

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Press, 1994, p. 49

development of underdeveloped areas. The Cold War had just started, and the US was engaged with its Marshall Plan of aid to Western Europe. This plan was in large part an attempt to stop Europe going into the communist camp. It was also designed to help the American economy recover from the war by creating a strong demand for US goods in a European market.

The US had a similar strategy for engaging with the third world. Truman had linked US economic and national security interests directly to the underdeveloped areas by declaring: "Their poverty is a... threat both to them and to more prosperous areas."[1] The US offered both military aid and support for development to third world countries, including Pakistan. Pakistan was unusual though. Even without the generalised concern the US had about newly independent states taking the USSR's side in the Cold War, Pakistan was recognised as having a strategic importance. A 1949 study for the US Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that Pakistan "might be required as a base for air operations against [the] central USSR and as a staging area for forces engaged in the defence or recapture of Middle East oil areas."[2] This naturally required supporting and strengthening Pakistan's military.

Development was not neglected, however. The US sent its brightest and best to Pakistan to help provide the knowledge of what it should develop into, and how to do this. These new foreign advisors, while being expert in all kinds of things, had little or no planning experience in third world countries. But, nonetheless, they were relied on very heavily by Pakistan's planners. The degree of reliance was such that their job was to

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1 A. Escobar; *Encountering Development - The Making and Unmaking of The Third World*, Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 3

2 R. J. McMahon; *The Cold War on the Periphery - The United States, India and Pakistan*, Columbia University Press,1994, p. 17

both prepare the first five year development plan for Pakistan, advise the government on day to day economic policy, and train Pakistanis to replace them.[1]

The larger context within which this advice was given was of course determined by the fundamental aims of US policy towards underdeveloped areas. This was laid out clearly by President Kennedy, when he said:

> Too little attention has been paid to the part which an early exposure to American goods, skills, and American ways of doing things can play in forming the tastes and desires of newly emerging countries - or to the fact that when our aid ends, the desire and need for our products continue.[2]

A clear example of how this has worked in Pakistan is the fact that by the late 1960s, in Karachi, there were eleven different soft drinks being made from imported concentrate -- including Coca Cola, Pepsi, Seven Up, and Fanta -- but only three sources of bottled milk supply.[3] It was not just soft drinks; in 1952, only 6% of Pakistan's imports were from the US, by 1966 this had risen to over 30%. There is also proof of Kennedy's claim about how the desire and need for American products continues even after aid stops. Despite the end of all US aid to Pakistan seven years ago (in 1990, because of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme), over 10% of all Pakistan's imports are still from the US and the US is the largest foreign investor in Pakistan.

The most recent evidence of the success of decades of US development aid is the arrival in Pakistan of American fast

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1 A. Waterston; *Planning in Pakistan - Organisation and Implementation*, Johns Hopkins Press, 1963, pp. 33-34

2 H. Magdoff; *The Age of Imperialism*, Monthly Review, 1969, p. 133

3 H. Magdoff; *The Age of Imperialism*, Monthly Review, 1969, p. 126

food companies such as McDonalds, Pizza Hut, Kentucky Fried Chicken, and Burger King. The response can be gauged from the news that the Pizza Hut store in Lahore is said to have broken the company's record for the highest volume of sales in any of its outlets anywhere in the world.[1] This news came in the same year as the reports of *atta* riots in Lahore, Peshawar, and Quetta.

Economic and Social Development

Pakistan's first attempt to lay out a road map of how it wanted to develop was in the First Five Year Plan, which was supposed to cover the period from 1955-1960. The plan actually came out several years after it was supposed to have started. The key strategy the state decided to adopt was summed up in one sentence: "The economic and social objectives of government policy are to develop the resources of the country as rapidly as possible so as to promote the welfare of the people."[2]

Ten years later, the problems with this strategy were starting to induce some concern among the development planners in Pakistan. In the Third Five Year Plan, the planners wrote that "The requirements for rapid economic growth are, to some degree, in conflict with social and political objectives." Nevertheless they decided to press on, arguing: "It is to rapid economic growth that the nation must look to free itself from poverty, ignorance, disease."[3]

Summing up the experience of two decades of planning and development, the authors of the Fourth Five Year Plan, intended to cover the period 1970-1975, were a little more

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1 A. Haroon; Country in Chains? *Newsline*, November 1977, p. 65

2 B. L. C. Johnson; *Development in South Asia*, Penguin, 1983, p. 42

3 B. L. C. Johnson; *Development in South Asia*, Penguin, 1983, p. 43

direct about what had actually happened. Rather than simply talking about abstract conflicts between the economic growth and social justice, they admitted that things had gone terribly wrong:

> In the last two decades, the basic objective of national economic policy was to seek maximum possible economic growth... The genuine requirements of the social sectors, like education, health and housing, were badly neglected... The stage was set, therefore, for the social and economic confrontations which took place in early 1969... they represented a forceful articulation of the deeply felt aspirations of the masses.[1]

The response they came up with was simple and familiar. Following in the footsteps of the British, when faced with rising public discontent Pakistan's development planners added a new-found commitment to welfare to the process. They declared that:

> The development strategy for the 1970s has to change fundamentally. While essentially protecting the growth rate already achieved, a greater regional and social balance is being attempted in its composition.[2]

The failure of official development plans is evident. It has been estimated that 38% of Pakistan's population were poor in 1960. By 1980, after two decades of development, this proportion was unchanged. In 1995, after thirty five years of development, 30% of the people were still poor. In absolute numbers the failure becomes stark. The total population of Pakistan in 1960 was 50 million, there are now 42 million poor

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1 Planning Commission; *The Fourth Five Year Plan*, Government of Pakistan, 1970, p. 11

2 Planning Commission; *The Fourth Five Year Plan*, Government of Pakistan, 1970, p. 12

people.[1] The story is worse than this though. There is now a greater gap between rich and poor than at any time in the last thirty five years, and the inequality is greatest in the cities, where more and more of the population lives.[2]

But such failure was by no means necessary. Dramatic improvements in the lives of people is possible, even in South Asia. A good example is infant mortality, as the most helpless members of any society, new born babies are the most sensitive to the capability of that society to provide care. In British India, in 1931, out of every 1,000 babies born, 162 died before reaching the age of one. In Sri Lanka, also part of the empire, 158 out of every 1,000 babies died in their first year.[3] In 1994, in Pakistan, the infant mortality rate was about 95 deaths out of every 1,000 that were born -- for comparison, the figure was 79 out of every 1,000 in India, in Bangladesh it was 91.[4] Over this same period Sri Lanka has reduced its infant mortality rate to 15 out of every 1,000. This is comparable to the infant mortality rates found in developed countries.

The amazing difference in infant mortality between Pakistan and Sri Lanka is not due to Sri Lanka being much wealthier than Pakistan, India or Bangladesh. All these countries are equally poor. The difference is due to the fact that, for decades, the Sri Lankan state chose to invest in improving the lives of its people rather than the fastest possible economic growth. It was government policy that made the difference.

Good examples can be found else where. At independence

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1 M. Haq; *Human Development in South Asia 1997*, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 18

2 T. Banuri, S. R. Khan and M. Mahmood; *Just Development*, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 68

3 B. L. C. Johnson; *Development in South Asia*, Penguin, 1983, p. 37

4 M. Haq; *Human Development in South Asia 1997*, Oxford University Press, 1997

Pakistan had a literacy rate of about 13%, it now has an official literacy rate of 35-40%, barely a three-fold increase in fifty years and much slower than the rate of increase of population. The number of illiterate people has increased enormously, there are now more than 80 million. For comparison, the average literacy rate in other low income countries is now over 60%. It does not take decades to tecah people to read and write. Consider, for instance, the case of Zimababwe, a country poorer than Pakistan, which increased primary school enrolment among its black population from about 50% to almost 100% within five years of independence. This was achieved by cutting military spending and increasing education spending to over 20% of the budget.[1]

The inequalities that development creates, and claims that it will remove once there is enough development, express themselves in many ways. The poor are not simply an anonymous mass spread equally over the country. They are concentrated in different places, places that are determined by the choices that the state makes as it plans and implements its development policies. The most poignant example of this in the history of Pakistan was the treatment of East Pakistan, which led ultimately to civil war, genocide, and independence for Bangladesh.

East Pakistan, with a majority of the country's population, contributed more than half of all Pakistan's exports, but received less than half of its imports. They were clearly:

> a backward people in a backward region. At $63, per capita income in East Bengal before secession was just half of that of West Pakistan... The Bengalis contended that expenditure per capita was skewed

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1 G. A. Cornia; Accelerating Human Development in Pakistan, in *Just Development*, eds., T. Banuri, S. R. Khan and M. Mahmood, Oxford University Press, 1997, p.130

> towards West Pakistan, where development investment would presumably bring a higher rate of return.[1]

The struggles by East Pakistan for a fair share of development ended with independence from Pakistan.[2] But, East Pakistan was only the most extreme case of regional inequality. Such inequality also existed in West Pakistan, most notably in Baluchistan. At the end of the 1960s, at least 70% of households in the province were below the poverty line.[3] Baluchistan had the lowest literacy rate of any province in Pakistan, and a per capita income just over half of that in Punjab. At the same time, the natural gas it supplies fuelled the industrial development of the country but was not available to heat the homes of people who live in the area. This led to the revolt of Baluchi people against the central government of Pakistan in 1973. As in the case of East Pakistan, the demands were for greater local control over natural resources and development.[4]

The conflicts over development continue. Baluchistan still demands the federal government pay a fair price for its gas. Sarhad demands a fair price for the hydro-electricity provided by its dams. Sindh demands a fair share of the revenues that the government collects as taxes from industry and business in the province. These demands are driven by the fact that under the 1973 Constitution it is provincial governments that are responsible for providing social services, especially health and education, but the money for this comes from the federal

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1 D.L. Horowitz; *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, University of California Press, 1985, p. 242

2 H. Zaheer; *The Separation of East Pakistan*, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 13-107

3 S.M. Naseem; *Underdevelopment, Poverty and Inequality in Pakistan*, Vanguard, 1981, p. 214

4 O. Noman; *The Political Economy of Pakistan 1947-1985*, KPI, 1988, p. 64

government. The federal government has chosen its own priorities and preferred to spend what little money is left over from paying the debt on the military and itself.

Development in Practice

The conflict created by development expresses itself in more than statistics of poor people, or percentages who are illiterate, or homeless, or bad relations between various levels of administration. Development destroys local communities, people's livelihoods and their environment. It destroys people's ways of making sense of the world, of how individuals are supposed to live, and forces them to adapt to circumstances that are not of their choosing. Development, in short, changes the ground under people's feet and expects them to cope with it.

These consequences of development can be seen by looking at Pakistan's proudest development project, Tarbela Dam -- the largest earthfilled dam in the world when it was completed in 1974. Initially constructed for irrigation purposes it was also turned into a power generation project. This symbol of development submerged 120 villages and displaced 96,000 people. To date, over 2000 people of these people have not been compensated at all and many more have been compensated inadequately.[1] It would require only 2% of the revenues that the government of Pakistan gets from Tarbela to compensate all the people displaced. As of 1997, the Government still refuses to pay this compensation.

The attempts to resettle the dispossessed farming communities produced unanticipated consequences. Those who were granted alternate land in Sindh faced serious hostility from local land-owners and farmers. On arrival at their new land, the displaced people were unable to take

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1 I. Ahmad, T. Naqvi and K. H. Khan: *Tarbela Dam Project: Independent Review of Outstanding Resettlement Issues*, submitted to World Bank and WAPDA, May 1996

possession, the land was already in use. Where possession was possible, the water supply was disrupted by local "*kabza* groups' (water users groups), who were deriving benefit from the vacant land. The displaced farmers were often physically threatened by the local population. In part this was due to land ownership in Sindh being run on a large-owner, or feudal system, a system that the presence of a small farmer from the area around Tarbela would obviously threaten.

During the displacement period the people settled around Tarbela were promised new homes in 'model villages' -- planned settlements that would have improved access to social services, health and jobs. In other words, the townships were presented as areas with more potential for economic development than what people were experiencing before displacement. But, twenty-five years later, the townships still provide inadequate social services, such as health, transport and education. In addition, lack of employment opportunities and depressed economic conditions in these areas has led to a very high rate of male out-migration, causing a variety of social problems, including a high incidence of drug abuse.

Development removed this community from a situation in which they may have had less access to 'modern' facilities but at least had some control over their access to natural resources, land and income. Their relocation to quasi-urban townships and the subsequent economic stagnation of these townships has led to the overall deterioration of their lives.

The alienation of the people dispossessed by Tarbela Dam is compounded by their belief that they have sacrificed their homes and community for the development of Pakistan and received no recognition. They see themselves being denied equality with other national 'servants', pointing to the armed forces and civil service, who are given privileged access to jobs, land, housing, life-time pensions, etc. The sense of betrayal is complete.

A Developed Future

The limits of development are now clear. The government estimates that Pakistan's population was 135 million in January 1997. The rate of increase of this population is estimated to be close to 3%. If the population keeps growing at 3% per year then it will double in size every twenty five years or so. This means that fifty years from now, when Pakistan is celebrating 100 years of independence, the population will be close 600 million people, more than four times what it is now.

Where will these people live? Pakistan has a total area of some 800,000 square kilometres, but not all of it is equally habitable. About a third of the land is incapable of growing trees, shrubs or even grass and cannot support large numbers of people. Another 30% is agricultural, and cannot be used for intense settlement. The population of 600 million will have to live in the remaining one-third of the country. If 600 million people are packed equally into this area it will mean a population density of about 2500 people per square kilometre. For comparison, Karachi has a population density that ranges from 1500 to 2500 people per square km. In other words, by 2047 all of the inhabitable area of Pakistan would be one giant Karachi slum.

To get some sense of what such a city would be like, consider the basic facts of day to day life. Assume that the land set aside for producing food for all these people can indeed feed all these people, by dint of pesticides, insecticides, herbicides, fertilisers, and genetic engineering of plant variety, they will still need water to drink, to cook with, to wash in, and to wash their clothes in. The population would need at least 200 Tarbela reservoirs full of fresh water every day.

Since the rivers carry much of their water in the spring and will be full not only of pesticides, insecticides and herbicides, but will also carry much greater amounts of industrial wastes such as chemicals and toxic heavy metals,

they will not be able to offer a clean and reliable water supply -- ask anyone who lives in Karachi! The water that will be needed could be produced by using all 300,000 or so tube-wells presently operating in Pakistan. It is worth remembering though that since the water the tube wells extract from the ground has first to get there, by slowly leaking down from the rivers, canals and after heavy rain, the underground water reservoirs can become polluted by industrial and agricultural processes and may remain polluted for hundreds if not thousands of years.

The real crisis, however, is much closer. As the cities grow, and demand for drinking water increases, and as the need for food increases, and demand for water for these crops grows, and as the debt gets bigger, and the need for cash crops and industrial goods for export becomes more pressing, and again increases the demand for water, Pakistan faces the natural limits of development.

Coping with the growing social and ecological failures created by development requires creating and implementing the kind of social policies that will address these failures and the underlying problems of development. To do this, and not repeat the mistakes of the last fifty years of development planning, means setting up participatory institutions that give people and communities direct control over the development process and the state. Such institutions are lacking in Pakistan. It is this need that the more than 2,000 thousand Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Pakistan have tried to fill.[1] But, NGOs can at most mediate between communities and the state. They offer no possibility of taking over the state and lack the financial resources and the political mandate to be a substitute for the state.

In this political vacuum, rather than confront the true

1 T. Banuri, S. R. Khan and M. Mahmood; *Just Development*, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 172

scale of its earlier failures at development, the debt ridden and militarised Pakistani state, administered by an elite that has enriched itself by siphoning off what little wealth was generated by development, is now surrendering to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and abandoning the rest of society. It is increasingly leaving citizens to fend for themselves and obtain what the state had once promised it would provide, namely, employment, education, health, and housing.[1] The response to this act of abandonment is that society is, in turn, abandoning the state. People refuse to pay taxes, have contempt for public authority, especially the police, and see the state as irrecoverably corrupt, an institution designed only for the illicit accumulation of wealth by those working for it, their families and friends. People are individually declaring their independence from government. If this continues, there will soon be a state without people and people without a state.

1 S. R. Khan; *Do IMF and World Bank Policies Work?*, SDPI, 1997

Jinnah's Vision of Pakistan

Sharif al Mujahid

For some years now, Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah's vision of Pakistan has been a source of controversy and conflict. Much of this has however tried to cut Jinnah to fit a predetermined image. A close look at Jinnah's long and chequered public life, encompassing some forty-four years (1904-48), helps determine the core values he was committed to throughout his political career.

This paper examines how Jinnah's politics evolved through main phases, which, though distinct, yet merged into the next, without sudden shifts. It analyses how his liberalism underwent an apparent paradigmatic shift from 1937 onwards, and led to him advocating the charismatic goal of Pakistan, and to elucidate it primarily in Islamic terms. Finally, the Islamic strain in his post independence pronouncements and his 11 August 1947 address is discussed, and an attempt made to reconcile it with his other pronouncements.

Jinnah as Liberal

In the first phase of his public life (1904-20) three main influences shaped Jinnah's personality and politics:

1. nineteenth century British liberalism, first

absorbed during his four-years' (1892-96) stay in England as a student of law,

2. the cosmopolitan atmosphere and mercantile background of metropolitan Bombay where he had established himself as an extremely successful barrister since the turn of the century, and

3. his close professional and personal contact with the Parsis, who, though only a tiny community provided an example of how initiative, enterprise and hard work could overcome numerical inferiority, racial prejudice and communal barriers.

These formative influences seem to have prompted Jinnah to join the Indian National Congress. Fashioned after liberal principles and cast in their mould, the Congress was at that time pledged to take India on the road to self-government through constitutional means. Soon enough, he rose high in its echelons, high enough to be its 'spokesman' for its representation to the Secretary of State on the reform of the India Council in May 1914. Jinnah believed in moderation, gradualism, ordered progress, evolutionary politics, democratic norms, and above all, in constitutionalism. When the Congress sought to abandon these liberal principles in 1920 and opted for revolution and extra constitutional methods, he walked out of the Congress for good.

The constitutionalist in Jinnah led to him having a similar experience with the Home Rule League (HRL). He had collaborated with it since it was founded by Annie Besant, and joined it in a show of solidarity when Besant was interned in 1917. In October 1920 Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, upon being elected HRL President on Jinnah's proposals, went about changing its constitution and its aims and objects and renaming it Swarajya Sabha rather unilaterally. Gandhi ruled out Jinnah's objections that the constitution could not be

changed unless supported by a three-fourths majority, and without proper notice. Jinnah, along with nineteen other members resigned, charging that the "changes in the constitution were made by adopting a procedure contrary to the rules and regulations of the (HR) League."

Throughout this period, in fact since 1897, Jinnah was active in Anjuman-I-Islam, Muslim Bombay's foremost religio-political body. In 1906 Jinnah opposed the demand for separate electorates, but before long his opposition thawed when he realized that the demand had "the mandate of the community". In 1910 he was elected to the Imperial Council on a reserved Muslim seat. From then on, he came in close contact with Nadwah, Aligarh and the All India Muslim League (AIML), and he was chosen by the AIML to sponsor a bill on Waqf alal Aulad, a problem of deep concern to Muslims since the time of Syed Ahmad Khan. Though not yet a formal member of the League, Jinnah was yet able to get the League committed to the twin ideals of self-government and Hindu-Muslim unity during the next three years, thus bringing the AIML on par with the Congress in terms of its objectives.

He joined the AIML formally in October 1913 and became its President in 1916. He utilized his pivotal position to get the Congress and the League act in concert, and work out common solutions to problems confronting the country. One result of his efforts was the Congress-League, Lucknow Pact of 1916, which settled the controversial electorate issue, at least for the time being, and paved the way towards a entente cordiale between Hindus and Muslims. Another result was the holding of Congress and League annual sessions at the same time and at the same place for seven years (1915-21).

It can be seen that there were three dominant strands in the first phase (1904-1920) of Jinnah's political career. These were a firm belief in a united Indian nationhood, with Hindus and Muslim sharing in the future Indian dispensation; a sense that Indian freedom could come through Hindu-Muslim unity,

and a need for unity in Muslim ranks through strengthening the Muslim League. These strands continued in the second phase (1920-37) as well; but with the years their position came to be reversed in his scale of priorities, as the Congress's ultimate objectives underwent a radical change under the influence of Hindu extremists. Jinnah's efforts for Muslim unity became increasingly pronounced with the years, becoming a passion with him towards the closing of the second phase.

For Jinnah, while national freedom for both Hindus and Muslims continued to be the supreme goal, the means adopted to achieve it underwent a dramatic change. If it could not be achieved through Hindu Muslim unity, it must be done through Hindu-Muslim separation; if it could not be secured through a composite Hindu-Muslim nationalism, it must be done through separate Hindu and Muslim nationalisms; if not through a united India, it must be through partition. In either case, the ultimate objective was to ensure political power for Muslims.

Jinnah's Transformation

The period after 1937 marked a paradigmatic shift. Jinnah became identified in the Muslim mind with the concept of the charismatic community, the concept which answered their psychic need for endowing and sanctifying their sense of community with a sense of power. Increasingly he became the embodiment of a Muslim national consensus, which explains why and how he had become their Quaid-i-Azam, even before the launching of the Pakistan demand in March 1940.

This shift was squarely reflected in his thinking, his posture, his platform, and in his political discourse. And of course his appearance -- for his public rallies Jinnah replaced his finely creased English Saville Row suits with achkan, tight pyjamas and, to boot, a karakuli cap. He still believed in democracy, but now felt parliamentary democracy of the

Westminster type was unsuitable for India because of the existence of a permanent majority and a permanent minority, which he defined in specific terms:

> Minorities means a combination of things. It may be that a minority has a different religion from the other citizens of a country. Their language may be different, their race may be different, their culture may be different, and the combination of all these various elements - religion, culture, race, language, arts, music and so forth makes the minority a separate entity in the State, and that separate entity as an entity wants safeguards.

Extending this elucidation, he occasionally called Muslims 'a nation', stressing their distinct religion, culture, language and civilization, and calling on them to "live or die as a nation". He even called the League flag 'the flag of Islam', arguing that "you cannot separate the Muslim League from Islam.

Jinnah also traveled across the other end of the political and ideological spectrum in other ways. Previously he had disdained mass politics, now he opted for mass politics. Previously he had objected to Gandhi's injection of religion into politics, now he was not averse to couch his appeals in Islamic terms and galvanising the Muslim masses by appealing to them in a cultural matrix they were familiar with. Previously he had called himself an Indian first and last, now he opted for an Islamic identity. Previously he had strived long and hard for a national consensus; now all his efforts were directed towards a Muslim consensus. Jinnah, the erstwhile "ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity" became the fiercest advocate of Hindu-Muslim separation.

Jinnah had a political basis for this paradigmatic shift, through which Muslims and Islam came to occupy the centre of his discourse. For one thing, how else could Muslims, scattered as they were unevenly throughout the subcontinent,

sharing with their non-Muslim neighbours local customs, ethos, languages, and problems and subjected to local conditions (whether political, social or economic) become a 'nation' except through their affiliation with Islam? For another, since Pakistan was to be established in the Muslim majority provinces, why else should the Muslims in the minority provinces struggle for Pakistan, except for their deep concern for the fate and future of Islam in India? Above all, what linked them irretrievably with their fellow Muslims in the majority areas except this concern?

In an address to Gaya Muslim League Conference in January 1938, Jinnah begun mapping out his new world view. He said:

> When we say 'This flag is the flag of Islam' they think we are introducing religion into politics - a fact of which we are proud. Islam gives us a complete code. It is not only religion but it contains laws, philosophy and politics, In fact, it contains everything that matters to a man from morning to night. When we talk of Islam we take it as an all embracing word. We do not mean any ill. The foundation of our Islamic code is that we stand for liberty, equality and fraternity.

Jinnah then used this to argue the case for Pakistan at two levels. First, he invoked the universally recognized principle of self-determination. But it was invoked not on the familiar territorial basis, but for the Muslim nation alone. As he stipulated in his marathon talks with Gandhi in September 1944, the constituency for the plebiscite to decide upon the Pakistan demand would comprise only the Muslims, and not the entire population of the areas concerned. Second, he spelled out his reasons for reaching out towards the 'Pakistan' goal in his Lahore (1940) address in more or less ideological terms, arguing that "Islam and Hinduism... are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are... different and distinct

social orders", that "the Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literature", "to two different civilizations", that they "derive their inspiration from different sources of history"... (with) different epics, different heroes and different episodes." "We wish our people", he declared, "to develop to the fullest our spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political life in a way that we think best and in consonance with our own ideals and according to the genius of our people."

Jinnah developed this into a definition of Muslim nationhood that was most cogent, the most closely argued, and the most firmly based in international law since the time of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. "We are a nation," he wrote to Gandhi on 17 September 1944, "with our distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of values and proportion, legal laws and moral code, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitude and ambitions; in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life."

He returned to this more extensively in his Id message in September 1945, saying:

> "Everyone, except those who are ignorant, knows that the Quran is the general code of the Muslims. A religious, social, civil, commercial, military, judicial, criminal, penal code, it regulates everything from the ceremonies of religion to those of daily life; from the salvation of the soul to the health of the body; from the rights of all to those of each individual; from morality to crime, from punishment here to that in the life to come, and our Prophet has enjoined on us that every Musalman should possess a copy of the Quran and be his own priest. Therefore Islam is not merely confined to the spiritual tenets and doctrines or rituals and ceremonies. It is a complete code regulating the whole Muslim society, every

department of life, collective[ly] and individually."

Jinnah's Realisation

After independence, as head of the state he had founded, Jinnah talked in the same strain. He talked of securing "liberty, fraternity and equality as enjoined upon us by Islam" (25 August 1947); of "Islamic democracy, Islamic social justice and the equality of manhood" (21 February 1948); of raising Pakistan on "sure foundations of social justice and Islamic socialism which emphasized equality and brotherhood of man" (26 March 1948); of laying "the foundations of our democracy on the basis of true Islamic ideals and principles" (14 August 1948); and "the onward march of renaissance of Islamic culture and ideals" (18 August 1947). He called upon the mammoth Lahore audience to build up "Pakistan as a bulwark of Islam", to "live up to your traditions and add to it another chapter of glory", adding, "If we take our inspiration and guidance from the Holy Quran, the final victory, I once again say, will be ours" (30 October 1947).

As for the specific institutions of the new state, he exhorted the armed forces to uphold "the high traditions of Islam and our National Banner" (8 November 1947); and commended the State Bank research organization to evolve "banking practices compatible with Islamic ideals of social and economic life" and to "work our destiny in our own way and present to the world an economic system based on true Islamic concept of equality of manhood and social justice" (1 July 1948).

For Jinnah, "the creation of a State of our own was a means to an end and not the end in itself. The idea was that we should have a State in which we could live and breathe as free men and which we could develop according to our own lights and culture and where principles of Islamic social justice could find free play" (11 October 1947). He told Edwards College students that "this mighty land has now been brought

under a rule, which is Islamic, Muslim rule, as a sovereign independent State" (18 April 1948). He even described Pakistan as "the premier Islamic State" (February 1948).

Jinnah's broadcast to the people of the United States (February 1948) is in a similar vein:

> I do not know what the ultimate shape of this constitution is going to be, but I am sure that it will be of a democratic type, embodying the essential principles of Islam. Today, they are as applicable in actual life as they were 1300 years ago. Islam and its idealism have taught us democracy. It has taught equality of men, justice and fairly play to everybody. We are the inheritors of these glorious traditions and are fully alive to our responsibilities and obligations as framers of the future constitution of Pakistan. In any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic State -- to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non- Muslims -- Hindus, Christians, and Parsis -- but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan.

In this broadcast, Jinnah, the constitutionalist that he was, refused to forestall the shape of the constitution, in order not to fetter the Pakistan Constituent Assembly from taking decisions it deemed fit. While he laid a good deal of stress on Islamic ideals and principles, he ruled out theocracy, saying "Pakistan is not a theocracy or anything like it. Islam demands from us the tolerance of other creeds."

Technically speaking, theocracy means a government "by ordained priests, who wield authority as being specially appointed by those who claim to derive their rights from their sacerdotal position." Unlike Catholicism, there is no established church in Islam; (in fact, it decries such a church).

Moreover, since Islam admits of no priestcraft, since it discountenances a sacerdotal class as the bearer of an infallible authority, and since it concedes the right of ijtihad to "men of common sense", the concept of theocracy is absolutely foreign to Islam. Hence, during the debate on the Objectives Resolution (March 1947), Mian Iftikharuddin refuted the Congress members fears about the sovereignty clause, saying that "the wording of the Preamble does not in any way make the Objectives Resolution any the more theocratic, any the more religious than the Resolution or statement of fundamental principles of some of the modern countries of the world" (10 March 1949). Thus neither Iqbal, nor Jinnah, nor any of the independence leaders (including Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani) stood for a theocratic state.

Of all Jinnah's pronouncements it is his 11 August address that has received the greatest attention since the birth of Pakistan, and spawned a good deal of controversy. Although made somewhat off-the-cuff -- he said that "I cannot make any well-considered pronouncement, but I shall say a few things as they occur to me" -- it is considered a policy statement. He said:

> ... If you change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter to what community he belongs, ... is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make. ...we must learn a lesson from this [our past experience]. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed - that has nothing to do with the business of the state ... we are starting in the days when there is no discrimination between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste, or

> creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State.... I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state.

Not surprisingly, it has elicited varied comments from scholars and contemporary journalists. One scholar has put it down to "loose thinking and imprecise wording" and a departure from Jinnah's erstwhile position. Another calls it "a remarkable reversal" and asks "was he [Jinnah] pleading for a united India - on the eve of Pakistan?" In dissecting this statement, there is, however, little that could lend itself to disputation. There is no problems with the dictum that every one, no matter what community he belongs to, would be entitled to full fledged citizenship, with equal rights, privileges and obligations, that there would no discrimination between one community and another, and that all of them would be citizens and equal citizens of one state. These principles Jinnah had reiterated time and again during the struggle period, though not in the same words.

It is, however, not usually recognized that political equality in general terms (because absolutism was the rule at the time of the advent of Islam) and equality before law in more specific terms are attributes Islam had recognized long before the world discovered them as secular values. They were exemplified in the Misaq-i-Madinah, the pact between the Prophet (PBUH) and Aus and Khazraj, and in his letter to Abul Hairs, Christian priest and the accredited representative of the Christians of Najran, and in the conduct of the Khulfa-i-Rashidun. This covenant, comprising 47 clauses, lays down, inter alia, that the Quraishite Muslim, the Medinites and the

Jews of Banu Auf from one community apart from other people, that the Jews shall have their religion and the Muslims their own, that they shall help each other against one who fights with the people of the covenant. Now, how could these disparate tribes characterised by differing religious affiliations from one political community unless their entitlement to equal rights, privileges and obligations are conceded in the first place. A community postulates such entitlement, and it may be conjectured that Jinnah believed that Islam concedes equal citizenship to one and all, without reference to creed, colour or race.

Finally one crucial question. If it is still contended that Jinnah had envisaged a 'secular' state, does one pronouncement prevail over a plethora of pronouncements made before and after the establishment of Pakistan. Does one morsel make a dinner? Does one swallow make a summer? A close study all of Jinnah's pronouncements during 1934-48, and most of his pronouncement during the pre-1934 period, shows that the word, 'secular' (signifying an ideology) does not find a mention in any of them. Even when confronted with the question, he evaded it -- as the following extracts from his 17 July 1947 press conference indicates:

> Question: "Will Pakistan be a secular or theocratic state?"

Mr. M.A. Jinnah: "You are asking me a question that is absurd. I do not know what a theocratic state means."

A correspondent suggested that a theocratic State meant a State where only people of a particular religion, for example, Muslims, could be full citizens and Non-Muslims would not be full citizens.

Mr. M.A. Jinnah: "Then it seems to me that what I have already said is like throwing water on duck's back (laughter). When you talk of democracy, I am afraid you have not studied Islam. We learned democracy thirteen centuries ago."

It is well to recall the ideological environment of the period in which the pronouncements we are trying to dissect, analyse and interpret today were made. It was already a bipolar world, smitten by the gathering cold war. The great ideological divide had warped simple and long familiar words such as freedom, liberty, equality, democracy, state, sovereignty, justice, and tyranny with ideological overtones. Hence these concepts had to be qualified to mean what they actually stand for. Hence when Jinnah talks of the concept of a democratic type embodying the essential principles of Islam, he was giving notice that he did not mean the standard Western type or the Soviet brand of people's democracy, but a sort of 'Islamic democracy' which, while retaining the institutional appurtenances of a democratic structure, is congruent with Muslims' ethos, aspirations and code of morality. And, as Mian Iftikharuddin argued, "no one need object to the word 'Islamic.' If we can use the words, 'Roman Law' or the 'British Parliamentary system' and so many other terms without shame or stint, then why not 'Islamic'?"

Conclusion

Jinnah was the most Westernised political leader in all the annals of Indian Islam; no other Muslim political leader could match him in terms of modernity and a modern outlook. He was completely at home with the milieu in cosmopolitan Bombay and metropolitan London. He also married a Parsi girl, so unconventional for a Muslim leader at that time, though after getting her converted to Islam. During his chequered career, Jinnah came in contact with an exceedingly large number of non-Muslim leading personalities and a host of British officials, more than any other Muslim leader and had interacted with them for some four decades -- before he underwent a paradigmatic shift. Jinnah was also a man who minced no words, stood no humbug, and called a spade a spade. He held political rhetoric in high disdain; he preferred political wilderness to playing to the gallery. Such a man could

not possibly have gone in for an Islamic orientated discourse unless he felt that the Islamic values he was commending were at home with the values underlying modernity, that Islam was in consonance with progress and modernity. During the debate on Islam and secularism, this is a point that has lain ignored.

Working Towards Pakistan-India Peace

Mubashir Hasan

The work of promotion of peace between Pakistan and India is a gigantic undertaking. The two main impediments to such a peace are ideological and political. The economic and religious arguments advanced by sections of populations in both the countries are not as relevant as they are generally assumed to be. These are used by vested interests merely to supplement the first two. However, they all come as one package and each may be separately considered for the purpose of this discussion.

In the realm of ideology, the hydra-headed monster of nationalism needs to be dethroned from its high pedestal. The irrational emotional relationship between citizens and the state, its armed might, its honour, its destiny, its unique personality, its superiority over other nations has to be replaced by a rational loyalty and patriotism which serves as a vehicle of peace and humanism. Politically, it is the permanent establishments of the states, their collaborating political forces, the beneficiaries of the present exploitative order, the intellectuals of the ideology of imperial nationalism and the domestic and foreign allies such as international arms merchants and the obscurantists which need to be confronted.

The strategy of peace comprises, first and foremost, in securing the empowerment of the allies of peace in political, economic and social fields. All platforms for securing the basic human rights of the vast majority of the population, as individuals or in groups, are platforms of peace between India and Pakistan. The allies of peace are hundreds and hundreds of millions of unorganised, hapless, poor, downtrodden masses and their supporters from the middle and upper classes who may be found all over, sometimes confused, often in disarray and generally with sights fixed on other than real objectives.

The Ideological Factor

The premises of the independence struggle were pregnant with ideas and mechanisms destined to lead to our pre-1947 history and what has followed since then. The founding fathers of the nation states of South Asia, while they were students in Britain, during the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the present century, had imbibed with great enthusiasm the ideology of nationalism as it had evolved in the imperial nations. In that era there was no way for young students from India, or for that matter from any of the colonised part of the world, but to be deeply impressed by what they came across in the countries that they had gone to for higher studies.

The younger generations from the imperial colonies found their host nations politically powerful, technologically advanced and far more prosperous than their own country. Moreover, they discovered the lands of Europe and North America were divided into nation states, each with a claim to be inhabited by a people unique as a cultural, social and political entity. The polities were structured and organised as sovereign states. The system of governance was called democracy with elected parliaments. Elections were regularly held and new governments were formed without strife or turmoil. The inhabitants of the imperial nations of the West were no longer subject to the arbitrary rule of a lord or a king. They had become citizens and as such acquired certain

inalienable rights which were enforceable through courts of law.

The ruling elites depicted their system of governance as government of the people, for the people, by the people. Liberty, Equality and Fraternity was the motto bestowed to the peoples of Europe by the French Revolution. Under the social contract they had evolved, citizens owed the highest loyalty to their nation-state for which they lived and were also prepared to die. They were nationalists. The nation was sovereign and it was answerable to none. Dedication to the principles of nationalism was akin to a dedication to a political religion.

The ideology of nationalism that took root in Europe and North America emerged as a new religion in form and content. The religion of yesteryear got split into religious and, what came to be termed as, secular components. The religious component became a matter of the private faith of the individual. The newly emerged nationalist faith took over the secular domain. The nation-state replaced the church in claiming the highest loyalty and devotion on political, social, economic and cultural questions. The national constitution acquired the sanctity of a sacred text. National heroes emerged more easily than religious saints used to be recognised in earlier times. There were national causes, a national destiny, national will, national honour, national flag, national struggle, national days, national pride, national culture, national language and national dress. National armies came into being to fight national wars to claim national victories and produce national martyrs.

The nationalist faith demanded that that the nation state constituted a kind of holy unit. Each nation was sovereign. It was a law unto itself. It could do no wrong. Its superiority over all other nations of the world was a matter of faith. Each nation had a destiny. Each nation had its distinctive culture, indeed, for larger nations a distinct civilisation which was

superior to all others. A nation's territory was sacred soil and to be defended at all cost with all the armed might that the national economy could possibly allow. The nations lying across the border must be considered potential enemies. Each nation must covet as much territory as possible and extend its political and economic influence over the territories that lie within other national boundaries.

This brand of nationalism permitted a nation to commit violence on another nation without any sense of guilt. Conquest through violence legitimised all. Wars, there had always been. But before the era of nationalism, wars between states were fought by kings through professional armies. The professional soldier could fight for a king today and against him the next day. The people were not expected to be a party to a war. In the era of nationalism wars became national wars. One people are supposed to be fighting another people. To kill in the name of the nation was sacred. Deaths directly caused by World War II alone and China have been estimated as 10 to 20 percent of the total population of USSR, Poland and Yugoslavia, between four to six percent of Germany, Italy, Austria, Hungary, Japan and China, about one percent of Britain and France, and slightly more in USA. Another estimate suggests there have been 187 million deaths in this century due to wars and strife between nations.

Gandhi and Jinnah, their seniors Dadabhai Naoroji, Pherozeshah Mehta, Syed Ahmad Khan, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, and their juniors, Jawaharlal Nehru, Subhas Bose, Liaqat Ali, to name only a few out of a vast galaxy of leaders from two generations of freedom fighters, appreciated and embraced the ideology of nationalism. In line with ideals of nationalism they demanded self-determination for India. They really believed that once India was free from the British yoke, all the problems would be solved. India would become a strong and prosperous country and would be rid of oppression and injustice.

Half a century after the achievement of independence, the peoples of the subcontinent have become intense nationalists but they have remained poor, backward, illiterate and ill-nourished paying only lip service to the concepts of liberty, equality and fraternity. At the altar of nationalism our rulers and politicians have made sacrificial offerings of home and hearth, life and property, development and progress, the health and happiness of hundreds of millions of weak, hapless and down trodden masses.

The nationalist creed adopted by the political leaders of the subcontinent failed to make their states truly imperial after independence. In the middle of this century, the nations of South Asia were in no way the emerging technological, industrial, commercial and military powers, as the nations of Europe were in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Being too weak, the South Asians could not confront the real imperialists of the world. All they could do with their imperial nationalist ideology and ambitions was to exercise imperialism within the borders of the former Indian Empire vacated the British. Rivalries of the imperial kind took no time to emerge. The dispute over the former state of Jammu and Kashmir was the first to surface. Today, Pakistan describes it as the core issue of its dissent with India.

The confrontation between India and Pakistan is based on the conflicting aspirations, rights and claims of one country against the other, all stemming from the adherence of each to the nationalist faith. In that Pakistan and India are not alone. A distinguished Sri Lankan intellectual told this writer that Sri Lanka feels that Lord Curzon is still in action in the South Block of the Indian Secretariat. The Nepalese also complain of the similarities of the treatment given them by the British and attempted by India after 1947.

The reality of the imperial mind set of the rulers all the states of South Asia gets clearly revealed when one surveys the attitudes of New Delhi, Islamabad, Colombo, Kathmandu and

Dhaka towards the states and provinces they rule. India had lost no time in annexing the princely states. Some like Junagadh and Mongrol were simultaneously claimed by Pakistan. For years, Indian leaders thought of undoing the 1947 partition of the country between Pakistan and India. Just as there were a few in India who dreamed of India exercising hegemony from Suez to the Straits of Malacca, there were also a few Pakistanis who dreamed of unfurling the flag of Pakistan over the Red Fort in Delhi.

In the tradition of the colonial rulers, the ruling elites of South Asia continue to act in a highly authoritarian manner. These states remain imperial in thought and action, ever ready to use force to fight the neighbouring state or to suppress racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious groups of people who demand liberty, autonomy, self-determination or independence from the clutches of our highly centralised and exploitative administrations in New Delhi, Islamabad, Dhaka and Colombo, ruling in the name of their nation states. But for the massive exercise of state violence the integrity of the states of South Asia would be in serious jeopardy. The burgeoning budgets of police and military, are proof, if one is needed, that the situation is getting worse year by year.

Pakistan developed a major internal colonial enterprise in its province of East Pakistan. It was therefore only natural that political and economic demands based on the doctrine of nationalism should emerge in the land of the Bengalis. Despite the use of massive military power in an environment of intense nationalist rivalry with the neighbour India, Pakistan could not prevent the establishment of Bangladesh. The elites of India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan have freely used the imperial apparatus of the state built by the British, to maintain 'internal security' against the dissenting populations residing in their countries. Only imperial mind sets were capable of doing that.

Unfortunately for peoples of the former colonies, there was no universally accepted basis of who constituted a nation.

The problem has remained unresolved and has often resulted in large scale violence. Masses of people have been claiming to be a nation on the basis of race, religion, language, ethnicity, tribal identity or territory, among others. To further their national aspiration, they are willing to use violence to achieve their end. That is what the nationalist ideology justifies for them. They may want increased representation, increased financial allocation, autonomy, or secession, all in the name of national self-determination. The states of South Asia have faced this problem of major dimension in one form or the other.

The Political Factor

Long before 1947, the elites of India had already founded political parties catering to a limited franchise. The framework of forming political parties followed was borrowed from imperialist countries. The demands in the party manifestos almost entirely consisted of issues related to the exercise of political power by an elite minority. Social and economic issues especially the interests of the weak and downtrodden received scant attention.

Years before the Indian National Congress or the All India Muslim League had adopted resolutions of independence, sections of the elites had begun to think in nationalist and imperial terms. In 1927, Malcolm Hailey, Member Governor General's Executive Council, in a letter to Arthur Hirtzel, Permanent Secretary in the India Office, narrated the mood of the elite of the Muslim North-West in the following words:

> They see that they can never have the same interests as Muslims in the provinces with large Hindu majorities and they seriously think of ... starting a Federation of their own. This will seek to embrace the Punjab, parts of the U.P., the North West Frontier, Baluchistan and Sindh; it is part of the programme to secure Sindh for Punjab and to give up to Delhi some of our Hindu districts in the South

> East of the province. They openly say that this in itself is only a preparation for a larger Federation which shall embrace Afghanistan and perhaps Persia... You will notice that the dream of the future to which I have alluded does not include Bengal. For the moment, the Northern India Moslem has given up his coreligionist in Bengal as hopeless and seems to expect no assistance from Bengal in the cause of Islam.[1]

The nationalist and imperialist thinking of the elite of the North West, Hailey knew so well, is patently clear. It was such thinking among Muslims as well Hindus, that lead to the clash between provincial and All India interests in the third decade of this century. The political battles between political parties, and within the parties themselves, were fought on the basis of nationalist and imperialist lines of thought.

Perhaps the hold of an imperial mind set among a socially and economically backward people, and the political wrangling it gave rise to, would not have sufficed for the development of the deadly confrontation between Hindus and Muslims and the Congress and the League before 1947 and between India and Pakistan after 1947. The colonial feudal culture of the ruling elites played a significant role in their political failures. An important value of this culture is loyalty. Under the bond of loyalty, a client-patron relationship permeates the entire society: *wafadari ba-shartay oostuvari asl-e-iman hai.*

This finds its day to expressions such as be loyal to personality; leave decisions to the leader; once an enemy always an enemy; once a friend always a friend. Be loyal to words; right or wrong, remain steadfast to what you have uttered (*Patharr par lakeer*). Word is more important than deed; come what may the man of honour and prestige sticks to his

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1 Cited in *Prelude to Partition* by David Page, 1987, Oxford, page 162

word; a war of words should never be lost, the spectre of real war matters little (*Gardan kat sakti hai, jhuk nahin sakti*). It is unmanly and humiliating to compromise. Do not forget or forgive, never allow the wound inflicted by tongue to heal. Never state your stand in concrete terms, stick to abstractions. Remain on guard, you are surrounded by enemies.

The political forces and power play necessary to maintain an iniquitous social and economic order based on violence irresistibly makes the members of the ruling elites adopt inhuman and immoral behaviour. They cannot afford to let considerations of ethics and aesthetics, environment and morality, peace and war come in their way when the stake is power or profit. The cult of pursuit of profit and power at all cost has played havoc with the peace and tranquillity within nation states. It has criminalised politics and brutalised the society. K.K.Aziz, the Pakistani historian, in a published lecture, "Are We Living in a Democratic Society" (1994), has characterised the normal behaviour of the Pakistani society in the following terms: intolerance, self-righteousness, inconsideration, selfishness, hypocrisy, irresponsibility, emotionalism, violence, and hatred.

Disagreements among the countries of South Asia after independence have continued on the pattern of the disagreements between political parties before independence. Before 1947, there was no dearth of attempts between political parties, political leaders and eminent persons to arrive at a consensus on how India was to be governed after the departure of the British; these included the Leaders Conference (1922), the Delhi Muslim Proposals (1927), The All Parties Conference (1928), The Motilal Nehru Committee's efforts (1928), Jinnah's Fourteen Points (1929), the Three Round Table Conferences in the early thirties, the Cripps Mission (1942), Gandhi-Jinnah Talks (1944), the Simla Conference (1945), the Cabinet Mission Talks (1946), and the London Conference in (1946).

Today, the seemingly unending confrontation between

India and Pakistan, duly sanctified by the interplay of ideological, political and cultural factors, is the principal weapon in the hands of the ruling elites of South Asia. The clash of interests among the elites notwithstanding, the ideology of nationalism clears the way for the two to collaborate in the name of the nation state. Committed to this insidious ideology they are able to raise the fear of the other nation state in the psyche of the people and present themselves as saviours. It has permitted the predatory elites to maintain an oppressive and exploitative order.

The most profound negative impact of the collaboration between the permanent establishment of the state and the politicians is the sanctification of preparation for and perpetration of violence on massive scale for the achievement of political ends. They consider war as politics by other means and keep their nations ready to inflict mass violence not only upon the neighbouring states but also upon their own people. Ethnic group, minority communities and lower castes are victims of such violence in the name of preserving the integrity of the state. A tiny minority maintains its rule over a vast majority by violent means. In the footsteps of the former colonial masters the policy of divide and rule is unashamedly practised by the little imperialist of today.

Working Towards Peace

Given the above, there are many issues through which the cause of peace may be advanced. Campaigns on any one or more of the following are part of the peace platform: for life, liberty and security of person, against bondage and slavery, against torture and cruel punishment, for recognition and equality before the law, against arbitrary arrest and detention, for presumption of innocence unless proved guilty, for privacy of person, home and correspondence, for freedom of movement, to marry and founding a family, for freedom of thought and conscience, for freedom of opinion and expression, for freedom of assembly and association, for free

and fair elections, for participating in governance, for favourable and just remuneration, for health care, for social security, for right to work, for equal pay for equal work, for the rights of minorities, for the rights of women, for the rights of child, for the right to be educated, against bureaucratic oppression, for democratic governance at lower levels of governmental organisations, for decentralisation of political, economic and social power, against bureaucratic governance, for devolution of power from salaried establishment to democratic institutions, against use of violent means to resolve political problems, for processes of negotiation, mediation and arbitration, against the ideology of imperial nationalism.

There are not many political parties in Pakistan or India which sincerely subscribe to a substantial number of the campaigns mentioned in the preceding paragraph, although lip service is generally paid by quite a few in their election manifestos. However, a very large number of non-governmental organisations, which are non-political, assiduously pursue one or more of the causes enumerated above. The exchange of views among them needs to be expanded and there may be a need to create a new organisation for this specific purpose. Any degree of co-operation achieved will contribute towards the goal of peace among nations. However, since the ultimate goal is the emancipation of the oppressed and the exploited, the nature of the endeavour is essentially political. The need to create awareness of this fact among activists in social fields is supreme.

The concept of empowerment of the people needs to be spread. In principle, the empowerment of the people should mean that big government i.e. one that exercises power from a distant capital through a manipulatable bureaucracy, primarily interested in its salary and promotions and serving the cause of an oppressive political order; be replaced. The need is for democratic institutions exercising jurisdiction over relatively much smaller territories, and which ensure:

(a) protection of life and property,

(b) prompt and fair trial of criminal cases,

(c) transparent system of land record and of settlement of revenue and civil disputes,

(d) economic and efficient running of local health and educationalfacilities,

(e) maintenance and operation of local communications,

(f) ownership and management of state owned lands and natural resources,

(g) supervisory powers over the operations of national and state service systems such as electrical power, irrigation, communications.

Decentralisation implies that wherever possible executive, and judicial matters should be resolved at the local level. Transfer of power on a vast scale, including that of tax collection, is required from the central to the state/provincial level and further to the levels of divisions, districts, cities, towns, villages. However, the detailed mechanism of the decentralisation of the coercive power of the state has to be such that when the executive, judicial and some tax collecting power does not constitute a leap for the people from the frying pan of the present elite into the fire of the local strongmen. The task of re-educating and re-training political and social cadres able to take over from the salaried officers created by the former imperial rulers is of prime importance.

There can be no genuine peace between India and Pakistan unless there is peace within each country. The peoples of both countries need basic changes in their structure of governance. Both need an atmosphere of freedom from restraints which stand in the way of creative activity. The role of the depredatory conservative elites has to be reined in.

These objectives are worth pursuing not only for the cause of internal peace but also to move towards peace between the two countries.

Those of us who have been actively engaged in promoting peace between the two countries have been much encouraged by the response among the people in favour of peace moves. The objective of promoting peace requires mobilising the people on both sides to a degree that leaders may feel free to take the right steps to normalise their relations. However, that is only a part, undoubtedly an important part, of what is required to be done. The objective of mobilising the people is indeed worth pursuing. However, it is a necessary but not sufficient condition. There are two other paramount considerations besides persuading the governments to come to some agreement.

During the last seven years a large number of political leaders and intellectuals in India as well as Pakistan have been kind enough to receive me to discuss the problems in the way of improving relations between the two countries. I have been regularly calling upon prime ministers, foreign ministers, secretaries to government and High Commissioners. The present and the former Presidents of Pakistan have generously spared time to listen to whatever I had to say or suggest. Besides leaders in government, I have called upon all the well known leaders of opposition in both the countries. I have also had occasions to meet a large number of retired generals and foreign secretaries. The result of these meeting over this considerable period has been a source of encouragement. Except for one leader of an opposition party in India (not BJP), I have not met any leader in India who, in private, has not favoured the cause of promoting peace between the two countries. The position of Pakistani leaders has been similar. However, when it comes to expressing their views in public they speak differently. This is quite understandable in the case of political leaders who can publicly only speak what they

believe in when it is acceptable to their political followers.

It may sound strange to many Indians and some Pakistanis who are working for peace that the nature of the opposition to the moves towards peace in Pakistan is not as rigid as it is in India. The Pakistanis who are believed to be strongly opposed to talks with India are always able to put forward a strong case. It is difficult to refute the facts they are able to muster in support of their argument. That, however, not withstanding, I have often found them willing to consider a different point of view.

Second, as we attempt to influence political leaders of Pakistan and India, a lasting resolution of the Kashmir dispute needs to be found. Even if the leaders of India and Pakistan agree to a particular solution of the question of Jammu and Kashmir which is contrary to the march of historical process, it shall not be the right solution. History is replete with countries and group of countries enforcing unworkable solutions to the problems that happen to fall in the sphere of their physical power. No government dedicated to govern through a highly centralised centre is likely to succeed to bring peace not only to the state of Jammu and Kashmir but to other provinces and states. The question of self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir has become a central problem. It can only be resolved through a wisely pursued course taking into account the basic aspirations of its peoples.

Militarisation, Nation and Gender: Women's Bodies as Arenas of Violent Conflict

Rubina Saigol

Recent feminist theories of nationalism have pointed out that the *Qaum* (nation) is essentially feminine in construction. The nation is narrated on the body of women who become an emotionally-laden symbol of the nation, self, the inner, spiritual world and home. One's motherland or *maadar-e-watan*, as it comes to be called, becomes invested with the kind of erotic attraction felt towards women, especially in the figure of the mother. The country comes to be appropriated, represented and contained within words which have strong romantic, erotic as well as maternal connotations. The desire for this land/woman/*dharti* is constructed as masculine desire; the desire to possess it, see it, admire it, love it, protect it and die fighting for it against rivals.

Since the desire for women gets transferred on to the nation and women's bodies come to signify the nation, communal, regional, national and international conflicts come

to be played out on women's bodies. These bodies thus become arenas of violent struggle. Women are humiliated, tortured, brutally raped, and murdered as part of the process by which the sense of being a nation is created and reinforced.

The first part of this paper will examine the ways in which gender ideology lies at the heart of the production of nationalist and militarist thought in Pakistan. The second part will look at how women's bodies were used during Partition as part of a national battle to create Pakistan and India.

Militarisation and the Erotics of Nationalism

Pakistan complicates and enriches a more general understanding of the gendered construction of the nation. Pakistan as an idea was imagined in opposition to Hindu/India within the parameters of the two-nation theory. There are constant attempts at the level of popular and official discourse to assert Pakistan's and Islam's difference from India and Hindus; in fact these two are often represented as the exact opposite of each other.[1]

When self-definition depends so desperately on real or imagined difference, this difference has to be asserted aggressively, consistently and violently. Most States maintain large standing armies for the purpose of protecting and maintaining the boundaries of the Self against encroachment, conquest, invasion and intrusion by the 'enemy'. These armies are provided with the latest weapons of mass destruction to enable them to enforce internal cohesion and integration, while sealing off the borders against the threatening and polluting outsiders. Militarisation thus becomes the foremost imperative of the nation-state, frequently its number one priority even at the expense of the welfare and happiness of its citizenry which it claims to protect.

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1 R. Saigol, *Knowledge and Identity: Articulation of Gender in Educational Discourse in Pakistan*, ASR Publications, 1995, pp. 217-243

The concept of militarisation is being used here not merely to denote a large, standing army equipped with the latest nuclear and conventional weapons. Militarisation, in a wider and more comprehensive sense, entails the effects of militaristic thinking on an entire society. This happens when the whole society becomes so permeated by violent imagery, thought, emotion, cognition and imagining, that it becomes inconceivable to solve any conflict without resorting to the force of arms. All institutions of society become saturated with violence and ideas of combat, battle, fighting, blood, martyrdom, victory, defeat, heroes and traitors become a part of everyday life even in civilian matters. In such cases, even the language of the military is borrowed and internalised by the civilian institutions, for example, words such as 'strategy', 'plan of action', 'targets' have become part of common usage in the departments of population, education and social welfare. Violence becomes so much a part of everyday consciousness that its brutal effects, its painful consequences and its tragic outcomes are obliterated.

The nation-state, as a form of legitimised violence, inscribes itself on the mind at both the conscious and unconscious levels. This is done through imagery which has immense evocative power through its associations with other objects which are invested with desire. The desire for objects of love is displaced on to the nation-state which becomes a highly erotic entity. It becomes the object of desire, the subject of poetry and song and it comes to be eulogised in the mass media, textbooks and public monuments.

A complex and intricate relationship develops between the predominance of military values, love and desire for the nation-state and gender ideology. This relation is articulated through the construction of the nation state as mother. As Saba Khattak writes "The nation state is portrayed as the mother which needs protection against the outside enemy. This appeals... to a male macho psyche that is called for

defence and survival."[1] As an example of the 'protector' and 'protected', she quotes Sardar Assef Ali, the former foreign minister, as having said that "to us the nuclear programme is similar to the honour of our mothers and sisters, and we are committed to defending it at all cost."

This kind of imagery is clearly evident in our nationalistic songs, poetry, *taranas*, *milli naghmas*, television plays and popular films. A song from the old movie *Aag Ka Darya*, (River of Fire), which became very popular, goes: *Ay Watan hum hain teri shama key parwanon mein* (Oh, Country you are the candle around which we, your lovers, hover). *Shama* (candle) and *parwana* (the lover) are commonplace images used generously in Urdu poetry to denote the beloved and the lover who yearns for her and burns in the pain of her love. In the song, the country becomes the beloved, therefore feminine, and the lover represents male desire. It reflects the displacement of private passion on to the public sphere of the nation.

There is ample evidence of the appropriating and desirous male gaze in other nationalist songs. One of the oldest comes from the national poet, Allama Iqbal, who wrote:

Saaray Jehan say Acha, Hindustan Hamara

Hum bulbulain hain is ki, yeh gulsitan hamara

Hindustan is better than the entire world

We are its nightingales and the land is our garden

Similar feelings are echoed later in a famous song: *Chaand meri zamin, phool mera watan* (My land is the moon, My country is a flower). These songs are extremely well-known

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1 S. G. Khattak; Militarization, Masculinity and Identity in Pakistan - Effects on Women, in *Unveiling the Issues: Pakistani Women's Perspectives on Social, Political and Ideological Issues*, eds., N. S. Khan and A. S. Zia, ASR Publications,1995, p. 63

and popular. They are often sung in schools and are printed in school textbooks next to pictures of war heroes, guns, tanks, fighter jets and submarines. In all three examples above, the country/land is compared to something considered beautiful in local folklore and national imagery. In the first case, the land/beloved is a candle/light around whom the burning lover hovers; in the second case the land is a garden and the lovers are bulbuls who sing love songs for the beloved; and in the third case the land is compared with the moon (usually considered beautiful) and the country with a flower, another symbol of beauty and romance.

The use of such romantic metaphors for the country is widespread in nationalistic poetry. Massive amounts of passion is displaced on to the land which is invested with images normally used for women and hardly ever used to describe men. The subject of desire is male and the gaze is also that of a male looking upon a beloved. The active/passive relation is easily discernible in the above poems as the candle is passive and it is the masculine *parwana* who hovers around her, the garden is passive and the active *bulbul* sings to it.

The connection of woman with inanimate objects, whether the moon, land, or candle is also common in our society as is obvious in the common saying that most troubles are caused by *zan*, *zar* and *zamin*, that is, woman, money and land. Here two inanimate objects are placed side by side with woman, a living being whose connection with land is once again asserted. The important thing to remember is that all three are commodities which males desire and exchange among themselves in the form of transactions and alliances.

The imagery of nation-as-mother and motherland evokes even more passionate responses. Nalini Natarajan argues that the image of the mother is used because it "suggests common mythic origins. Like the land (which gives shelter and 'bears'),

she is eternal, patient, essential."[1] There seems to be a primordial sense of connection between land (*dharti*) and mother; both are perceived as being in need of protection; both are loved and admired; both are respected; there a willingness to die for the honour of each. The irony is that while the trope of mother-as-nation is so powerful in nationalist thought, actual mothers and women are unequal, lesser citizens with less rights in the nation-state's structure of power. The discriminatory laws about women in Pakistan bear ample testimony to that.

Nevertheless, the symbolic appropriation of woman as mother into the nation-state carries immense emotional investment. Women's primary entry point into the nation-state is as mothers, as producers of strong, brave sons ready to fight to death for the sacred land. It has been argued that "family play[s] such a central role in the nation's public imaginings that motherhood could be viewed as a national service."[2] The idea of motherhood as a national service is explicitly present in Pakistan's educational policies in which the stated aim of female education is to produce good, moral motherhood for the benefit of the family, nation and State.[3]

The fact that the symbolism of motherhood is intensely emotionally evocative can be gauged from the reaction to the US State Attorney's mindless and foolish remark regarding how easily Pakistanis would sell their mothers. It is a well-known fact that women are exchanged, bought and sold in

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1 N. Natarajan; Woman, Nation, and Narration in Midnight's Children, in *Scattered Hegemonies: Postmodernity and Transnational Feminist Practice*, eds., I. Grewal, and C. Kaplan, University of Minnesota Press, 1994, p. 83

2 A. Parker, M. Russo, D. Sommer, and P. Yaeger, (eds.); *Nationalisms and Sexualities*, Routledge, 1992, p. 7

3 R. Saigol, *Knowledge and Identity: Articulation of Gender in Educational Discourse in Pakistan*, ASR Publications, 1995, pp. 186-191

some form or another in all societies, including American society. The remark was thoughtless and insensitive, but the reaction reveals the intensely threatened self which relies on moral motherhood to reproduce a nation of valiant sons. As Syed Talat Hussain observed:

> Mothers are the hub of most family activity and even when they do not enjoy financial freedom and when they are confined to their homes, they enjoy incredible power and clout over the whole family. They run this basic unit of the society and command a position on the scale of honour that cannot be compared with any other relationship...Pakistanis do take their mothers very seriously.[1]

In the quotation above, Hussain recognises the confinement and lack of financial power Pakistani suffer but refers to their clout in the family. The family is the basic unit of society, as well as the pillar of the State, and it is within the family that the nation can reproduce itself, its sons and future mothers. It is the family, therefore, that exercises the greatest control over female sexuality in the name of the purity of the nation. Women's sexuality can find legitimate expression only in national service through the family; it is otherwise denied, controlled and hidden behind the *chadar* and *chardivari*, the personalised boundaries placed around the woman, equivalent to the boundaries, frontiers, and borders of the state, all of which are under the protection of the son/*mujahid* or other male member.

The figure of the mother appears in nationalistic poetry and war songs as the bearer of brave sons, the sacrificing brave mother who suffers in silence, the proud mother who bore the *shaheed* and who salutes him. Women in war songs praise male valour and the fact that the lover, or husband, or son, is a soldier. They praise his war exploits, urge him on and promise eternal love in life or in death. The following song was

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1 *The News*, 3 August 1997

extremely popular during the 1965 war with India and brought tears to the eyes of all who heard it. In this song, the mother of a soldier who has just been killed in battle, is the speaker

Ik Jinay Jamia si, o teri maan ay
dooji teri maan ay, zameen jida naan ay
lay ke meray kolon onay tenu godi pa lia
sadqay main jawan teray, maan kehn walia
hoyon tu shaheed, khat aya teray naan da
puchday nay lok lal si o keri maan da
rab di janab wich sir main jhuka lia
sadqay main jawan teray, maan kehn walia
teray jeaan putran da des Pakistan ay
meray jiaan maanwaan noon jinan utay maan ay
sadqay main jawan teray, maan kehn walia

The one who gave you birth is your mother
The land is also your mother
it has taken you from my loving embrace
and placed you in her own lap
May you have my life, Oh you who calls me Mother
When you were killed in battle
the news came in a letter
the people asked 'who is the proud mother of this soldier'
I bowed my head in obedience to God's will
May you have my life, Oh you who calls me Mother
Pakistan is the land of sons like you

of whom mothers like me are proud

May you have my life, Oh you who calls me Mother

Here the various elements of nationalism are all woven together; the sacrificing but proud mother, the connection between the mother's lap and the land/grave, the soldier as the son of the soil who was killed defending the honour of the motherland. Another extremely popular song during the 1965 war had the following words:

Ay rah-e-haq kay shaheedo, wafa ki tasweero

watan ki betian, maaien salaam kehti hain

Oh, martyrs in the path of righteousness

pictures of faith

the daughters and mothers of the land salute you

The women of the nation are cast as those who praise, applaud and eulogise the young males who fight in battle. The glory, the greatness and the eternal life belongs to the men; the women are in the background urging, encouraging, praising and supporting. An essentially passive role is carved out for them to participate vicariously in the masculine exploits of war. Giving birth to such sons, or having such brave men as lovers is the greatest honour that a woman can receive. In a lighter vein, the lover/fighter is praised for his position in the army by a doting beloved who sings: *Mera mahi chail chabeela, hai ni karnail ni, jernail ni* (My lively lover is a colonel, a general). Songs like this one became so popular during the war of 1965 that the singer Noor Jehan, who sang these at the front to entertain the *jawaans*, herself became a kind of icon of the eulogising, doting, loving woman/mother.

Nationalistic poetry and songs, which connect the whole enterprise with the honour of mothers/sisters and one's inner sanctum, enable the gory reality of war to be forgotten. The glory attached to martyrdom and bravery in battle, the

playfulness in the song above, all mask the sordid reality of war - the mangled and charred bodies, the brutalisation, the violence, the excruciating pain, the needless wastage of precious life, the human degradation and misery, all for state expansion and economic gain. When religion is added on to the protection of state and nation, the emotional investment doubles.

In the creation of the war mind-set, it is not only young men who are conditioned to be the defenders of the faith, the motherland and nation; women are similarly conditioned to believe that they need defending by strong male protectors and that, as mothers, they must raise strong sons. Women are taught to be convinced of their own 'inherent weakness' from childhood and it is in opposition to this 'weakness' that male 'strength' is constructed. Hence, as mentioned earlier, gender ideology lies at the heart of the production of nationalist and militaristic thought. This kind of complementary construction of masculinity and femininity enables warlike nationalism to be imbibed by the whole population, which feels empowered by a sense of participation in the State's nationalist triumphs.

Women not only participate in the imagery of violence and war by creating and upholding it, they constitute the bodies on which the narrative of gendered violence is written. War imagery gets divided into masculine and feminine, for example, being defeated is equal to being feminine and winning is equal to being masculine. A very popular song during the 1965 war had the following verse:

Uj Hinduan jang di gal cheri

ukh hoi hairaan hairaanian di

Maharaj, ay khed talwar di ay

jang khed naien hondi zenaniaan di

Today, the Hindus have stirred up war

Surprise itself is surprised

Maharaj, this is a game of the sword

War is not the play of women

In this song not only is war referred to in terms of a game and play which removes attention from its horrors, the clear message is that war is not the play of women. In other words, war is a masculine pursuit, the implication being that it requires strength, valour and bravery which women lack. It is a manly enterprise, and Hindus, who are here equated with women, are too weak to fight.

The feminisation of Hindus is commonplace in Pakistan. It is indicated in common sayings like "the banya is a vegetable eater, he cannot fight". In textbooks, Hindus are frequently presented as weak, timid, non-warlike and effeminate, in contrast to Muslims who are represented as hypermasculine.[1] It has been noted that the "difference between male and female human beings is exaggerated in warlike societies."[2] With Pakistan's massive defence spending, and the preponderance of warlike imagery, it can safely be considered a warlike society.

Pakistani war songs not only reflect this hypermasculinity but exaggerate the imagery of blood, gore, death, weapons and pain. A very popular song during the 1965 war went:

jis rah se Aye ga

us rah pe maarain gay

pani bhi no maangay ga

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1 R. Saigol, *Knowledge and Identity: Articulation of Gender in Educational Discourse in Pakistan*, ASR Publications, 1995, pp. 217-243

2 M. Trawick; Gendered Aspects of International LTTE Image-formation, presented at the Conference on Violence Against Women: Victims and Ideologies, Colombo, Sri Lanka, March 1996, p.5

yoon nasha utarain gay

Whichever direction you come from

we will kill you there

You will not even have the time to ask for a drink of water

So completely will we erase your intoxication with war

The enemy becomes a soldier who is dying in battle and cannot even ask for a drink of water. The humanity of a dying soldier is erased; he is merely the 'enemy' and has no existence as a person. His pain is obliterated, his sorrow a matter of scorn. The whole song is designed to show the immense power and prowess of the Pakistan army which is represented as capable of inflicting exemplary defeat on India. In the process, the army *jawaan* is also created as heartless and inhuman. Strength is equated with cruelty.

The idea of being unrelenting towards the enemy is emphasised in other songs as well, possibly as a way of keeping up the spirits of the *jawaans*. Another very popular song, also from the 1965 war days, is the following:

Rakh jigra tey ho ja hun tagra

mit jaye kufr da jhagra

bala ji hun thar ragra

deyo ragra aena noon deyo ragra

Don't lose heart and become strong

The infidels must be eliminated

give them a severe bashing

give them a bashing, give them a bashing

The conflict is presented as that between Islam and kufr, which is not unusual. National war is couched in religious

terms in order to increase emotional investment in it and exploit people's religious feelings. The aggressive impulses within human beings, meant for survival purposes, are here harnessed to the national cause in which manhood can be proved by a repeated bashing of the enemy.

In Pakistan, children have always been indoctrinated in the discourse of war, bloodshed, fighting and manhood. In a song which emerged early on after Partition:

Aao bacho sair karain tum ko Pakistan ki

Jis ki khatir hum ne di qurbani lakhon jan ki

Yeh dekho yeh Sindh jehan zalim Dahir ka tola tha

yehin Muhammad Bin Qasim Allah-o-Akbar bola tha

tuti hui talwaron mein kya bijli thi kya shola tha

ginti ke kuch ghazi thay lakhon ka lashkar tola tha

Come children, we will take you on a journey around Pakistan

the country for which we sacrificed millions of lives

See, this is Sindh where the cruel Dahir had a band of men

this is where Muhammad Bin Qasim pronounced Allah-o-Akbar

there was lightening and fire in their broken swords

there were only a handful of ghazis and millions of the enemy

By associating victory, power, glory and fire with a hero and in turn associating the hero with religion, children, who all grow up listening to this song, are infused with the desire to become like the historically reconstructed heroes. The same message of martyrdom, war, death and fighting turns up in virtually every history and social science textbook. Aggressive

impulses are directed towards a real or imagined enemy, within and without, so that legitimacy can be provided for organised state violence.

As the song moves around the newly independent state of Pakistan it comes to Bengal. Praise is lavished on the beauty of the province, on its jute as a golden fibre and its ability to withstand floods and cyclones. The last line is: *yehan ka bacha bacha upni qaum pe marne wala hai* (Every child of this land is willing to die for the nation). This is highly ironic given that in 1971 many Bengalis did die for the nation, but the nation was not Pakistan; it was Bangladesh. They died fighting against Pakistan.

The nation is a fictional construct and at any moment in time, its boundaries can shift re-determining who is excluded and who is included. In 1947 East Bengal was part of the nation, a part much derided by Ayub Khan and other West Pakistani leaders.[1] In 1971, Bengalis became outsiders, enemies of the nation. This shows how the homogenising process of the nation-state is replete with violence and how tentative the identity of any nation-state is; nevertheless, people are expected to lay down their lives for this precarious and contested entity.

In the last part of the same song, the masculinity and strength of the men of the Frontier Province is established.

yeh ilaqa sarhad ka hai, sub ki nirali shaan yehan

bandooqon ke saye me bachay hotain hain jawaan yehan

thokar main zalzalay yehan hain muthi main toofan yehan

sar pe kafan baandhay phirta hai dekho har aik Pathan yehan

Qaum kahe to abhi laga dain bazi yeh sab jaan ki

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1 O. Noman; *Pakistan: Political and Economic History Since 1947.* p. 30

This is the Frontier region, everyone has a unique glory

children grow up in the shadow of the gun

it has withstood many Earthquakes and Storms

every Pathan wears a kafan on his head at all times

If the nation desires, they are all willing to die

Children are told here of how Pathans grow up in the shadow of a gun and are ever ready to die for the nation. The emphasis on the word *jawaan* repeatedly does not simply mean youth, but virility, power, strength and valour.

A recent incident shows how pervasive the evocative power of battle, conquest and glory, and masculinity have become. The Wills World Cup Cricket Championship in 1996 was described almost entirely in terms of war. The cricket grounds were referred to as a battlefield, the cricketers as warriors, coke bottles as missiles and winning and losing became a matter of life and death.[1] In this kind of cricket nationalism, gender imagery was once again employed; the defeated Pakistani team was sent a set of bangles signifying that losing to arch-enemy, India, meant they must be feminine.[2] Similarly, Wasim Akram was accused of losing the 'battle' against India because he wears an earring.

The concern about maintaining gender identities is evident in a news item entitled 'No long hair for Sahiwal boys', which reported that the District Administration in Sahiwal had decided to launch a campaign against young men with long hair and earrings. The City Magistrate started a campaign in which he took barbers with him to give haircuts to any offending boys and remove their earrings on the spot.[3]

1 *The News*, March 17, 1996

2 *The News*, March 12, 1996

3 *The News*, May, 31, 1997

This is a telling example of the State's nationalist anxiety manifesting itself in the possible loss of masculinity -- if we don't have 'masculine' men, our nation will be weakened.

It is through a consistent reinforcement of the imagery of power, masculinity, strength, blood, death and war, that a masculine and powerful nation is evoked. Along with the imagery of strong and brave men, a concomitant imagery of weak women/mothers in need of protection, is maintained. In order to buttress this imagery further, a permanent sense of threat and impending doom is maintained by means of the myth that India wants to devour Pakistan as it never accepted its existence.[1]

Women's Bodies as Arenas of Violent Struggle

An important part of nationalism in S. Asia has been the way women and their sexuality are treated as the symbol of culture, tradition and home.[2] In a situation of national conflict this leads to the women of the enemy being forced into a similar symbolic role. This is why while violence during communal, ethnic and international conflicts is directed against everyone, women are violated in a sexually-specific way, that is, they are raped. Not only are they raped, their bodies are marked in particular ways that are meant as reminders of their being women, the honour of the community/nation.

The use of women in this way marked the moment of independence for India and Pakistan. The most horrifying tales of torture and insane violence during the Partition of 1947 have been recorded by writers like Saadat Hasan Manto in stories like *Thanda Gosht* (Frozen Flesh) and *Siyah Hashiyeh* (Black Frames). Similarly, Krishan Chandar in his story

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1 T. Rehman; Myths as Causes of War, *The News*, September 24, 1994

2 P. Chatterjee, The Nationalist Resolution of the Women's Question, in *Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial History*, eds., K. Sangari and S. Vaid, Kali For women, 1989, pp. 233-253

Ghaddar (Traitor), recorded the specific kinds of sexual violence against women of opposing communities. There are terrible instances of this in the more recent history of Pakistan. According to one estimate, the Pakistan army raped two hundred thousand women during the army action in East Pakistan in 1970.[1]

Writing on the Partition of 1947, Veena Das comments that widespread violence against women of all religious communities was witnessed with more than hundred thousand women having been abducted from each of the two parts of Punjab alone.[2] She argues that "the bodies of women became political signs, territories on which the political programmes of the rioting communities of men were inscribed." In her view, the desire to assert collective identity, whether of nation or of community, becomes transformed into "the desire to humiliate the men of other nations and communities through the violent appropriation of 'their' women." Women's own identities are transformed and subsumed in this process of state-formation and nation-building.

In their analysis of communal sexual violence during the Partition of India, and more recently in Bosnia, Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin find there are three specific features of the crimes against women, namely their brutality, their extreme sexual violence, and their collective nature. The range of explicit sexual violation includes "stripping; parading naked; mutilating and disfiguring; tattooing or branding the breasts and genitalia with triumphal slogans [including the phrases 'Pakistan Zindabad!' and 'Jai Hind!']; amputating breasts; knifing open the womb; raping, of course; killing foetuses." Furthermore, violent sexual crimes were often committed against women of other communities in public places, such as

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1 Tribunal on Violence Against Women, Simorgh Women's Resource Centre, Lahore, December 30-31, 1993

2 V. Das; *Sexual Violence, Discursive Formations and the State*, 1995, p. 1

the marketplace, usually in the presence of their male kin.[1]

Given the symbolic role of women, the desecration of women becomes a matter of national shame and cultural/religious dishonour and must be avenged. Menon and Bhasin note that "one rumour guaranteed to provoke communal violence and reprisal during Partition, was that of large-scale raping of a community's women." Thus, just as the nation is narrated on women's bodies, the enemy inscribes its victory on the female body. The ultimate defeat that can be inflicted on the enemy is the pollution of its race through collective rape during war and other forms of conflict. Women's dishonour is the dishonour of the race, the nation and the country. It is the ultimate form of defiling, the defiling of one's mother. It is interesting to note that since so much emotion is evinced through the imagery of the mother, most forms of Punjabi abuse centre around the defiling of the mother, sister or daughter. This is usually considered the ultimate insult to be avenged with physical violence.

Menon and Bhasin quote Stasa Zajovic about ethnic cleansing in Bosnia: "when 'their' women are raped, it is experienced not as, and through, the women's pain, but as a male defeat: they were too feeble to protect their property."[2] Menon and Bhasin conclude that the failure to protect women-as-property reflects on a man's masculinity -- and, by extension, his community's honour. This is one reason why, in communal violence, a whole collectivity is involved.

Women's bodies are treated as territories to be conquered, claimed or marked by the assailant. The fact that so much of communal sexual violence took place in temples or

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1 R. Menon and K. Bhasin; They Wanted to Die: Women, Kinsmen and Partition, presented at the Conference on Violence Against Women: Victims and Ideologies, Colombo, Sri Lanka, March 1996. p. 8

2 Ibid. p. 9

gurudawaras means that it was the simultaneous violation of women and sacred space. As Menon and Bhasin assert, "In the context of Partition, it engraved the permanence of the division of India into India and Pakistan on the women of both religious communities, in the way that they became the respective countries, indelibly imprinted by the Other."

For Menon and Bhasin, then, the marking of the breasts and genitalia made permanent the sexual appropriation of the woman. This enabled the enemies to pollute the "biological national source of the family". In this way, women's reproductive power was appropriated to prevent the undesirable proliferation of the enemy's progeny. Thus, the female body itself could be made to appear as a traitor. Such violence constituted the "profaning of everything that was held to be of sacred and symbolic value to the Other."

It is clear that wherever identity and self are threatened by an Other, an outsider defined as an enemy, women's bodies become the arena of the most violent forms of conflict. As global conflicts intensify, and males of weak and dependent countries feel threatened by global powers, the notion of women's bodies as signifiers of nation, home, and honour is likely to increase. This increase can potentially manifest itself as nationalist anxiety and the response is most likely going to be further incarceration of women, greater emphasis on the veil and the *chardivari*, an enhanced desire to confine women to domestic tasks and motherhood. This is likely to be accompanied by an intensified glorification of motherhood and a more urgent need to protect motherhood against violation and impurity, even while increasing women's participation in the market due to economic imperatives. The double burden is, therefore, likely to increase along with the controls imposed on women's bodies. Women's bodies will not merely be the site of political, national and armed struggles; they will also become the major signifiers in economic struggles and market conflicts.

Conflict and Violence in the Educational Process

Khurshid Hasanain and A. H. Nayyar

In any modern nation-state, education is a highly organised activity with a hierarchical structure. The government and its educational bureaucracy sit at the top controlling the flow of funds and privileges to the lower tiers. With the help of the vast network of state universities, colleges and schools, and the thousands of teachers working as government employees, and with the curriculum, the system of examination and text books all defined by it, the state's power to impose a particular mindset can be almost unchallenged. This is especially so in countries still struggling to build effective systems of institutional checks and balances.

This essay will detail how the educational process in Pakistan contributes to exacerbating and prolonging rather than resolving the crises and conflicts confronting the people. We shall try to show that the cumulative effect of educational acts of commission and omission by the state has been to create an intolerant mindset, deeply susceptible to chauvinistic slogans and calls for violence, and unwilling to accept the diversity of beliefs and cultures that exists within the country.

Before looking at how curriculum and textbooks in

particular serve this purpose it is important to point out that in Pakistan the entire process of education, from designing curricula to classroom instruction, suffers from a systemic problem. There exists a strong belief, one could almost call it a cultural compulsion, that knowledge is not a creation of mankind, but something that is given or revealed, and hence to be accepted as such. Whatever is given out as knowledge therefore becomes unquestionable. There are unique answers and unique interpretations. There is no place for plurality of ideas and coexistence of conflicting views.

In such a situation, the teacher as the giver of knowledge acquires the status of an authority whose words are final and unquestionable. It is most uncommon to find teachers encouraging students to view the subject matter of lessons critically. In fact, a critical attitude on the part of the students often provokes a violent response from the teacher. Not surprisingly, textbooks acquire a similar status with students and teachers alike placing an almost blind faith in the written word.

This suppression of the thinking process is in itself an act of violence on minds. Human-beings by nature are inquisitive and creative. Education, and particularly the process by which it is imparted, is meant to sharpen these faculties. When, instead, they are stifled and energy is not allowed to be channelled towards creative work, the ever-present possibility of creating a rational human-being is eliminated. In the process, a mindset is created which cannot tolerate disagreements, and can only respond to them with violence.

The Purpose

Pakistan's curriculum is designed by the educational bureaucracy and as such reflects the priorities and goals of the state. Textbooks, particularly at school level, serve as the basic source of information for students besides being the foremost expression of the objectives desired by the curriculum. Together they constitute the necessary institutional

cohesiveness, memory and continuity that allows an educational system to act as a national social process to shape children's' minds.

The most recent national curriculum document, which determines what is taught in all government schools, was prepared by the Ministry of Education in 1994. It lists the following as some of the purposes of teaching the national language, Urdu. The student should:

a) be able to take pride in the Islamic way of life, and should try to acquire Islamic knowledge and to adopt it;

b) read religious books in order to understand Quranic teachings;

c) listen to events from the Islamic history, and should be able to derive pleasure from them (khushi mehsoos karen);

d) also know that national culture is not **local culture or local customs** (our emphasis), but it means the culture whose principles have been determined by Islam.[1]

Since identity is constructed in large part through language, the overwhelming impression from reading this set of objectives is that the learning of language itself has to serve Islamic religious purposes, and is to hold even for those students who may not be Muslims. Thus the image that the child develops right from the start is that there is a special place for the Muslims and the 'Islamic' way of life which overrides the right of all citizens to be viewed as being equal and to take full pride in their own ways of living and beliefs.

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1 Curriculum Document, Primary Education, Classes I-V, Integrated and Subject Based; National Bureau of Curriculum and Textbooks, Ministry of Education, Govt of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1994

The most amazing of the purported objectives, however, is the one which seeks to convince students of the divorce of national culture from any regional or local context. In other words what exists as culture, and what the child experiences and lives in, are not the real culture. Rather, it is something else transcending the child's own reality. This view, of course, conveniently overlooks the fact of an actually existing regional and local culture which encompasses the cultures and identities of various religions.

Such a construction of culture points the way for a later structuring of the learning of history. History and Pakistan studies textbooks rarely mention the ancient and non-controversial cultures of the Indus valley (Moenjodaro, Harrappa and Kot Diji), and completely bypass the entire Buddhist and Hindu periods of history. They suddenly jump to the advent of Mohammed bin Qasim in India and treat it as the beginning of history for all practical purposes. The specific ideological basis of this structuring is to make children regard the Muslim part of the history as the only relevant and certainly the most significant part. This process reaches its culmination with the specific learning objective suggested by the curriculum:

> To understand the Hindu Muslim differences and the resultant need for Pakistan

In view of such politically motivated suggestions from the curriculum, it is not surprising that the textbooks have a markedly communal and even chauvinistic attitude. The Class I textbook of the Punjab textbook board declares:

> Pakistan is our country. We live in our country. Pakistan is an Islamic country. Muslims live here. Muslims believe in one God. They do good deeds.[1]

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1 *Meri Kitab*, Urdu for Class II, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, p36

The implications of the above statements are very obvious. The country belongs to Muslims, and others do not really have any claim to it. This of course is justified by the logic that doing good deeds is expected of Muslims alone. It is clear that by implanting these notions in the minds of children, and omitting any favourable mention of the minorities in Pakistan or peoples of other faiths outside Pakistan, the books sow the seeds of contempt and conflict.

The Hindu

Following the instructions given as 'Specific Learning Objectives' in the curriculum for Pakistan/Social Studies for Class V, namely "to understand the Hindu and Muslim differences and the resultant need for Pakistan", the writers project Hindu-Muslim differences. A survey of textbooks reveals this theme running through them all the way up to the graduation level. It can be summarised as follows: Muslims and Hindus lived always in a deeply hostile and antagonistic relationship. The Muslims were broadminded, accommodating and brought enlightenment to an otherwise inhuman society characterised only by the caste system and the practice of Sati. The class 4 text book states:

> The religion of the Hindus did not teach them good things -- Hindus did not respect women...[1]

Another book tells the students:

> Hindus worship in temples which are very narrow and dark places, where they worship idols. Only one person can enter the temple at a time. In our mosques, on the other hand, all Muslims can say their prayers together.[2]

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1 *Muasherati Ulum for Class IV*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, 1995, p 81

2 *Muasherati Ulum for Class V*, Punjab Textbook Board, 1996, p 109

For another, the Hindus as a monolith were always cunning, scheming, and conspiring to deprive the Muslims of their due rights:

> The Hindus always desired to crush the Muslims as a nation. Several attempts were made by the Hindus to erase the Muslim culture and civilisation. Hindi-Urdu controversy, shudhi and sanghtan movements are the most glaring examples of the ignoble Hindu mentality .[1]

If the Hindus had any national aspirations then these were clearly a sign of their prejudices, while if the Muslim kings and invaders plundered Hindu temples then presumably they did so with very noble intentions.

The experience of colonialism is described in a textbook as a British-Hindu conspiracy:

> The British joined forces with the Hindus to bring harm to the Muslims. Muslims tried in every way to maintain good relations with the British and Hindus, but they did not allow it to be so. [2]

This typecasting of Hindus as a nation of collaborators in league with their colonial masters is typical. The entire freedom struggle is thus represented as though it was primarily a struggle of Muslims against a joint force of British and Hindus:

> Exploiting the anti-Muslim policy of the British, the Hindus fully collaborated with them and obtained all kinds of monetary benefits. The British opened the doors of government service to them and also encouraged them in trade and commerce.[3]

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1 M. Ikram Rabbani and Monawar Ali Sayyid, *An Introduction to Pakistan Studies*, The Caravan Book House, Lahore, 1995, p 12.

2 ref 3, p 83

3 *Mutalea-e-Pakistan for Class IX and X*, Punjab Textbook Board,

One book declares:

> He (Mr. Jinnah) wanted to establish here a separate homeland for the Muslims . The Hindus did not like this and became his enemies. The English were also with Hindus.[1]

Descriptions of the traumas of partition and the horrors that occurred are treated in a similarly biased manner:

> While the Muslims provided all type of help to those wishing to leave Pakistan, the people of India committed cruelties against the Muslims (refugees). They would attack the buses, trucks, and trains carrying the Muslim refugees and they were murdered and looted.[2]

It is hard to see such material as anything but an effort to fill young minds with hatred against an enemy, rather than against the acts of depravity and savagery committed by both sides.

Significantly, Sikhs are spared the same treatment in the textbooks. This is despite the fact that East and West Punjab witnessed the most savage acts of violence. This points to a desire for the fiction of a simple bipolar conflict of Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India.

The historical and cultural inevitability of Hindu-Muslim conflict and the attendant creation of irrational hate against Hindus are not confined to the curriculum and textbooks for young children in government primary schools. It continues all the way up to the degree level and extends even into the private education sector. No sector of education is immune.

1996, p 16

1 *Meri Kitab*, Class II, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, p 7

2 ref 3, p 85

A few examples from a textbook on Pakistan Studies for Intermediate and Senior Cambridge classes, which is prescribed even in the elite English-medium private schools, are given below to highlight the seriousness of the problem, and to gauge from this the extent to which such books are contributing to irrationality and intolerance in elite society. The authors teach at the prestigious Government College Lahore, and Aitchison College Lahore respectively. The book states:

- The British, with the assistance of the Hindus, adopted a cruel policy of mass exodus against the Muslims to erase them as a nation
- The British adopted a policy of large scale massacre (mass extermination) against the Muslims
- The Muslim population of the Muslim minority provinces faced atrocities of the Hindu majority
- [The Muslims] were not allowed to profess their religion freely
- Hindu nationalism was being imposed upon Muslims and their culture
- All India Congress turned into a pure Hindu organisation
- The Congress was striving very hard to project the image of united India, which was actually aimed at the extermination of the Muslims from the Indian society
- The two Hindu organisations [Congress and Mahasabha] were determined to destroy the national character of the Muslims to dominate and subjugate them perpetually.[1]

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1 ref. 5, p 6, 13, 31, 45, 7, 25, 8, 46, 48, 50

This is only a sample. The entire book is interspersed with statements like the above. What the authors hope to achieve, and are perhaps quite successful in their attempt, is to create hate for Hindus, and in the process to create an enemy image. But it would be wrong however to suggest that this is done in a seamless and complete substitution of an imagined history for real events. There are glaring contradictions everywhere. For instance, Rabbani and Sayyid state at several places that the British patronised Hindus in order to crush Muslims, yet go on to say that the Hindus joined the 1857 mutiny, in one place even saying that they were equally responsible for the rebellion. They also admit that Muslims extracted (extraordinary) concessions from the British - including a separate electorate, a quota in the services, and the partition of Bengal. Similarly, they claim that the Indian National Congress turned into a pure Hindu organisation aimed at destroying Muslim culture, imposing Hindu nationalism upon Muslims and exterminating Muslims from the Indian society. Yet they are forced to admit at several places that many Muslims, including scholars like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Dr. Zakir Hussain, were among the top leadership of the Congress. Quite conspicuously, the book fails to mention that a very large number of Muslim ulema at the time, including Maudoodi, had opposed the creation of Pakistan.

The most charitable explanation of these and other glaring contradictions can be that the authors are not smart enough to have noticed them. A conclusion nearer to the truth would be that the contradictions are a result of deliberate distortions. The effect of these on a student is another matter. If the student notices these contradictions, and it is hard to not notice them, the student is expected to either ignore them and learn by heart selected topics to reproduce in examinations. A second, more dangerous, thing to learn is that there is no such thing as logical consistency in arguments and that there is nothing wrong in being contradictory.

As if this was not enough, education in Pakistan is now such that even the history of recent events, i.e. those within the lifetime of the parents of many of the children using these books, is not spared. For example while describing the events relating to the war of 1965 the book for Class 4 declares:

> India always took initiative in souring relations between the two countries and on September 6, 1965, India launched an attack at the Lahore border without declaring war. Pakistani forces gave a befitting reply, and captured many Indian territorial areas"[1]

A little later the same book describes the outcome of the war as:

> At last in the face of the valour of Pakistani soldiers and the people, the Indians surrendered.

The text on Muasherati Ulum for Class V says in the same context:

> In the face of defeat, India pleaded with the UN to stop the war. The war ended and Pakistan returned the Indian territories.[2]

Not to be outdone, the book of Pakistan Studies "Mutalia-e-Pakistan" for classes 9 and 10 states, in the context of the separation of East Pakistan:

> In 1971 while Pakistan was facing political difficulties in East Pakistan, India helped anti-Pakistan elements and later on attacked Pakistan.... As a result of this war in December 1971, the eastern wing of Pakistan separated and appeared as Bangladesh on the world map.[3]

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1 ref 3, p 86

2 ref 4, p 113

3 *Mutalia-e-Pakistan for Classes IX and X*, Punjab Textbook Board,

As may be evident, both these selections suffer from gross omissions related to the events leading to the two wars in which the adventurism of the Pakistani establishment (the 1965 war) or the systematic policy of keeping the Bengalis out of power (the 1971 war) played a key role in precipitating the respective crises. These are classic examples of presenting historical events in such a manner as to absolve the Pakistani state of its fair share of the blame while laying the entire onus for these catastrophes on enemies.

The History of History

The approach to history found in current textbooks is not a new phenomenon. The tradition of distortions in the written history of Pakistan is as old as Pakistan itself. The atrocious distortions seen today are built on earlier history texts written by ideologues like Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, for whom the distortion of facts about the movement for Pakistan was necessary to justify a particular view about the formation of the new state. For these early writers, the problem was to write a history of a people that did not satisfy the prevalent and generally accepted definition of a nation at a time when opponents of the creation of Pakistan, both Muslims and Hindus and particularly Indian nationalists, were questioning the legitimacy of the new state.

The solution these ideologues found was to put the two-nation theory of the pre-partition days on a strong pedestal, at least for Pakistanis. To achieve this, not only were some events of recent history presented with coloured arguments, but also some events were selectively omitted if they came into conflict with the theory. In particular, the political points that the Muslim League used in its forward thrust after the 1937 election debacle and the events leading to the 1940 Lahore Resolution were presented in a way that created an irrational

hatred against Hindus as a community. This tendency laid the foundation of all subsequent official history of the Pakistan movement.

The history textbooks written in the early years of Pakistan attempted to establish the two-nation theory, and also needed to show that the Muslims would not have been happy in a united India dominated by a Hindu majority. Influenced particularly by the carnage of partition, Hindu-Muslim conflict was highlighted. But the history textbooks were still somewhat objective in the sense that the presentation of facts was not as selective and as distorted as it is now. The history of the great Hindu kingdoms was also told, as was the contribution of everyone in the freedom movement irrespective of his or her religious affiliation. Yet the recent history of the Pakistan movement, coloured by the demands of the two-nation theory, combined to create a strong enemy image of Hindus.

The art of writing history took another turn for the worse during Zia-ul-Haq's dictatorship, when the hitherto obscure notion of an 'Ideology of Pakistan' took centre stage. Much has been written about the distortions of history introduced in this period.[1] What is important here is that the urge to establish the so-called 'Ideology of Pakistan' meant throwing objectivity overboard. The authors of both the curriculum as well as textbooks proceeded to create irrational hate with an unprecedented vengeance.

It is the permanency of these latter distortions that is now astounding. They persist despite the recognition that the concept of an 'ideology of Pakistan' was a vehicle used by Zia-ul-Haq to legitimise his rule and by Jamat-e-Islami to further its politics and even though the Jamat-e-Islami no longer enjoys state patronage and staunch anti-Zia political forces have held

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1 P. Hoodbhoy and A. H. Nayyar, Rewriting the History of Pakistan, in *Islam, Politics and the State: The Pakistan Experience*, Ed. Asghar Khan, Zed Books Ltd., London, 1985

state power a couple of times. Their survival in the education system is a testament to the fundamental way in which curricula were changed at all levels -- from the very elementary classes to university, and because of the halo still surrounding the so-called ideology of Pakistan.

The Crisis

In addition to the many serious errors and the hostile messages generated by the textbooks in their eagerness to construct a picture of the historical development of Pakistan based on the so-called ideology of Pakistan, there are also very serious acts of omission.

One obvious omission is the place of minorities in the history of Pakistan. The acknowledgement that philanthropists and concerned people from these communities laid the foundations of many educational institutions, hospitals and social welfare schemes for both Muslims and non Muslims alike, in the cities now comprising Pakistan, would have given a greater sense of dignity and participation to these communities. Recognition of men such as A.R. Cornelius, Dorab Patel and Zafrullah Khan, among many others, who made major contributions to Pakistani society, would have created a sense of fraternity with the minorities.

The pervasive attitude in our textbooks, however, is that only Muslims can be good, courageous and patriotic Pakistanis. This rules out the possibility of any attitude above the level of petty chauvinism. It should come as no surprise to have witnessed what happened outside the court where two Christian youths accused of blasphemy were acquitted by the judge. A hostile crowd reacted wildly to the verdict by smashing cars and chanting death threats to the acquitted, their defenders and the judge. The unfortunate judge was later murdered brutally.[1]

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1 *Newsline* , Karachi, 1997

An even more fundamental omission from the educational system is one of context. Textbooks make every possible effort to maintain a sharp delineation between politics and economics, both in their discussion of the past and of more recent events. Ancient history appears simply as the chronicle of kings and their conquests or defeats, sometimes punctuated with references to communal differences. There is no mention anywhere of how the modern concepts of states and nations emerged, or how various periods in history were marked by different property and class relations, and how these can be used to understand social reality.

The saga of the recent (post independence) period is told only in terms of successive regimes, their conflicts with India and their attempts to expand ties with neighbours and Islamic countries. There is no mention of the various trends in our foreign alignments, e.g. pro-western and anticommunist, for the entire period of the cold war or what those alignments meant, or why and how the world has changed in this respect. The Chinese people and our friendship with them finds a mention at some places, but again in the same abstract way, i.e., not as a country with a very specific social and economic system but as our great and friendly neighbour who has always stood by us in times of difficulty.

Despite these textbooks being about the history of Pakistan not even a single paragraph mentions political developments in any serious way that would explain why the country disintegrated into two parts in1971, all the pious proclamations of religious brotherhood notwithstanding. Nor why the country has remained under military rule for a good twenty of the fifty years of it's existence, or why poverty and illiteracy still plague the land.

While it is admittedly not easy to discuss contemporary events freely and dispassionately, it certainly remains possible, as some better (i.e. for the elite) textbooks show, to critically evaluate the past using modern political concepts. But the

problem government sponsored text book writers face is a serious one. To discuss the concepts and relationships of feudalism in the past risks questions about their persistence in our society. To talk of the age of enlightenment and humanism, or to mention the slogans of "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" in the context of the French Revolution, begs the question of why these are not applicable to our own society, still saddled with the baggage of social hierarchy, severe class differentials, and military domination.

Pakistan, while not being manifestly ideological in its social organisation, uses an ideology to perpetuate certain class privileges and monopolies over power, decision making, expression and consumption. The preservation of status quo in favour of the ruling elite becomes the touchstone for acceptability, indeed of the legality of ideas and mindset. Education is required in such a situation to serve the purposes not of liberating but enslaving the minds. It serves to propagate the wisdom and truth of the dogmas advantageous for the elite, and suppression of facts and attitudes inimical to those ends.

As a result of the twin demands, self imposed, of defining the Pakistani state and identity in purely religious terms and of not questioning the social and economic status quo, the scope of the educational process in generating any political and social awareness is severely limited. In turn, this lessens the ability of any political party with a serious agenda of reform or individuals even of impeccable pro-people credentials, to make any electoral impact.

But, instead of facing up to its failures the education system sticks to a process of memorising and reproducing dead, and often distorted facts verbatim. Not surprisingly then it produces frustrated, unemployed youth with no skills either for economic survival or social analysis. Lacking the tools of social and political organisation or consciousness, they are turning in increasing numbers towards crime or towards militant sectarian and ethnic outfits based on primitive

loyalties of biradari, clan, ethnicity and sect where instinctive bonding replaces one formed by a rational social choice.

This tendency is not confined to the poorly educated. It is to be found among College and University students and is witnessed by the way that student organisations have degenerated from being programmatic and political to being based on ethnicity and sectarianism. In recent years 'politics' in the educational institutions in Punjab has come to be dominated by the Jat-Arain biradari divide, while urban Sindh has seen the emergence of the Mohajir Students Organisation with allegiances cutting across class and ideological boundaries. An even more recent phenomenon are the student groups associated with militant Shia and Sunni sectarian formations.

This latter development points to another small but menacingly growing corner in the educational landscape of Pakistan where a different kind of intolerance and hate is being cultivated. These deeni madaris (religious schools) are growing in numbers and enrolment.[1] The older students in them are taught through sectarian polemics with pungent criticism bordering on hate. The dogmatic mindset created by the madaris is therefore highly intolerant of other faiths and now feeds an increasingly militant sectarian conflict. Not content with this, some madaris are reported to provide military training to their students.

The sectarian divide between Shias and Sunnis and within Sunnis is not new. It has existed since the resurgence of religious schools in the sub-continent in the later half of the nineteenth century. The first large darul-ulum at Deoband was Sunni. Its founders, Maulana Mohammad Qasim Nanotvi and Maulana Rashid Ahmed Gangohi, both wrote polemical commentaries challenging the veracity of the Shia faith. Among the Sunnis, the Barelvi school upheld the custom-laden

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1 The latest figures available are that there are 3706 madaris with 540,000 male and female students

mystic (sufi) religious practices around shrines, and challenged the puritanism of the Deobandi school. The Ahl-e-Hadith were even more fundamentalist in outlook than Deobandis. A joint target of all these sects was the new sect of Ghulam Ahmed of Qadian, which was later unanimously ex-communicated from the pale of Islam.

Given such beginnings, the madrassa curricula had to have discussions on these differences. These 19th century sectarian critiques, along with modern derivatives, are part of the curriculum even today. For example, the *Wafaq ul Madaris* (Deobandi) curriculum has the following topics and texts in their grade *Aaliah* (13th and 14th years of schooling). The list below contains a selection from a prescribed bibliography on the critique of Christianity, Judaism, atheism, Qadiani faith, Shiaism, Barelvi faith, Ahl-e-Hadith, and the teachings of Abul Ala Maudoodi:

- *Abtal e Usul ush Shi'a Bid Dalael e Aqliah wan Naqliah*, (Rejection of the Shia faith on reasons of logic as well as of the revealed knowledge) by Maulana Abdur Rahim Bijnori
- *Hidayatush Shi'a*, (a polemical commentary on the Shia faith) by Maulana Qasim Nanotvi
- *Hidayatush Shi'a*, by Maulana Rashid Ahmed Gangohi
- *Naseehatush Shi'a*, by Maulana Ehtesham ul Hasan
- *Barelvi Fatway - Faisla Kun Munazerah*, (Barelvi religious edicts: the decisive debate) by Maulana Mohammad Manzoor Nomani
- *Deoband se Bareli Tak*, (From Deoband to Bareli) by Maulana Abdul Quddus Roomi
- *Maudoodi Mazhab*, (The religion of Maudoodi) by Qazi Mazhar Hussain

- *Ahl-e-Hadith Aur Angrez: Tark-e-Taqleed ke Bhyanak Nataej*, (Ahl-e-Hadith and the British: horrendous consequences of abandoning tradition) by Maulana Bashir Ahmed Qadri

It is hard to imagine a process of education less likely to contribute towards a strong commitment to increasing tolerance and democratisation in society. There is no prospect within such a system of creating doubt, of raising questions, of provoking thought, and certainly no possibility of challenging the finality and superiority of the presuppositions and biases that are being taught. It is mind control, propaganda and indoctrination masquerading as an educational process.

Conclusion

The Pakistani state has intervened in the educational process in two fundamental ways. First, it has encouraged students to be uncritical, submissive to authority and treat education as a process simply of memorising certain 'facts'. At the same time, it encourages teachers to adopt the authoritarian attitude required for establishing the finality of their word and those in textbooks. Second, it has enforced the distortion of historical facts in textbooks, encouraged religious chauvinism and glorified militarism. It has also deprived students of role models who could have inspired and motivated them towards creativity and to address the conflicts of their society in a humanistic, compassionate and intelligent manner.

The violence manifest in Pakistani society reflects the failure to try to create a critical mindset and a social consciousness. It is an indicator of a people incapable of attacking the roots of their social and political disempowerment, turning upon themselves in a masochistic rage.

Enemy Images on Pakistan Television

I. A. Rehman

Pakistan's television reminds viewers of their enemy every day. For years now its main news bulletin has been presenting, prominently in the first half of the programme, an account of this enemy's atrocities in the Muslim-majority part of Kashmir -- the Valley. The story may include the latest acts of barbarism by Indian troops against the militant guerrillas or innocent civilians, or protest strikes in towns, or restrictions placed from time to time on dissident leaders' basic rights to freedom of movement and political agitation. The killer/oppressor is identified as an enemy not merely because he is committing gross violations of human rights, although the spoken line does suggest this, but because he is operating as an instrument in India's decades-old conflict with Pakistan by perpetuating its hold over Kashmir that, according to Pakistan, has been denied its right to self-determination.

With a view to facilitating public acceptance of the enemy image, Pakistan television has been offering, besides news items, feature productions and discussions in current affairs programmes. The features are usually enlarged versions of news reports of the conflict in Kashmir -- the heroic resistance put up by ordinary and generally resourceless Kashmiri men

and women against a merciless foe, the enormous sacrifices borne by them in the cause of freedom and justice, and the utter inhumanity and bestiality of their oppressors. The current affairs programmes offer a recapitulation of history -- how the partition principle, according to which princely states were required to join one of the new dominions -- India or Pakistan --- in accordance with the wishes of the population was subverted by the Maharaja of Kashmir in collusion with the Indian rulers, how the United Nations Security Council's resolutions calling for a plebiscite in the disputed territory were frustrated by Indian obduracy, how important for peace in the region the resolution of the Kashmir problem is, and how impossible and immoral it would be for Pakistan to give up the cause of the Kashmiri people.

The issue is placed in a wider historical context. India has resorted to carnage and pillage in Kashmir, it is argued, because it has not reconciled to the creation of Pakistan. Its Kashmir policy is therefore part of its plans to undo Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan is confronting a entity whose hostility is not confined to the dispute over Kashmir, but one whose enmity to Pakistan is more deeply rooted. Since India's non-acceptance of the reality of Pakistan is on account of its repudiation of the theoretical foundations of Pakistan, it is an enemy in an ideological sense as well as in physical terms. Thus, unless India agrees to give up Kashmir and offers proof that it has reconciled to Pakistan's existence as a free state, it will continue to be rated as a standing enemy.

However, this enemy image is not the product of Pakistan television alone, which came into being 17 years after independence. Pakistani people's thought-processes had already been fixed by a long history of communal confrontation in the sub-continent, the orgy of violence which attended the partition, and the impressions formed by the literature of the colonial period and the under-developed Press before independence and the controlled one afterwards.

In order to fully appreciate Pakistan television's performance in creating enemy images it is necessary to briefly review the development of the country's media. Pakistan had a fledgling Press at the time of independence. A low literacy rate impeded its growth. Even today the combined circulation of newspapers is around two million copies in a population estimated at 140 million. A better part of the Press chose to accept between 1947 and 1958 the official version of Pakistan's disputes with India, mainly because it formed a continuation of the communal controversy that preceded independence and in the course which the masses had imbibed a certain view of politics.

With the advent of military rule in 1958 freedom of the Press was among the first casualties. The Ayub regime (1958-1969) embarked on a policy of bringing the entire media including the Press under its control. Film censorship was toughened. An old colonial law that gave the administration arbitrary control over theatrical performances was invoked with greater zeal. The powers the colonial rulers had acquired to muzzle the Press in periods of emergency were incorporated into a new regular law. Finally, it created an officially controlled Press Trust to take over a string of newspapers. Those that escaped falling into the net had to find props to sustain their existence and they gave their pro-democracy professions the under-pinning of ideological commitment to slogans sanctified during the movement for independence. Rhetoric about religion and national security became their stock-in-trade and anti-India fervour became handy as essential cement for the mix.

Television was launched in Pakistan in 1964 as a state-controlled enterprise, the immediate motive being to establish a direct channel of mass communication for President Ayub who was due to stand for re-election. From the outset it was meant to be a government propaganda outfit, and to this day its character has remained unaltered despite such cosmetic

changes as the creation of a corporation governed by articles of incorporation. The government appoints its main executives and they are replaced with almost each change of government. Similar, though less strict, has been the state's control over radio broadcasting. Less than a decade ago a private television network was created by a semi-official agent, the Shalimar Recording Company, but it was not allowed to present news or current affairs programmes and what it was allowed to telecast had to be approved by the official censor. Thus, for its perception of enemies or elements hostile to Pakistan the electronic media is fed largely by state functionaries. Of course, it is free to fall back upon the legacy of the pre-partition politics in the same manner as official spokesmen or the print media do.

India may be the principal enemy identified by Pakistan's television and other branches of the media, but it is not the sole occupant of this status, and the techniques and styles adopted to draw the other enemy-images have been applied to India too. Some enemy images developed by Pakistani people during their pre-independence history have survived, to some extent on television also. The colonial power that determined the fate of South Asia for two centuries is often recalled as the enemy that extinguished the Muslim empire whose successor the state of Pakistan is seen to be not only by the fiction-addicted masses but also by some of the historians. Television may not have cared to study colonialism as a system and the impact it has had on Pakistan's administration and politics but a great deal of the political rhetoric about Pakistan's problems being due to the colonial power's collusion with the main enemy -- the Hindu community -- regularly colours TV programmes. The colonial enemy is frequently encountered in historical features on events such as the collapse of the Mughal dynasty, or the agitation for the defence of the Turkish Caliphate, or in biographical studies on or references to prominent figures in political movements such as Syed Ahmad

Khan or Mohammad Ali Jauhar.

The enemy-image of the colonial masters also appears in features on the history of the Pakistan movement and their role in creating the Kashmir issue. Some of the problems Pakistan faced at the time of independence are attributed to the cupidity of the colonial authority, to its desire to punish the leaders of the Pakistan movement for their refusal to surrender to its wishes. This enemy image has been painted in somewhat bolder colours in features depicting the resistance to foreign occupation put up by smaller autonomous communities in Pathan and Baloch lands.

Two other enemy images have been shaped by Pakistan's adoption of the Muslim world's causes as its own. The Crusades still provide an important theme for fiction writers and so does the expulsion of Muslims from Spain in the 15th century. In both contexts Pakistan is seen as part of a trans-national community against which Christian powers have waged a ceaseless war through different means. Quite often the hostility displayed by the colonial power against the subcontinent's Muslims is presented as part of this global confrontation. This concept has lately received strength from the view promoted by religious parties, and shared to a considerable extent by policy-makers, that Pakistan is a target of the West because the latter is afraid of the Muslim world's unity and its potential in both economic and political terms. It was in this context that Pakistani people's solidarity with the Palestinians grew and that resulted in the casting first of Zionism and then Israel in the role of enemies.

Afghanistan appeared as a hostile country in the perceptions of both the state and the public soon after the emergence of Pakistan, because of its irredentist claims and its opposition to Pakistan's admission to the United Nations. But by the time television came to Pakistan the peak in hostility between the two countries had passed, and references to the northern neighbour's hostile actions and attitudes on TV were

few and scattered. Even when Pakistan became a party to the war against the Soviet-supported regime in Afghanistan the enemy there did not receive special attention and PTV was content with reproducing the image that had been created by the West. This attitude was in continuation of the somewhat ill-defined policy adopted by the state media throughout the cold war period. Although Pakistan belonged to Western defence pacts and TV did sometimes present foreign features in which communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular were treated as enemies of the 'free world', it avoided relating these enemy sketches to Pakistani people's concerns.

Enemy images develop fully in periods of active and prolonged armed conflict, and even then the process takes time and requires definite planning. Pakistan has had three wars with India but each time the conflict was of short duration and one is not aware of any propaganda planning effort of the kind the Allies and the Axis powers made during the Second World War or even the strategies devised during the conflicts in Korea, Algeria and Vietnam. The enemy images created by parties to these conflicts had considerable material to draw upon in the form of the division of the world into occidental and oriental societies, colour distinctions and racial prejudices. No such material in developed form was available to Pakistani creators of the enemy image.

However, the fact that India has been consistently identified by the television as an enemy is not disputed. In its essays into history, India is identified as the party that was more hostile to the Pakistan demand than even the British. The war with India in 1965 took place at a time when Pakistan's television was less than a year old and it played a leading role in creating the image of the enemy against whom the patriotic forces were to be mobilised. Throughout the upheaval in the former East Pakistan considerable attention was given to India's contribution to it. And Kashmir has been

a perennial theme with the PTV, especially since the beginning of the people's uprising eight years ago. Out of all the enemy images Pakistani people have seen on the TV screen it is the treatment of India that merits attention in the present exercise.

In both substance and style the enemy image on TV is derived from the stereotypes of Muslims' adversaries in Urdu historical fiction and of villainish characters in sub-continental cinema. The main characteristic of 'us versus them' situations has traditionally been concentration on the assumption that we have always been in the right, that we have been more courageous than the adversary, and that the latter's chief weapons have been deceit and intrigue. The appeal has been to raw emotions rather than to reason. The purpose has been to perpetuate belief in the existence of an enemy instead of drawing up its complete portrait or presenting an analysis of the factors that propel the enemy to persist in its hostility to Pakistan.

Let us recall the 1965 conflict with India. Since the stereotyped enemy figure derived from the literary tradition was that of a scheming coward much attention was focussed on India's unannounced advance on Lahore in the darkness of the night. Other features of the enemy were to be derived by the public from what was said about ourselves. The Indians were said to have challenged the followers of Islam, hence they were primarily against our faith. Since our air force had dealt severe blows to the enemy air force and our army had halted its advance it followed we were not only better and braver fighters than the aggressor, we were also inspired by a loftier ideal than the latter. These assumptions furnished the basic approach to the enemy Pakistan fought in 1965. All that mattered was that there was an enemy out there at the borders and it was checked not only by the soldiers at the battlefront but also by a fully supportive population. It was not necessary to analyse the genesis of the conflict or the enemy's version of events or even the stakes in the conflict. This approach did not

help in drawing a full image of the enemy.

The difficulties in bringing the enemy in sharper focus during the conflict in the former East Pakistan were much greater than in 1965. Although India was identified as the real enemy the fact that till its direct intervention the force confronting the Pakistan regime comprised Pakistani Bengalis interfered with image-making efforts. And once war broke out between India and Pakistan attention was diverted to events on the battlefield or to speculation about rumoured plans for the western front and stories about non-existent initiatives by friendly states to such an extent that an adequate portrayal of the enemy lost priority.

In its treatment of the Kashmir dispute TV has attempted to project a somewhat fuller image of the enemy. In its current affairs programmes the emphasis is on India's reneging on a solemn pledge to allow a plebiscite in the disputed territory and on its defiance of the United Nations resolutions. It is assumed that the present-day audience is as familiar with the genesis of the Kashmir dispute as an average Pakistani was forty or fifty years ago and its appreciation of the UN resolutions has not been affected by its awareness of the world body's conduct over the years. Thus, what these programmes convey to the Pakistani audiences is the existence of an inveterate enemy that is engaged in wanton killing of Kashmiri nationalists, they do not enable them to realistically assess the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy.

In the history of conflicts between states and communities we find many effective uses of enemy images for arousing public emotions. In the most widely known examples, such as we saw during the second world war, or colonial campaigns to suppress liberation movements, such as in Algeria or Kenya, or during the cold war, the enemy was presented as a source of evil that threatened not only all the values of civilised human conduct one had established but also all the interests central to one's existence and prosperity. The enemy is to be hated to an

extent that no effort and sacrifice can be considered too great to combat it. Such an enemy cannot be presented as lacking in physical strength or resolve, but it must be shown lacking in respect for human and moral values. The effective enemy images have presented adversaries as monsters out to devour everything that is cherished by the other party. One has only to recall the images that expressions such as Algerian Moslem terrorists, Mau Mau, Vietcong guerrillas, and the Evil Empire conjured up to realise the effect enemy's portrayal in political rhetoric or media projection can produce.

For some reason that appears to be rooted in the peculiar way the history of communal conflict in South Asia has been recorded the enemy images we see on Pakistan television are drawn as caricatures. Whether the enemy is projected as a sly and devious disciple of Chanakya and whether his ritualistic display of belief is exposed as hypocritical the figure appears more ridiculous than it is menacing. Such figures have been seen in almost all the plays on Kashmir presented on Pakistan television, including the better productions offered by Shahzad Khalil and Shahid Mahmud. They cannot produce the desired effect because no community can be persuaded to fight an enemy to the bitter end if it invites laughter instead of sizzling hatred.

Creation of enemy-images is not wholly a matter of trading assumptions and old myths. The task demands crafting of an all-embracing myth about the enemy. The marks of identification are given the widest possible currency so that a single epithet is sufficient to open the whole enemy image in the mind of the target audience. But the use of such expressions cannot be limited to situations obtaining at the time of their coinage; they need to be related to changing realities on the ground. When the liberated part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir was named Azad Kashmir and the rest of the territory given the name of Indian-occupied Kashmir the basis for an easily identifiable enemy-image was laid but there

the process stopped. Our image-makers have not been adequately successful in developing terminology that must accompany an enemy-image.

The art of demonising an enemy demands that the authors of the exercise should be free, or at least believed to be free, of the blemishes for which the adversary is attacked. The second world war allies could not have succeeded in projecting the Axis as enemies of democracy without demonstrating their own adherence to the principles of democracy. Nor could they assail the adversary's designs to subjugate the entire humankind without shifting from their imperialist concepts and promising freedom to the colonies. In this business the kettle's blaming the pot does not work.

It is worth considering that Pakistan TV's attempts to create the image of an enemy lacking democratic principles or a serious commitment to secularism or a practical denial of guarantees to minorities might have failed to move the audience at home because of the absence of a better record on its own side. Perhaps our image-makers could have been more effective if we had banished from our midst the evil we saw in the other camp. Nothing illustrates this point better than the use by Pakistan TV of dispatches on atrocities in Kashmir from a Srinagar-based Muslim reporter. Public awareness that this reporter was enjoying freedom to an extent his counterparts on our side apparently did not have could not fit in with the scheme of producing an enemy-image.

Pakistan television's capacity to project convincing enemy-images has also been affected by its lack of credibility, by the public belief that it has been used both to suppress truth and disseminate not only half truths but also pure fiction. In a country where for long years the ordinary citizens learnt more about events at home from foreign radio and television channels than national networks, the television has had to function under an insuperable handicap. Thus it certainly has played its part in sustaining the stereotype of the enemy

created by literature and the print media and strengthening this image. However, the translation of the enemy image found in words, which leaves much to the reader's imagination, into a visual expression, which leaves nothing to the viewer's imagination, carries risks as well as advantages. The visual image to be effective has to be far more convincing than the one drawn in printed words. Lack of production resources have added to Pakistan television's difficulties, which have only partially been reduced by access to clippings from outside TV coverage of the enemy's atrocities in Kashmir. Pakistan television apparently does not realise that in the past the people could find some support for its enemy images from their own experience, the new generation does not have this back-up facility.

Today Pakistan television's exercises in image-making, of enemies as well as friends, cannot remain unaffected by the global revolution in mass communication. Fax, E-mail and satellite dishes have to a large extent demolished the barriers to the flow of information that traditionally played a fundamental role in the art of creators of enemy images anywhere in the world. In this game the better developed and more resourceful image-makers surely have an advantage over less resourceful media apparatuses but Pakistan television falls in the latter category and not in the former. The effectiveness of its image-making efforts are bound to decline.

This prospect is quite welcome to peace activists with whom the present writer unreservedly identifies himself. No-one should gloss over the fact that when a community is driven by hate, which is what enemy images are created for, and demonises a rival or competitor, to a great extent it strays from the path of rational thinking and fruitful endeavour, and eventually demonises itself. It may even start justifying concepts and practices for which the enemy is assailed. This is precisely what happened during the Second War when each side deliberately indulged in atrocities against both combatants

and civilian populations on the other side on the ground that this was what was being done to it. One hopes that in the on-going development in the field of mass communication all nations will have opportunities of recognising each other as they are and not in forms created by privileged myth-makers. The more ineffective get the enemy-images on television drawn by hacks belonging to one group or the other the better will be the prospects of peace and sanity.

Nuclear Enemies

A. H. Nayyar

The half century old conflict between India and Pakistan became violent on three occasions. Two of the wars were fought over the still unresolved dispute of Kashmir, and the third over the independence of Bangladesh. Each time the level of violence was worse than before. This process now threatens massive destruction of both countries because of the nuclear weapons they have acquired. The object of this essay is to look at the way nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan have built on earlier senses of who the enemy was, shaped views on what the respective nuclear weapons are for, and create obstacles to eliminating them.

It has to be said at the outset that in this kind of discussion it is important not to conflate the views and fears of ordinary people with those of military leaders, and politicians, or some notion of a national view. But, in both India and Pakistan, there are few ways of accurately assessing how people in large numbers feel about themselves and each other, and how they think about their security, and their fears. History certainly sheds some light, but this often only tells the story of how political and military leaders think. Opinion polls also offer insight, as do public debates, but they too largely reflect elite opinion. Most of the time, the overwhelming majority of

people in both countries are excluded from history, from polls, from informing public debates, and from making decisions.

With this note of caution, it can be said that Indians and Pakistanis have been deeply suspicious of each other for decades. Each regards the other as a source of insecurity. The fears of Pakistanis are based upon their perception that:

(i) India has never accepted Pakistan's existence, and is doing all it can to undo Pakistan;

(ii) Pakistan has been wronged in the matter of Kashmir, and it has an obligation and a right to support efforts to free Kashmir from Indian rule.

The Indian perceptions fuelling the fears are:

(i) Pakistan is a constant threat to the integrity of India because it extends support to separatist movements in India;

ii) India is poised for an important role in the world politics, and Pakistan is being used to tie it down.

The difference in attitudes in the two countries is also reflected in the way they conducted their foreign policies during the fifty years of their existence India had a strong non-aligned and self-reliant attitude, while Pakistan, seeing the world through an India-shaped lens, and in the face of severe internal weakness, opted to align itself with military powers, taking their dictation even on domestic issues.

The existence of such fears and concerns is at the root of the continuing conflict between India and Pakistan, and because a vast majority of the public in the two states supports nuclear weapons, the conflict assumes potentially fatal proportions.

Nuclear History

The story of the nuclearisation of South Asia is also a story of Indian ambitions for modernisation and Pakistan's

paranoiac efforts to catch up. It is also cloaked in secrecy. The story begins with a brilliant Indian physicist named Homi Jahangir Bhabha persuading his friend, Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru, to make a heavy national investment in nuclear technology. Bhabha, who had already earned a name for himself in the world of physics, was at the University of Cambridge when many of his contemporaries there were involved in the early research on nuclear energy and the atomic bomb. Bhabha succeeded in planting the nuclear seed in India, in part, because of the use of nuclear weapons by the US at the end of World War II. This use of a revolutionary new technology marked the emergence of the US as a major world power and, in line with the general thinking of the nationalists to see the newly independent India progress rapidly and acquire the best and most advanced technology, offered a goal for India to aim at.

The first step in this direction was the establishment of an Indian Atomic Energy Department in 1948, the subsequent purchase of a nuclear research reactor, APSARA, in 1956, and the purchase of the first power reactor for making electricity from the USA in 1964. These were followed by a few other research and power reactors bought in the late sixties. Eventually, India started to produce its own reactors by duplicating those it had purchased. At the same time, India also purchased a reprocessing plant which was used to extract plutonium from the burnt fuel from its CIRUS research reactor. This plutonium was used in the nuclear explosion test conducted in Pokharan in 1974.

Over the years, India has built up a sizeable nuclear complex - from uranium and thorium mining to fuel fabrication, to indigenously produced research and power reactors, to plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment -- everything it needs to produce large numbers of nuclear weapons. It is believed that India already either possesses, or has the capability to make, 80 to 100 nuclear weapons of the

kind that the US used to destroy Nagasaki in 1945. It has successfully defied international pressures, mostly from the USA, and continues to produce a variety of fissile materials and is believed to be working on more advanced designs of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan's quest for nuclear technology was a little slower for two major reasons: (i) it lacked a scientific base, and (ii) it was not led by such aggressive nationalists as Nehru or Bhabha. Rather than take decisions for itself, it simply tagged along behind India. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was established almost a decade after the establishment of India's Atomic Energy Department. Lacking a scientist of Bhabha's talents and outlook, the man Pakistan put in charge was Nazir Ahmad, a former Chairman of the Cotton Committee of Pakistan, and ex-director of the Indian Cotton Textile Institute. As time went on, Pakistan purchased first its research reactor and then a power reactor in the 1960s. In each case the time lag between the steps taken by India and corresponding steps taken by Pakistan was at most a few years to a decade.

While there may have been some discussion about trying to make nuclear weapons for Pakistan during and after the 1965 war with India, the pursuit of nuclear weapons really began after the defeat in the 1971 war. A meeting was called in Multan in 1972 by the then President, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, to plan an all-out effort to produce nuclear weapons, ostensibly for the Islamic world, but actually to counter growing Indian military strength. It is believed that this meeting was inspired by the renowned Pakistani physicist Abdus Salam who, as the Chief Science Advisor to the President, was playing the role that Bhabha had played in India.

Pakistan decided to build its own research reactor of the CIRUS type to produce plutonium and entered into an agreement with France for a reprocessing plant. But, when France backed out of the deal under pressure from the USA,

Pakistan chose to construct on its own an ultra-centrifuge uranium enrichment plant based on the blueprints brought by A. Q. Khan from URENCO in Holland. After an immense investment of resources and effort, sometime between 1985 and 1988 Pakistan succeeded in producing highly enriched uranium (HEU), the only material other than plutonium that can be used to make a nuclear weapon. The enrichment plant continued to produce HEU until around 1991 when, again under intense USA pressures, it started to produce only lower grade uranium, which can not be used to weapons. It is believed that in the meantime, the country had produced somewhere between 200 and 250 kg of HEU, sufficient to make eight to ten simple nuclear weapons. It is possible however to convert the low grade uranium still being produced into weapons grade material within a matter of weeks, and so double the number of nuclear weapons Pakistan can make.

The above story shows three things:

(a) The two countries had different reasons for opting for nuclear capabilities;

(b) Pakistan's program has been reactive to India's;

(c) Pakistan has shown a greater susceptibility to international pressures, while India has maintained an independent posture.

Nuclear Fears

There is some recent opinion poll data that helps clarify how the elite thinks about their respective nuclear programmes in India[1] and Pakistan.[2] The people questioned were

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1 D. Cortright and A. Mattoo; *India and the Bomb - Public Opinion and Nuclear Options*, University of Notre Dame Press, 1996

2 S. Ahmad and D. Cortright; *Pakistan and the Bomb - Public Opinion and Nuclear Options*, University of Notre Dame Press, 1998

academics, doctors, lawyers, journalists, social workers, artists, civil servants, politicians, business people, and representatives of the armed forces and police. On the basis of their opinions they can be divided into three categories: there are nuclear advocates or hawks (32% of the total in Pakistan, and 33% in India), supporters of the official government policy of their country (61% of the total in Pakistan and 57% in India), and the nuclear opponents or doves (6% of the total in Pakistan and 8% in India).

The clearest expressions of who the enemy is can be found in the opinions of the nuclear hawks. In the case of India, one obvious enemy is Pakistan; 57% of the people who thought India should further develop its nuclear weapons said the threat came from a nuclear Pakistan. But, surprisingly, only 20% of the hawks cite China as a threat. There was, in fact, greater concern (27%) about threats from other nuclear powers, i.e. the Western powers, with which India has no recent history of war. Other answers to this question of why India should further develop its nuclear weapons increase the importance of this response. 49% of the Indian hawks wanted nuclear weapons as a means to improve India's bargaining power in world affairs, and 38% wanted the weapons to enhance India's international standing. Taking these together suggests that Indian nationalism, linked to the struggle for independence from centuries of colonial subjugation, and nurtured for half a century, has now become assertive.

Pakistan's hawks offer almost no surprises. All of those questioned said that the threat from India was sufficient reason for Pakistan to develop its nuclear weapons. The only additional reasons offered were from those (3%) who wanted nuclear weapons to increase Pakistan's bargaining power in the world, and the 1% who thought nuclear weapons would enhance Pakistan's international status. Another 1% regard the other nuclear powers as a threat against which Pakistan needs nuclear weapons. The one surprise, for some people, is that

not a single supporter of nuclear weapons felt that protecting and enhancing the security of the Islamic world was a reason for Pakistan to have nuclear weapons. All these responses clearly indicate that Pakistani nuclear nationalism is defined in unique opposition to India.

These ideas about who the enemy is can be found in the responses the nuclear hawks have to a question about what kind of nuclear arsenal India and Pakistan should develop. The largest proportion (35%) of the Indian hawks said they would like an Indian arsenal to be able to strike anywhere in the world, and large enough to be usable against the other nuclear weapons states, i.e. they want a superpower nuclear arsenal. Less than 20% wanted an arsenal capable only of attacking China, and only 12% wanted India to restrict itself to being able to attack Pakistan. In contrast, 96% of the Pakistani hawks said a nuclear arsenal able to attack India was sufficient.

The global view of Indian hawks and the local view of Pakistani hawks finds an echo in those, in both countries, who claim to support the official policy of their respective government. When they were asked what circumstances would justify developing nuclear weapons, the responses were broadly similar to those of the hawks. The largest number of Indian respondents, 52%, said that threats from the nuclear powers would be sufficient justification for India pursuing its own nuclear weapons programme. This was slightly more than those who said that Pakistan testing a nuclear weapon would offer a justification. Those who support official nuclear policy in Pakistan saw justification for developing nuclear weapons if India carried out another nuclear explosion (85%), or if India deployed its Prithvi or Agni missiles (72%). Slightly more than one-third of the official policy supporters thought an increase in Indian conventional military strength would justify a nuclear response.

The single most significant difference between elite opinion in the two countries is about when nuclear weapons

could be used. A very large fraction (44%) of those questioned in the Indian poll said that India could never use nuclear weapons. But only 1% in Pakistan thought the same way. There seems to be an overwhelming opinion among the Pakistani elite (98%) that Pakistan could use nuclear weapons if India were about to attack Pakistan across the international border. This opinion was held by almost all the hawks, official supporters, and the doves. In marked contrast, only 33% of the Indian elite thought India could use nuclear weapons if Pakistan were about to take over Kashmir.

There is, however, some small room for optimism. Nuclear doves are obviously a minority in both India and Pakistan, with less than 10% support among the respective elites. But, a significant minority, 13%, of those who support official Indian policy on nuclear weapons said that there were no circumstances that would justify India going nuclear. In Pakistan, a surprising 16% of such people felt there were no circumstances that would justify Pakistan actually going ahead and developing its nuclear weapons. This would suggest that around 20% of the elite in both countries sees no real circumstances that would justify further development of nuclear weapons.

There is enormous support among elites in both countries for an international agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons. The difference however is when they think it will happen, or even if it will happen. Half of those questioned in Pakistan thought a nuclear treaty would be signed within five years, and a further 39% thought it would be signed within ten years. Only 2% thought it would never be signed. In India, there seems to be much greater scepticism. Only 22% think that an international treaty will be signed within five years, and somewhat more think it will happen within ten years. The largest group, over a third of those questioned, think it will never happen.

This support for eliminating nuclear weapons is tempered

with a sense of what else may be required for Pakistan and India to feel safe without nuclear weapons. Less than half of those questioned in India thought that a time-bound plan for global nuclear disarmament would be reason enough for India to renounce its nuclear weapons. Almost 20% of them thought there were no circumstances within which India could give up its nuclear weapons. In Pakistan, nuclear disarmament by India was not enough, large sections of the elite (over two-thirds) want a final settlement on Kashmir, and about half want a reduction in India's conventional arms superiority, as conditions for Pakistan to give up its nuclear weapons.

Implications

Having established their respective nuclear capabilities, there is now a nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan. Both admit to being able to make nuclear weapons, but deny having made them. But, if neither state has weapons, yet can make them whenever it wants, the questions are when would they make them and how would they use them. There are no definitive answers to these questions, only suggestions and implications.

India's nuclear weapons are it seems meant to establish some kind of parity with the major nuclear powers and achieve a greater role in global affairs. They are not Pakistan-specific. As a doctrine India may have decided to use nuclear weapons against any country - be it Pakistan or any other nuclear weapon states - that uses or threatens to use nuclear weapons against it. Whether Indian nuclear weapons will be used if there is no nuclear threat is not clear. India may use its nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the superior conventional force of the superpowers.

Pakistan's nuclear strategy is relatively simple. Since the threat comes from India alone, and since Pakistan's conventional defence is unable to match India in such forces, Pakistan's nuclear weapons will be used to prevent an Indian

venture across the border. This Pakistani thinking can be spelled out a little more: if in any future war we find that our forces are losing ground, we shall not hesitate to use what nuclear weapons we have. They may be few, but they will surely cause damage that cannot be acceptable to you. We also know that you have a much larger stock of nuclear weapons, and you can inflict much worse damage on us, but destruction is preferable to capitulation.

An obvious consequence of nuclear deterrence has been an increase in proxy wars across the border. Both the countries have increased support, military and otherwise, to dissident and separatist movements in each other's territory. Pakistan has been more of an adventurer in this respect. Assuming that India is sufficiently deterred from initiating a full-scale military response, Pakistan has gone all the way in supporting separatist movements, first in the Indian Punjab and now in Kashmir. India on the other hand is known to have provided sanctuaries and support to groups in rural Sindh and in Karachi.

Nuclear deterrence has thus increased the level of tension between the two countries. On at least two occasions in the last decade they came very close to the breaking point. Some reports insist that Pakistan on one of these occasions actually moved and loaded their nuclear arsenal in preparation for a nuclear attack. The two countries are now involved in a race to build longer range missiles, which could carry nuclear weapons. The short time of five minutes or so for these missiles to reach targets makes this development extremely dangerous. The short time leads to much greater tension, and the need for much quicker responses to any incident, both of which dramatically increase the chances of making a mistake. Any mistake would prove catastrophic for the region.

Efforts to resolve this dangerous situation are stalled. The nuclear diplomacy of the two countries also reflects their differing security perceptions. Although it has the distinction of proposing several major international disarmament

measures, such as the nuclear test ban treaty (now called the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) and a treaty to stop the production of nuclear weapons, India refuses to sign any international nuclear weapons agreements unless the nuclear weapon states give a firm commitment to eliminate all nuclear weapons within a set time. India has also persistently refused to participate in any regional de-nuclearisation effort. This looks like a principled stand for achieving a world free of nuclear weapons, but detractors prefer to see it as a way for India to buy time in which to increase its military strength and fulfil the dream of superpower status.

Pakistan's eyes, on the other hand, remain firmly focused on India. Its position in international arms control negotiations is to support every treaty that comes along in principle, but refuse to sign it unless India does. In this way, Pakistan has found an easy solution to a dilemma, how to ease international pressure on its nuclear program on the one hand, and keep a nuclear deterrent against India on the other. This solution however amounts to giving up any initiative. It is a policy that can only remain viable as long as India and the nuclear weapons states remain locked in their own dispute.

The situation appears to be intractable; Pakistan will not move till India moves and India will not move till the nuclear powers move. One solution is to speed up the process of global nuclear disarmament by exerting sufficient pressure on the nuclear weapon states. This is a task that must be accomplished in any case, irrespective of what happens in S. Asia. There are several strong international movements trying to push the nuclear powers in this direction, but they remain adamant. There is a determination, especially in the US, to retain nuclear weapons for the indefinite future. As long as this attitude continues, there is no possibility of India renouncing its nuclear weapons and without that Pakistan will not do that either.

On the other hand, India must also realise that its sheer

size and strength evokes a deep fear in Pakistan. In such a situation, it should expect only two responses. Either Pakistan capitulates to Indian hegemony, or the mad race goes on unabated on the two sides, until Pakistan collapses - as it surely will. Given the fatalistic attitude that Pakistanis have adopted, the first possibility seems rather remote. The alternative, the collapse of Pakistan, would create a massive crisis that India would find impossible to handle.

There is a third possibility, or rather a hope. It is within the means of India to take unilateral steps that would help assuage fears in Pakistani minds. India could declare that it would under no circumstances use nuclear weapons first in any conflict with Pakistan. It could stop the deployment of its Prithvi and Agni missiles. It could remove its armed forces several hundred miles away from the border with Pakistan and create a unilaterally demilitarised zone. There are many other possibilities. India needs to assure Pakistan that it has no hegemonic ambitions in the region. A less fearful Pakistan always to India's good.

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For the publication of this book, Mashal is specially thankful to *Konrad Adenauer Stiftung* for its financial support.

It is increasingly common to ask whether Pakistan will survive its next fifty years? Of course it will, for the land and the people who live on it shall always remain. The real question is: will we survive with or without dignity, and if the former then how?

Mashal has held a number of discussions in Lahore and Islamabad on Issues of Peace and Conflict in Pakistani Society. This book is the outcome of a seminar to which thoughtful people of intellect and integrity were invited for a discussion for two days in Islamabad.

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